3 Common Misconceptions about the Ukrainian Crisis

The Ukrainian crisis is propagating several common misconceptions based on an interpretation of history that requires nuance; three assertions in particular that distort our judgment on the issue. If we must not unduly exaggerate the threat this crisis poses, we must also not sink into a state of complacency either.

If Only NATO Had Not Expanded

Some place a great deal of blame for the crisis on NATO. If NATO’s open door policy had not been in place since the mid-1990s, then we would not be here, they say, because Russia would feel reassured, not betrayed. However, that’s a myth that belies the record. The record shows that Russia knew expansion was unavoidable and that expansion was the choice of Eastern European countries. Up until Vladimir Putin rewrote history, the false promise of “not one inch eastward,” made at the time of German reunification in 1990, had nothing to do with a guarantee to never include the dozen or so countries that have joined since. At the time, there was no question of isolating Russia.

First Boris Yeltsin, then Putin publicly expressed interest in joining the organization, but each time they rejected the idea. Russia nonetheless agreed to participate in group initiatives such as the NATO-Russia Council, created in 1997 in order to set guidelines for cooperation.* Putin, on the other hand, gradually dismantled what was gained at the end of the Cold War, fearing the spread of democracy much more than the spread of Western security in Eurasia. This attitude explains why he invaded Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. These countries have incurred Moscow’s wrath because Putin wants to preserve Russia’s influence — its authoritarian and colonialist vision — on those countries which are “near abroad.”

The fact remains that not only is NATO membership a free choice for these countries to make for populations that strongly support membership, but it was also Brussels that, in 2008, gave Kyiv and Tbilisi a helping hand, worried that Russia wanted revenge. Revisiting this decision to expand would be a huge mistake and would give Putin the veto power he so fervently seeks, as in the days of the Soviet Union. That’s to say nothing of his eccentric demand that NATO withdraw its forces and bases from certain Eastern European countries.

If Only the United States Weren’t Panicking

Some think that the America (and Canada) are overreacting and giving in to panic. Has NATO become the aggressor and Russia the victim of its militarism? Panic does not inform decisions very well. But is it really about panic? Or is it more about the fear of losing all credibility when it comes to threats of retaliation against Putin’s military pressures? After Putin invaded Georgia and Crimea, who can rule out an incursion into Ukraine? Deterrence is thus essential in order to increase the cost to Putin of taking military action and to avoid a repeat of 2008 and 2014 in Ukraine. We could look at this another way: Maybe Putin is the one being taken for a ride, having underestimated the Biden administration’s reaction. Maybe the panic is not where we think it is.

What’s more, Western disinformation regarding the build-up of Russian troops at the Ukrainian border has absolutely nothing to do with disinformation we saw regarding the alleged weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003 — we can see the satellite images of the Russian troops. As for President Joe Biden, he cannot sit still in the face of a possible Russian invasion, in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pundits would quickly criticize America for its inept diplomacy. American leadership is indispensable for managing the crisis, because the messages that Biden’s decisions will send have a decisive impact on the reputation of the United States with respect to other events, such as China’s threat to Taiwan. In short, where some see panic in Washington, others instead see a real awakening to the seriousness of the crisis and its consequences.

If Only Ukraine Were Neutral

What are the available ways out of this crisis? A diplomatic solution remains the best option, provided that America‘s response satisfies Russia’s demands, which is unlikely. A moratorium on Ukraine joining NATO is possible, if the Donbass region is also demilitarized. (Some 14,000 people have died there since 2014.) It is also conceivable that China or Hungary could quietly mediate the situation, or that there could be a suspension of hostilities and postponement of any resolution.

At the same time, a proposal that Kyiv declare neutrality, as Austria did in 1955, is far-fetched for two reasons. On the one hand, the context is completely different today. Large powers at the time may have imposed neutrality on the Austrians, but the Ukrainians would never agree to it. We are no longer in the Cold War era when large powers decided the fate of lesser powers without their say.

On the other hand, Ukraine was in fact neutral from 1992 to 2008, and it is not clear that this status helped in its search for security. Let’s remember that in 1994, Kyiv agreed to give Moscow its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees from Russia. Russia was supposed to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity. (If it could have predicted the future, perhaps Kyiv would have held onto those weapons.) It is ironic to admit that neutrality is now being questioned by countries as peaceful as Sweden and Finland, which have been neutral for decades and are now considering membership in NATO.

Imagine what the pundits would say if Donald Trump had amassed 100,000 troops along the Eastern Canadian border, threatening to invade Quebec or Ontario in order to acquire a portion of territory that the U.S. historically believed to be its own! In all likelihood, we would have panicked and looked for any means of deterring Washington (perhaps calling on Paris, London, Beijing, NATO or the U.N. for help?), and we would have convinced absolutely no one about the merits of neutrality in the face of such a threat.

*Editor’s Note: The NATO-Russia Council was established in May 2002 and was meant to build on the goals and principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, considered the formal basis for NATO-Russia relations.