Who Holds the Strategic High Ground? The Meaning of the Harsh Words between US and China

Published in UDN
(Taiwan) on 27 July 2021
by Chang Ching (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Jennifer Sampson. Edited by Michelle Bisson.
After numerous holdups, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman finally visited China. Before her trip, both countries had continuously engaged in bad-mouthing each other, which cast a shadow over the visit early on. In the end, as expected, when Sherman met with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng, neither showed good will during the meeting. In fact, it could be described as a showdown between the two powers, who each arrived rebuking the other. Where is the meaning in all of this? How should we interpret the current situation?

Deng Xiaoping once described the unique nature of the relationship between Beijing and Washington as being unable to be great, but also unable to be terrible. The disparity in strength, however, between the two sides when Deng was in power cannot be compared with what it is today. Although China’s growth in strength has reduced the disparity between the two countries, based on measures of change, it has not reversed their strengths or hit the point that would invert their basic structure. This must be kept carefully in mind when watching the two powers confront each other.

While China and the U.S. are not getting along well and are in conflict over many issues, they still must find a space in which to mutually adapt and coexist. This is the current reality that Beijing and Washington need both to acknowledge and accept. On the international stage, the U.S. has used propaganda to whip up public opinion, launching a swift and fierce attack. On the surface, it occupies the moral high ground. In reality, however, can the U.S. use this to command a strategic high ground that will compel Beijing to give in? The answer is no.

Effective strategies worry opponents, while ineffective strategies only make them happy. Whether Washington wants to adopt confrontational methods when facing Beijing or maintain a competitive stance, it should consider two factors: how much room for winning can be obtained at most, and does the U.S. have the capital to lose?

Engaging in a power struggle requires not only the ability to strike others, but more importantly, the ability to endure the fight. Donald Trump's administration began a trade war with China, and the U.S. has continually and bombastically adopted methods to increase pressure by raising tariffs. However, now that these measures have been in place for a while, China has proven that it can endure this trade war. In fact, statistical trade figures from both sides prove that the U.S. has been incapable of making China capitulate.

As we observe the rivalry, we might as well consider: If their relationship can be worked out, what actual benefits can Washington gain, and on what issues might Beijing be willing to concede? If both powers arrive at an impasse, what kind of losses will Beijing incur? And at what point might Washington hit a wall? That Beijing and Washington have engaged in openly rebuking each other proves that the incentive each has for working out how to interact is no match for the need to make a strong statement that will satisfy domestic political demands.

Sending a high-profile deputy secretary of state to Tianjin showed America’s desire to strive for harmonious channels of communication. At the same time as the meeting, however, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin was visiting Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines. The main part of America’s foreign policy is obviously to create a perimeter around the South China Sea, drawing a common battle line from which to deal with Beijing. Washington has never concealed this two-pronged strategy, so naturally Beijing was not thrilled.

Although Beijing and Washington are not close allies, Beijing does intend to maintain a mutually beneficial, stable relationship. However, both sides have let the relationship devolve into its current state. In “Bitter Love,” the most iconic work of scar literature (a genre depicting the suffering during the Cultural Revolution), author Bai Hua writes, “If we are comrades, battle companions and compatriots, why must you try to ensnare me? If you plan to shackle me, why bother to smile at me? If you plan to stab me in the back, why bother to embrace me?” Unfortunately, this portrays Beijing’s current helplessness as it confronts Washington.

Beijing will not fail to understand that, in terms of the disparity in strength between both sides, it by no means can replace Washington’s international standing. Moreover, Beijing has no strength, or intention, of assuming that standing, as it is not powerful enough to maintain the international social order. Washington also clearly understands that Beijing has no interest in challenging its leadership position on the global stage and only wants to obtain fair and reasonable treatment. Why, then, is Washington still being so imperious? Has Joe Biden’s team overestimated its odds of success?

Through political calculations, Beijing has compared the gains and losses from compromising or conflicting with the U.S. Since the showdown in Alaska, no matter how strongly Washington has attacked on the fronts of public opinion and propaganda, in the end, after all the twists and turns, Sherman put on a brave front and arrived swinging in Tianjin.

When all is said and done, where is Washington’s bottom line? When China will not accept defeat, will Washington have another opportunity to celebrate a victory?


誰的「戰略高地」?中美罵戰玄機何在

美國副國務卿薛曼(Wendy R. Sherman)經過波折總算出訪大陸,雙方在其啟程前不斷較勁放話,早就讓此行蒙上重重陰影,結果不出所料,在與大陸副外長謝峰會談時,真是會無好會、砲聲隆隆,誠可謂是兩強對決,搞成雙方罵戰登場,其中玄機何在?應當如何解讀目前狀況?

鄧小平曾以「中美關係好也好不到哪裡去,壞也壞不到哪裡去」,來形容北京與華盛頓雙邊關係特殊性質。儘管就鄧小平主政時,當時雙方實力差距,與今日當然不可同日而語;但就中國大陸實力成長,拉近雙方差距之量變過程觀察,其實並未到達顛覆雙方實力,翻轉對比基本架構之質變點。這亦是在觀察兩強對決時,必須審慎注意之重點所在。

雙方關係不睦,在諸多議題上存在矛盾,但又必須找到相互適應共同生存空間,這亦是北京與華盛頓都必須承認與接受之現實狀況。華盛頓在國際宣傳營造輿論發動凌厲攻勢,在表面上是佔領「道德制高點」(moral high ground),但實際上能否藉此掌握到能讓北京不得不就範之「戰略高地」(strategic highland),其實答案是否定的。

有效策略會使對手憂心,無效策略只讓自己開心;華盛頓在面對北京,不論是要採取衝突手段,抑或是保持競爭態勢,其實都要思考兩個要素,最多能夠獲得多少「贏的空間」,並且更要思考本身是否具有「輸的本錢」。

強權對決不但是要有打人本事,更重要的是耐得起打。川普政府在貿易戰場上與中國大陸開戰,雖然不斷高調採取提升關稅無限施壓手段,但經過具體實踐後,中國大陸在貿易戰中,證明出本身相當耐得起打,各項雙方貿易統計數字,亦證明華盛頓無法讓北京俯首稱臣。

從旁觀察雙方對決較勁,不妨思考雙方關係要是搞得好,華盛頓能夠獲得那些實際利益,北京又願意在何處讓步?兩個強權要是搞僵,北京又會產生何種損失?而華盛頓將會在何處碰壁扼腕?北京與華盛頓雙方會搞到公開罵戰交鋒,其實證明雙方搞好互動關係誘因,顯然不敵必須強勢表態滿足內部政治消費需求。

美國派出副國務卿高調到天津表示要爭取溝通協調管道,但在此同時美國國防部長奧斯汀卻同時出訪新加坡、越南與菲律賓,整個對外政策基調,顯然就是要在南海周邊佈局,建立對付北京共同陣線。華盛頓亦對此種兩手策略從不掩飾,自然北京也不會拿出什麼好臉色。

儘管北京與華盛頓並非志同道合盟友,但北京確實有意維持互利穩定關係;但雙方搞成這樣,中國大陸文革後傷痕文學最具代表性作品,白樺所著《苦戀》:「既然是同志、戰友、同胞,何必要給我設下圈套?既然你打算為我戴上鐐銬,又何必對我面帶微笑?既然你準備從我背後插刀,又何必把我擁抱?」恐怕是北京目前面對華盛頓,最無奈之內心寫照。

北京不會不理解,就目前雙方實力差距來說,北京絕無可能取代華盛頓之國際社會地位,同時北京亦無力更無意去承擔,其實力所無法維護之國際社會秩序。華盛頓亦是明確理解北京無意挑戰其國際舞臺領袖地位,只是希望獲得公平合理待遇,但為何華盛頓還是要如此咄咄逼人?拜登團隊是否還是過度高估其勝算呢?

北京經過政治精算,對比與美國妥協與衝突所能產生之損益,顯然從阿拉斯加攤牌至今,不論華盛頓在輿論宣傳戰線上如何強勢出擊,到最後不論如何波折,副國務卿薛曼都還是硬著頭皮到天津去面對罵戰砲火。

華盛頓究竟底線在何處?當北京不會吞下華盛頓所端出之罰酒時,華盛頓還有機會再端出敬酒嗎?
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