2-Level NATO*

*Editor’s note: On March 4, 2022, Russia enacted a law that criminalizes public opposition to, or independent news reporting about, the war in Ukraine. The law makes it a crime to call the war a “war” rather than a “special military operation” on social media or in a news article or broadcast. The law is understood to penalize any language that “discredits” Russia’s use of its military in Ukraine, calls for sanctions or protests Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It punishes anyone found to spread “false information” about the invasion with up to 15 years in prison.

CNN, the mouthpiece of American globalists, pronounced the simple idea that Donald Trump, after returning to office, will activate the strategy of a “two-level NATO,” in which countries will have different levels of U.S. security guarantees, depending on their contribution to the defense budget. This is interesting because it is almost entirely correct. But a few details remain hidden from view that change our understanding of the logic of the processes taking place around NATO. And these, if we go beyond the usual demonization of Trump, are directly connected to the conflict around Ukraine.

Trump has indeed discussed similar ideas regarding “investing in security” within the framework of NATO, although not as radically. If he returns to office in January 2025, he will unhesitatingly start to extort tribute from the Europeans, blackmailing them with the prospect of dismantling American security guarantees, which were taken for granted in Europe.

The situation will be aggravated by the fact that Trump perceives European leaders, even Emmanuel Macron, whom he favors, as traitors who have taken the side of his enemies and who have actively helped them over the course of the current election campaign.

It is important that the victory scenario for Trump during the November presidential election in the U.S. is becoming a part of medium-term planning for areas most important to American policy.

People are discussing the need to build Euro-Atlantic structures, and not only in the sphere of security and are also considering the need to limit how much influence Trump has. I feel the urge to mention a word from the Soviet political-cinematic lexicon — “voluntarism.”

Actually, there is nothing new in the concept of “two-level NATO” — the topic of a “Europe of different speeds” has been raised repeatedly in military-political terms as well. Let’s remember the discussion that took place ahead of the biggest expansion of the alliance in March 2004, when seven states were admitted at one time without sufficient organizational preparation. These discussions were considered insignificant before and were used only as an element of political negotiations.

There are three circumstances that remain outside these very obvious aspects of the situation.

First. Objectively, there is an ongoing transfer of American military resources from Europe to East Asia with a short stop in the Middle East. This process does not depend on Trump's victory or defeat. Although, of course, the factor of family involvement of Joe Biden's clan in political and corruption schemes in Ukraine creates turbulence, demonstrating the power of family interests in today’s America.

Second. It seems that people are pedaling “Trump’s two-level NATO” not so much in the U.S., but in Europe, in order to achieve greater voting rights in the alliance and thus limiting Washington’s ability to manipulate the situation in Europe through its “young European” satellites. This is true, for example, when it comes to the question of admitting Ukraine and Moldova into the alliance or the question of managing European military assets, particularly the Eurocorps.

Third. They are directly postulating the need to divide the security standards in Europe and, therefore, the revision of the often-mentioned Article 5 of the NATO Charter. It looked vague even in its original form, without taking into account the immediate use of American military potential; a “two-level NATO” gives Washington a lot of wiggle room.

Under such conditions, “two-level NATO” starts to look like an attempt to construct a new “buffer zone,” considering that Ukraine, in military-political terms, is close to collapse.

It seems that serious reconstruction of the European security architecture is due, something that Euro-Atlantic political circles, despite their loud anti-Russian statements, have already come to terms with morally. And so they begin — this skill cannot be taken away from the Euro-Atlanticists — to build a new institutional base for the emerging scenario.