Multilayered Positioning: The West’s Asian Coalition
Published in Svobodna Evropa
(Bulgaria) on 23 September 2024
by Vladimir Shopov (link to original)
The West is increasingly focused on defense cooperation with Asia. The reasons are several, including an attempt at deterring China. Vladimir Shopov analyzes how Western countries are operating, which structures support them, and the approach’s weaknesses.
Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” is an often misunderstood and underestimated element of his foreign policy. The most common criticisms have focused on the policy’s doctrinal shortcomings, the precarious commitment behind it and the policy’s naivete toward China.
These criticisms are reasonable, but they do not consider the abrupt change in Beijing’s posture following Xi Jinping’s first few years as president, as well as his then-dominating, enthusiasm-cloaked idea of an “Asian 21st Century.” Some of the pivot’s goals, including, for example, the creation of a large free trade zone in Asia have also been underestimated.
The significant change in the Middle Kingdom’s strategy coincides with Donald Trump’s administration and specifically with the influence of that administration’s more conservative members of the Republican establishment.
A fundamental reconsideration of China, as well as a wholesale reassessment of development for the Indo-Pacific region, is integral to some of the crucial strategic documents produced by the Trump administration between 2017 and 2021.
Indeed, the actual ripening of the “Pivot to Asia” has occurred recently. Under Joe Biden’s administration, the establishment of a new U.S. and Western mentality toward Asia is now a fact.
The “Pivot to Asia” and Its Foundation
The pivot contains three main elements.
The first is the undisputed acceptance of the crucial importance of a broad Asia for the security and prosperity of the 21st century. For at least 20 years, Western businesses have both watched and participated in the economic boom generated by the “rise of the rest,” yet the political and institutional spheres have realized what these processes mean only in the last several years.
An example of this is the fact that most Western countries now have their own Indo-Pacific strategy.
A second element is the acceptance of cooperation as a long-term basis for presence and positioning when it comes to the West’s Asia policy. This includes bilateral and multilateral relationships.
The third foundational element of the “Pivot to Asia” is the idea of containing China as a response to Beijing’s radical change of strategy and behavior in the last decade. This element is based upon the understanding that the ever-increasing risks and dangers of a broad Asia stem from the coordinated actions of Beijing with Moscow, Tehran and Pyongyang. These combinations have formed the base upon which the U.S. and the West have built a new institutional architecture for Asia.
This is mainly achieved through bilateral partnerships and alliances.
US Partners in Asia
The U.S. reaffirmed its relationships with Japan and South Korea. The U.S. also has security treaties with the two countries. The strategy for growth of the relationship with each country was unique.
The U.S. expanded and improved operational cooperation under the umbrella of real-life conflict scenarios, accelerated technology transfers, moved its operational headquarters for the Pacific, created a joint and integrated force and conducted training to counter China in Japan’s western territorial waters.
In Seoul, the U.S. expanded technological transfers, reinforced its military presence and strengthened its nuclear guarantees in the case of a Pyongyang attack.
Perhaps most obvious is the deepening relationship with the Philippines. There, the U.S. has doubled its army personnel and provided half a billion dollars for military modernization; joint military exercises have increased in both frequency and scale, and concrete operational strategies have been designed in order to respond to multiple scenarios.
An upgraded relationship is also evident and important in India, a country continually finding ways to become closer to Washington (military modernization, joint industrial ventures, technological transfers).
In the last several years, contrary to the expectations of many, a restoration in relationships has also occurred with Vietnam and Indonesia. Relations with Australia, a traditional ally, have also improved, in addition to relations with many smaller Pacific Island nations which are also important operationally.
AUKUS and QUAD
Especially important are two partnerships: The first is the partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. — AUKUS — which includes multiple parameters (the acquisition of new nuclear submarines, the rotation of existing nuclear submarines, military innovation, technological transfers, information sharing, cyber cooperation and others). Japan and New Zealand will participate in some of the activities while Canada, South Korea and India are also looking to join the cooperation.
The second structure is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the QUAD, between India, Japan, Australia and the U.S. The partnership was created in 2007 and revived in 2017 under the Trump Administration. The partnership continuously expands its activities and has practically institutionalized the common vision of its member states for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”
There is an expanded QUAD Plus partnership that includes South Korea, Vietnam, Brazil, Israel and others. There are also trilateral agreements such as those between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul. The Washington-Tokyo-Seoul agreement required deliberate diplomatic efforts in order to overcome decades-old differences and disputes between the two Asian countries.
A similar structure underlines the joint exercises between Japan, the U.S., and the Philippines. The rapprochement between NATO and Japan and South Korea, in both political and military terms, must also be noted as efforts toward the strengthening of ties between the West and its Asian partners.
The US and European Influence in Asian Politics
The awakening of European countries is also tangible despite Europe being more limited in scope and less consolidated politically. Increased military investment will enhance Europe’s ability to be a factor and to project its capabilities over a wider perimeter.
Foreign policy and military considerations have irrevocably placed Asia as a location for some of the prime regions of desired European influence. Countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands have, when available, sent parts of their military assets to different parts of the continent. The European Union and NATO, as well as think tanks and research institutes focused on Asia, have seen increased investment.
The more active role played by the U.S. in its broad-Asia strategy has had other effects with equally important consequences. One such consequence is the renewal and development of bilateral relationships between countries that, in some cases, do not share values, goals or political principles.
For example, Japan and India have expanded and deepened their cooperation in the security field and now foresee “joint army exercises” that include a wide palette of expertise and structures. A plan for the long-term presence of Japanese naval forces in India’s territorial waters is also being developed. There are further plans for the sharing of defense technology, from Tokyo towards New Delhi.
Shortcomings
There are several deficiencies and drawbacks in the U.S. and European strategy.
Outside official diplomatic communications, the question of America’s strength and commitment, especially in the hypothetical scenario of a direct collision with China, is being considered by many politicians from countries allied with the West. The introduction of evermore conditions has generated insecurity and has caused local elites to consider alternatives or complementary security models.
The most important of such alternatives is the acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Korea, and less likely, Japan.
A key deficit of the pivot strategy is the absence of an attractive economic and investment structure, led by the U.S., that could reinforce security cooperation and offer business opportunities for the countries of the region.
The U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership immediately after Donald Trump’s election deprived the country of an important carrot of influence, while the Democratic Party’s reluctance to support free trade agreements has effectively made this shortfall irreversible.
Beyond economics, the current administration refuses to accept the need for a large-scale investment strategy for U.S. defense. The corresponding financial expenditures have grown with the rate of inflation rather than with the need for increased spending to match the challenges faced. Due to this, many experts have warned that the U.S. could find itself in an adverse position within five years.
In general, U.S. domestic politics have moved away from defense preparations and military engagements outside of the need to respond to immediate threats. Preparedness for a rapid and successful military commitment would require an engagement and outreach not currently evident in the priorities of Washington’s leading political figures.
It is beyond doubt that the last several years have been marked by an unprecedented large-scale and multi-layered positioning of Western countries in Asia. This is a belated effort with many unknowns.
For example, the level of commitment to long-term investment, the meaning of “red lines” for individual state actors, the desire for expansion and consolidation of structures and capabilities are all unknown. A potential preemptive move by China in the region would also create multiple dilemmas. Despite these unknowns, the actions of the West and the emerging infrastructure of security and defense are among the most-important international relations developments in the last decade. This process is likely to continue.
Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” is an often misunderstood and underestimated element of his foreign policy. The most common criticisms have focused on the policy’s doctrinal shortcomings, the precarious commitment behind it and the policy’s naivete toward China.
These criticisms are reasonable, but they do not consider the abrupt change in Beijing’s posture following Xi Jinping’s first few years as president, as well as his then-dominating, enthusiasm-cloaked idea of an “Asian 21st Century.” Some of the pivot’s goals, including, for example, the creation of a large free trade zone in Asia have also been underestimated.
The significant change in the Middle Kingdom’s strategy coincides with Donald Trump’s administration and specifically with the influence of that administration’s more conservative members of the Republican establishment.
A fundamental reconsideration of China, as well as a wholesale reassessment of development for the Indo-Pacific region, is integral to some of the crucial strategic documents produced by the Trump administration between 2017 and 2021.
Indeed, the actual ripening of the “Pivot to Asia” has occurred recently. Under Joe Biden’s administration, the establishment of a new U.S. and Western mentality toward Asia is now a fact.
The “Pivot to Asia” and Its Foundation
The pivot contains three main elements.
The first is the undisputed acceptance of the crucial importance of a broad Asia for the security and prosperity of the 21st century. For at least 20 years, Western businesses have both watched and participated in the economic boom generated by the “rise of the rest,” yet the political and institutional spheres have realized what these processes mean only in the last several years.
An example of this is the fact that most Western countries now have their own Indo-Pacific strategy.
A second element is the acceptance of cooperation as a long-term basis for presence and positioning when it comes to the West’s Asia policy. This includes bilateral and multilateral relationships.
The third foundational element of the “Pivot to Asia” is the idea of containing China as a response to Beijing’s radical change of strategy and behavior in the last decade. This element is based upon the understanding that the ever-increasing risks and dangers of a broad Asia stem from the coordinated actions of Beijing with Moscow, Tehran and Pyongyang. These combinations have formed the base upon which the U.S. and the West have built a new institutional architecture for Asia.
This is mainly achieved through bilateral partnerships and alliances.
US Partners in Asia
The U.S. reaffirmed its relationships with Japan and South Korea. The U.S. also has security treaties with the two countries. The strategy for growth of the relationship with each country was unique.
The U.S. expanded and improved operational cooperation under the umbrella of real-life conflict scenarios, accelerated technology transfers, moved its operational headquarters for the Pacific, created a joint and integrated force and conducted training to counter China in Japan’s western territorial waters.
In Seoul, the U.S. expanded technological transfers, reinforced its military presence and strengthened its nuclear guarantees in the case of a Pyongyang attack.
Perhaps most obvious is the deepening relationship with the Philippines. There, the U.S. has doubled its army personnel and provided half a billion dollars for military modernization; joint military exercises have increased in both frequency and scale, and concrete operational strategies have been designed in order to respond to multiple scenarios.
An upgraded relationship is also evident and important in India, a country continually finding ways to become closer to Washington (military modernization, joint industrial ventures, technological transfers).
In the last several years, contrary to the expectations of many, a restoration in relationships has also occurred with Vietnam and Indonesia. Relations with Australia, a traditional ally, have also improved, in addition to relations with many smaller Pacific Island nations which are also important operationally.
AUKUS and QUAD
Especially important are two partnerships: The first is the partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. — AUKUS — which includes multiple parameters (the acquisition of new nuclear submarines, the rotation of existing nuclear submarines, military innovation, technological transfers, information sharing, cyber cooperation and others). Japan and New Zealand will participate in some of the activities while Canada, South Korea and India are also looking to join the cooperation.
The second structure is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the QUAD, between India, Japan, Australia and the U.S. The partnership was created in 2007 and revived in 2017 under the Trump Administration. The partnership continuously expands its activities and has practically institutionalized the common vision of its member states for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”
There is an expanded QUAD Plus partnership that includes South Korea, Vietnam, Brazil, Israel and others. There are also trilateral agreements such as those between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul. The Washington-Tokyo-Seoul agreement required deliberate diplomatic efforts in order to overcome decades-old differences and disputes between the two Asian countries.
A similar structure underlines the joint exercises between Japan, the U.S., and the Philippines. The rapprochement between NATO and Japan and South Korea, in both political and military terms, must also be noted as efforts toward the strengthening of ties between the West and its Asian partners.
The US and European Influence in Asian Politics
The awakening of European countries is also tangible despite Europe being more limited in scope and less consolidated politically. Increased military investment will enhance Europe’s ability to be a factor and to project its capabilities over a wider perimeter.
Foreign policy and military considerations have irrevocably placed Asia as a location for some of the prime regions of desired European influence. Countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands have, when available, sent parts of their military assets to different parts of the continent. The European Union and NATO, as well as think tanks and research institutes focused on Asia, have seen increased investment.
The more active role played by the U.S. in its broad-Asia strategy has had other effects with equally important consequences. One such consequence is the renewal and development of bilateral relationships between countries that, in some cases, do not share values, goals or political principles.
For example, Japan and India have expanded and deepened their cooperation in the security field and now foresee “joint army exercises” that include a wide palette of expertise and structures. A plan for the long-term presence of Japanese naval forces in India’s territorial waters is also being developed. There are further plans for the sharing of defense technology, from Tokyo towards New Delhi.
Shortcomings
There are several deficiencies and drawbacks in the U.S. and European strategy.
Outside official diplomatic communications, the question of America’s strength and commitment, especially in the hypothetical scenario of a direct collision with China, is being considered by many politicians from countries allied with the West. The introduction of evermore conditions has generated insecurity and has caused local elites to consider alternatives or complementary security models.
The most important of such alternatives is the acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Korea, and less likely, Japan.
A key deficit of the pivot strategy is the absence of an attractive economic and investment structure, led by the U.S., that could reinforce security cooperation and offer business opportunities for the countries of the region.
The U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership immediately after Donald Trump’s election deprived the country of an important carrot of influence, while the Democratic Party’s reluctance to support free trade agreements has effectively made this shortfall irreversible.
Beyond economics, the current administration refuses to accept the need for a large-scale investment strategy for U.S. defense. The corresponding financial expenditures have grown with the rate of inflation rather than with the need for increased spending to match the challenges faced. Due to this, many experts have warned that the U.S. could find itself in an adverse position within five years.
In general, U.S. domestic politics have moved away from defense preparations and military engagements outside of the need to respond to immediate threats. Preparedness for a rapid and successful military commitment would require an engagement and outreach not currently evident in the priorities of Washington’s leading political figures.
It is beyond doubt that the last several years have been marked by an unprecedented large-scale and multi-layered positioning of Western countries in Asia. This is a belated effort with many unknowns.
For example, the level of commitment to long-term investment, the meaning of “red lines” for individual state actors, the desire for expansion and consolidation of structures and capabilities are all unknown. A potential preemptive move by China in the region would also create multiple dilemmas. Despite these unknowns, the actions of the West and the emerging infrastructure of security and defense are among the most-important international relations developments in the last decade. This process is likely to continue.
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