Expert Eye: Ukraine Is a Foregone Conclusion. Watch for a Grand US About-Face
Published in United Daily News
(Taiwan) on 2 March 2022
by Yang Ying-chao (link to original)
Despite indications of an uptick in fighting in Ukraine [since the beginning of March], the country’s fate was sealed from the moment the Russian military invaded and declared its nuclear forces on high alert. Ukraine will lose territory once again and become a buffer zone between Russia and the West.
For Taiwan, the next point to watch will be how quickly the United States can free itself from its sanctions against Russia, as the speed with which it does so will be indicative of the firmness of its resolve in containing the Chinese Communist Party. Furthermore, like it or loathe it, the Taiwanese should be thinking about what the prospect of Finlandization* could mean for Taiwan.
The reason for calling Ukraine a foregone conclusion is that it is in the interests of the United States, China and Russia to create a tense but noncombative situation in Europe; Ukraine’s vulnerability and burgeoning status as a buffer zone fulfill this requirement. For the United States, Ukraine historically falls within the former Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, at a time when it would have been difficult for the United States to confront both the USSR and the Chinese Communist Party. Now that the United States’ influence has waned, it will inevitably want to prevent China and Russia from entering into any long-term alliance.
Based on this premise, it is wholly unrealistic to see the United States insisting on an Indo-Pacific strategy on the one hand, while attempting to bring down Russia through war and international sanctions on the other. The expulsion of specific Russian banks from the SWIFT payment system raises the question as to why, in the past, the United States has gone to the trouble of only sanctioning Hong Kong officials and terrorists through U.S. banks or banks that do business with them. It could also lead to China and Russia forging closer economic ties, something that probably will not take long to be implemented.
In addition, the United States wants a European Union that is united beneath it and willing to share the cost of military spending. After the Cold War, their attitudes toward Russia diverged. During Donald Trump’s presidency, France and Germany were repeatedly asked to raise military spending, but Chancellor Angela Merkel kept the defense budget consistently below 2% of the gross domestic product. Several days into the war between Russia and Ukraine, countries including Germany and France have taken uniform steps to resist Russia; more importantly, Germany has announced that it will substantially increase its military spending, putting more than 2% of its GDP into defense and immediately investing 100 billion euros into upgrading its military equipment.
Since a well-oiled global economy is in the Chinese Communist Party’s interest, the tense situation in Europe may distract the United States, which will be able to make use of the opportunity to expand its influence, but the situation must not get out of hand. Here we can see the recent narrative out of Beijing, namely that the crisis in Ukraine has pushed Russia to the front line of conflict with the West, and that the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to finally take a back seat again will create a post-9/11 strategic buffer period, which will once more play out in its favor.
During this period, other than the countries involved looking to the Chinese Communist Party for support, we also note that when Josep Borrell Fontelles, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, called Beijing, apart from discussing the situation in Ukraine and confirming the agenda for this year’s meeting between European and Chinese leaders, the Chinese Communist Party seized the opportunity to pressure the EU into urging Lithuania to return as soon as possible to the “proper track of the One China principle.”
Given the determination of the aforementioned powers and the limits of U.S. power, we can almost be certain that the situation in Ukraine will run its course, and that the United States will have to make a strategic choice. The recent series of favorable developments in Ukraine, including news of its formal application for EU membership, are merely political moves to raise the bar in negotiations.
For Taiwan, several subsequent developments will be worthy of attention: First, how soon the United States withdraws its sanctions against Russia. The longer the United States drags out the issue of Russian sanctions, the more difficult it will be to deal with the Chinese Communist Party. The stalemate in the war is a test of the United States’ strategic wisdom, and Joe Biden’s sudden sending of a delegation to Taiwan is a sign of his strategic intent.
Second, pay attention to the Finnish model: The realities of international politics have never been shifted by the wills of small countries. Although the Ukrainians had insights into their larger neighbor’s way of thinking, they still insisted on pushing NATO membership through their constitution, leading to the bitter consequences seen today. Ultimately, they will have to conform to Russia’s will. This is similar to the experience of Finland in the 1930s, which was first taught a lesson by the USSR, before being “Finlandized” during the Cold War.
The world has long been at peace and forgotten the suffering of war, and even Finland is showing signs of relaxing. However, to paraphrase our National Defense Minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng: Is there ever a time when the situation in the Taiwan Strait is not tense? We must think about how to deal with war.
Of course, forewarned is forearmed, but it is not a bad thing to have other options. In the past, it was argued that bending the knee over issues of sovereignty would not bring about peace. Notwithstanding the fact that this debate continues to the present day, has sovereignty been lost? Or alternatively, which of Taiwan’s parties has lost more of Taiwan’s sovereignty while in power? The point of Finlandization is not whether bending the knee can bring about peace, but rather that small countries do not actively draw fire in the game of the great powers: The important thing is to stay the course. The Ukraine crisis reminds us that, for the great powers, there are so many strategic points to fight over. Should we prioritize the low-profile neighbor or the pawn of our rival? Finland’s perseverance, maintained right up to the collapse of the former Soviet Union, may well be a point of reflection.
*Editor’s Note: Finlandization refers to the process by which a small country is inclined to favor, or not to oppose, the interests of a more powerful country despite not being politically allied with it.
For Taiwan, the next point to watch will be how quickly the United States can free itself from its sanctions against Russia, as the speed with which it does so will be indicative of the firmness of its resolve in containing the Chinese Communist Party. Furthermore, like it or loathe it, the Taiwanese should be thinking about what the prospect of Finlandization* could mean for Taiwan.
The reason for calling Ukraine a foregone conclusion is that it is in the interests of the United States, China and Russia to create a tense but noncombative situation in Europe; Ukraine’s vulnerability and burgeoning status as a buffer zone fulfill this requirement. For the United States, Ukraine historically falls within the former Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, at a time when it would have been difficult for the United States to confront both the USSR and the Chinese Communist Party. Now that the United States’ influence has waned, it will inevitably want to prevent China and Russia from entering into any long-term alliance.
Based on this premise, it is wholly unrealistic to see the United States insisting on an Indo-Pacific strategy on the one hand, while attempting to bring down Russia through war and international sanctions on the other. The expulsion of specific Russian banks from the SWIFT payment system raises the question as to why, in the past, the United States has gone to the trouble of only sanctioning Hong Kong officials and terrorists through U.S. banks or banks that do business with them. It could also lead to China and Russia forging closer economic ties, something that probably will not take long to be implemented.
In addition, the United States wants a European Union that is united beneath it and willing to share the cost of military spending. After the Cold War, their attitudes toward Russia diverged. During Donald Trump’s presidency, France and Germany were repeatedly asked to raise military spending, but Chancellor Angela Merkel kept the defense budget consistently below 2% of the gross domestic product. Several days into the war between Russia and Ukraine, countries including Germany and France have taken uniform steps to resist Russia; more importantly, Germany has announced that it will substantially increase its military spending, putting more than 2% of its GDP into defense and immediately investing 100 billion euros into upgrading its military equipment.
Since a well-oiled global economy is in the Chinese Communist Party’s interest, the tense situation in Europe may distract the United States, which will be able to make use of the opportunity to expand its influence, but the situation must not get out of hand. Here we can see the recent narrative out of Beijing, namely that the crisis in Ukraine has pushed Russia to the front line of conflict with the West, and that the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to finally take a back seat again will create a post-9/11 strategic buffer period, which will once more play out in its favor.
During this period, other than the countries involved looking to the Chinese Communist Party for support, we also note that when Josep Borrell Fontelles, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, called Beijing, apart from discussing the situation in Ukraine and confirming the agenda for this year’s meeting between European and Chinese leaders, the Chinese Communist Party seized the opportunity to pressure the EU into urging Lithuania to return as soon as possible to the “proper track of the One China principle.”
Given the determination of the aforementioned powers and the limits of U.S. power, we can almost be certain that the situation in Ukraine will run its course, and that the United States will have to make a strategic choice. The recent series of favorable developments in Ukraine, including news of its formal application for EU membership, are merely political moves to raise the bar in negotiations.
For Taiwan, several subsequent developments will be worthy of attention: First, how soon the United States withdraws its sanctions against Russia. The longer the United States drags out the issue of Russian sanctions, the more difficult it will be to deal with the Chinese Communist Party. The stalemate in the war is a test of the United States’ strategic wisdom, and Joe Biden’s sudden sending of a delegation to Taiwan is a sign of his strategic intent.
Second, pay attention to the Finnish model: The realities of international politics have never been shifted by the wills of small countries. Although the Ukrainians had insights into their larger neighbor’s way of thinking, they still insisted on pushing NATO membership through their constitution, leading to the bitter consequences seen today. Ultimately, they will have to conform to Russia’s will. This is similar to the experience of Finland in the 1930s, which was first taught a lesson by the USSR, before being “Finlandized” during the Cold War.
The world has long been at peace and forgotten the suffering of war, and even Finland is showing signs of relaxing. However, to paraphrase our National Defense Minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng: Is there ever a time when the situation in the Taiwan Strait is not tense? We must think about how to deal with war.
Of course, forewarned is forearmed, but it is not a bad thing to have other options. In the past, it was argued that bending the knee over issues of sovereignty would not bring about peace. Notwithstanding the fact that this debate continues to the present day, has sovereignty been lost? Or alternatively, which of Taiwan’s parties has lost more of Taiwan’s sovereignty while in power? The point of Finlandization is not whether bending the knee can bring about peace, but rather that small countries do not actively draw fire in the game of the great powers: The important thing is to stay the course. The Ukraine crisis reminds us that, for the great powers, there are so many strategic points to fight over. Should we prioritize the low-profile neighbor or the pawn of our rival? Finland’s perseverance, maintained right up to the collapse of the former Soviet Union, may well be a point of reflection.
*Editor’s Note: Finlandization refers to the process by which a small country is inclined to favor, or not to oppose, the interests of a more powerful country despite not being politically allied with it.
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