Edited by Catherine Harrington
The Path to a Nuclear-Free World: A New U.S.-Russian Security Agreement
Published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta
(Russia) on 15 January 2010
by Sergey Rogov (link to original)
(Russia) on 15 January 2010
by Sergey Rogov (link to original)
Translated from
by Olga Kerzhner.
Edited by .
The Kremlin has a real opportunity to preserve the military-strategic stability in relations with the U.S.
2009 did not live up to the expectations for a radical improvement in Russo-American relations. However, there was a noticeable decrease in tension. Hostile rhetoric disappeared. Serious negotiations on strategic arms began. But it can't be said yet that Washington and Moscow were able to overcome mutual mistrust and lay down a solid foundation for a long-term partnership.
Russo-American summits, at which the presidents of these two countries declared their intentions, started to take place on a regular basis again. But these declarations are stuck in a bureaucratic vacuum. In practice, very little is happening. Either there is no action, or it's very slow. Consequently, there are no results.
This situation is beginning to look like a rerun. After all, following the end of the Cold War, Russian and American leaders have repeatedly proclaimed a strategic partnership. But the good personal relations between the two presidents did not automatically create an effective mechanism of interaction between the two countries. Moreover, each time there were high expectations, which invariably lead to mutual frustration and alienation. The reason is the enormous asymmetry in the United States and Russia's power.
Washington was not ready for equal partnership with Moscow, and hoped that Russia's foreign and domestic policy would develop according to American instructions. This kind of partnership was unacceptable to Russia. However, Moscow did not have political, economic, or military capability to force the U.S. to take Russia's interests into account. Nevertheless, it's too early to predict another Russo-American detente failure.
Formation of Obama's Military Doctrine
Barack Obama (unlike Bill Clinton and George W. Bush) is forced to operate in a rapidly emerging multi-polar world. Apparently, the current U.S. president has no illusions about the omnipotence of America. In the new international environment, Washington cannot place its bets on unilateral action. The United States did not live up to the role of the "sole superpower." U.S. forces were over-expanded. In a poly-centric system of international relations, U.S. policy must become more flexible and sophisticated.
The Obama administration's new approach will be set out in its National Security Strategy, which should be published in early February. It is believed that the essence of Obama's strategy is: maintaining U.S. leadership by keeping the world's balance of power favorable to the U.S., and by avoiding the emergence of rival powers that equal the U.S., or coalition of powers that could counterbalance American power.
In reality, no country can compare to the U.S. in terms of total force, although China might be able to come close in the foreseeable future. In these circumstances, acquisition of nuclear weapons (which inherently have a deterrent function) is particularly important. Nuclear weapons violate the classical power hierarchy; a weaker country with nuclear weapons can hinder a stronger opponent's use of military force against it.
After the Cold War, one of America's top priorities has become preventing access to nuclear weapons by potential adversaries. In recent years, this has been the reason for its preemptive strike on Iraq, and threats to use military force against North Korea and Iran. Active steps to prevent access to nuclear weapons have been called "counterproliferation." However, the Bush administration was unable to handle this task. The U.S. got bogged down in endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which limited a military solution to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues.
After inheriting these problems from the previous administration, the new leadership of the U.S. announced its intention to focus on diplomatic means to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Moreover, Obama declared that U.S. policy aims to completely destroy nuclear weapons in the distant future. Undoubtedly, such a slogan requires a radical revision of U.S. nuclear policy. In the 65 years after Hiroshima, Washington saw nuclear weapons as the basis of its military might. The new approach is based not on nuclear dominance, but on the overwhelming U.S. superiority in the field of high-precision conventional weapons. The ability to make a "global strike" using conventional means makes the use of nuclear weapons excessive.
Similar ideas have emerged prior to Obama's election. It's significant that high-precision conventional weapons were one of the components of the "new" strategic triad of the Bush administration. It seems that this concept will be further developed in the Quadrennial Defense Review, in which the Obama administration must present its military doctrine. This document, which will be published in late January, is inextricably linked to another key doctrinal document - the Nuclear Posture Review. It is assumed that in this document the Obama administration will set out its vision for the transition to a nuclear-free world, or at least a radical change in approach to nuclear deterrence.
Geneva Talks
The Russo-American talks on a new treaty that would reduce strategic offensive weapons began in the spring of last year, before the U.S. formulated a new military doctrine. The reason for such an early start was that the term of the START-1 Treaty, as well as the related test procedures and verification, ended on December 5, 2009. Unlike the Bush administration, the new U.S. leadership does not consider arms control "obsolete." Moreover, Obama and his associates understand that without a new U.S.-Russian treaty the forthcoming conference on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in May 2010 could have unpredictable consequences. After all, if the nuclear superpower demonstrates that it's not willing to fulfill its obligation under the 6th Article of the disarmament treaty, it could undermine the non-proliferation regime, which is already not very effective.
Under these circumstances, Washington did not propose anything radical in the area of nuclear weapons reduction. Instead, it tried to get quick acceptance from Moscow on an agreement that combines elements of SORT and START-1. There are fundamental differences between these agreements. SORT has only one provision (1700-2200 "deployed" warheads); START-1 has a detailed description of the rules of set-off, the timing and procedures for reductions, and the rules of inspection and verification (including on-site inspections and exchange of telemetric data).
The Obama administration showed that it's ready to make certain concessions, particularly with respect to setting limits not only on warheads, but also the means of strategic weapons delivery. Additionally, it's ready to acknowledge the relationship between offensive and defensive weapons. Moreover, outside the scope of the negotiations, the Pentagon announced a freeze on creating strategic missile defense. Thus, the U.S. has moved away from the rigid position that the Bush administration took on these issues.
In return, Washington has been pushing Moscow to agree to rules concerning strategic delivery system "discharge" that would be favorable to the United States. These terms would allow the U.S. to maintain a huge breakout potential and preserve procedures for testing and verification under START-1. However, during the talks in Geneva, the two sides' positions were very different, which stalled the negotiations.
Russia has sought to drastically reduce the number of carriers. 1100 carriers, as suggested by the American side, means preserving the current structure of U.S. strategic forces, and the possibility of reloading more than 3000 stockpiled nuclear warheads. Moscow proposed setting the limit at 500 carriers. Compromise can be reached at 700-800 units, if the Pentagon in its new Nuclear Policy Review would adopt such a standard.
The difference between the two sides' positions with respect to warheads is small. An agreement in the range of 1500-1600 units is possible, provided that the U.S. agrees to consider conventional warheads as strategic, intended for a "global strike" (about 100 units). In turn, Russia's side will probably have to agree to exclude from this limit four strategic submarines Trident-2, which re-launch cruise missiles.
The issues of verification and validation are the greatest differences in Moscow and Washington's positions. Both sides have verbally agreed that START-1 procedures are too cumbersome. But while the Russian side wants a radical change in these procedures, the American side disagrees. The problem is that the land component of the parties' strategic forces has substantially changed since the signing of START-1 in 1991. Not only has the U.S. abandoned mobile-based ICBMs MX, but also ended their production and removed them from service (although some components and stored). So in recent years, the verification measures relating to mobile ICBMs have been asymmetrical and one-sided.
After all, since the U.S. doesn't have these missiles, the restrictions on where they are based relate only to Russia. Before dispersing, the vulnerability of mobile Topol is very high. In connection with the end of the life cycles of missiles built in Soviet times, Russia has modernized its strategic forces, including new types of ICBMs and SLBMs. The U.S. will proceed with the modernization of its strategic missiles during the 2018-2020 period. Therefore, intrusive verification measures provided by START-1 do not give any valuable information to the Russian side. However, by preserving the inspections along the perimeter of the plant in Votkinsk, Americans will be able to track the production of not only the ICBM Topol-M, but also the short-range missiles Iskander, and in the future, the new Russian MIRVed and SLBM Bulava. Considering that the American IDB manufacturing plant was closed 14 years ago, the Russian side has demanded the unconditional cessation of inspections in Votkinsk.
A similar situation exists with the exchange of telemetric data. The U.S. is very interested in receiving information about the testing of new Russian strategic missiles. Russia gains nothing from telemetry, because Americans still do not have new types of ICBMs and SLBMs. American intelligence and the Pentagon supported arms control because it makes Russia's development of strategic nuclear forces transparent. Russia's situation is different. But, apparently, Washington was convinced that Moscow would agree to American demands. This is evidenced, for example, by Vice President Joseph Biden's scandalous interview given last summer. He said that Russia is too weak to reject the U.S. proposal and will inevitably make concessions.
But this did not happen. Soon, the Geneva talks stalled. It would seem that a compromise was possible, but neither side took the initiative, expecting that the other side would make concessions first. As a result, the new agreement was not signed until December 5, and temporary agreements were not reached.
Thus, for the first time in nearly four decades, a vacuum was created in the field of strategic arms control. While the Treaty on DPR is still formally operational, the parties are not obliged to do anything until December 31, 2012 (and there is no consistent definition of what constitutes a deployed warhead or the mechanism for verifying the reductions). After that, each side can do what it pleases. The Geneva talks will resume in the second half of January. But so far there is no evidence that Moscow or Washington's positions will make serious progress.
Debates on Nuclear Deterrence
Meanwhile, sharp debate on the issue of nuclear weapons is unfolding on the American political scene. On the one hand, the idea of universal and complete nuclear disarmament, which George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn and William Perry proposed three years ago, has received an overwhelming response not only in pacifist circles, but also among many in the American political elite. But aside from generalities about the need to prevent a nuclear catastrophe, no detailed proposals on the plan to eliminate nuclear weapons have followed. In the U.S., there was no mass movement to renounce it.
On the other hand, in recent months, nuclear weapons advocates have been clearly trying to seize the initiative. Their main argument is that there's a need to maintain, rather than weaken, reliable nuclear deterrents while international instability grows. Thus, the magazine "Foreign Policy" has recently published an article in which the author argues that nuclear deterrence remains the foundation of strategic stability, and the probability of nuclear war or nuclear terrorism is very low. Another influential magazine, "Foreign Affairs," has published an article alleging that the U.S. should not reduce nuclear weapons. Instead, it should make their use more effective, allowing the U.S. to safely hit any target, including super-protected targets.
In addition, some experts expressed a concern that major reductions may encourage China to enhance its nuclear capability. But the United States is not interested in having to recognize a "mutual nuclear deterrence" with China.
In general, opponents of revising nuclear strategy do not object to placing emphasis on high-precision conventional weapons. But they think it's possible to achieve absolute excellence in both conventional and nuclear armaments. This specific alignment of forces is emerging in the U.S. Congress as well. Although the Democratic Party controls both chambers of the American supreme legislative body, and Democratic leaders in the House and Senate are advocates of arms control, the White House is facing serious challenges on Capitol Hill.
First, in light of the severe economic crisis that has engulfed the U.S., some American congressmen began to consider questions of strategic arms reductions as a threat to jobs (which would be lost as a result of military base closures and the loss of defense orders). The bipartisan Institute for Defense & Business, which supports U.S. nuclear capabilities, is particularly active, calling for Obama not to reduce the current number of missiles (450 units) in the new treaty on strategic offensive arms. Similar groups operate to protect strategic submarines and heavy bombers.
Second, the Republican Party has an extremely negative attitude towards any of the Obama administration's policies. This applies to issues of arms control. Republicans have strongly condemned the White House for its decision to reduce spending on strategic missile defense, and for refusing to deploy a third missile defense position area in Eastern Europe. But Republicans failed to get these programs included in the budget. However, Republicans have enough votes to prevent the Senate from ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as well as the future START II with Russia. Republicans have 40 out of 100 seats in the Senate, and 67 votes are necessary for the ratification.
The far-right Republican Senator Jon Kyl (Arizona) leads the opposition to the new treaty on strategic offensive arms. In the summer of 2009, he managed to get the heads of the committees on defense and foreign relations to write a letter to Obama, demanding that he provide a detailed plan for the modernization of U.S. nuclear forces. In September, the Republican Senate committee issued a report that put forward some conditions for a new treaty on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on tactical nuclear weapons, the development of new nuclear warheads, and an unlimited deployment of missile defense. Similar requirements were set out in December in a letter to Obama, which was signed by all 40 Republican senators and former Democrat, now independent, Senator Joseph Lieberman (Connecticut).
Of course, this does not mean that the ratification of the new treaty is doomed to failure. Some influential Republican senators, such as Richard Lugar (Illinois*) and John McCain (Arizona), may support it. But apparently, the price that the White House will have to pay will include the modernization of weapons-grade nuclear complex and the creation of new nuclear weapons systems.
There are serious concerns that in a few decades, the reliability of nuclear warheads may be uncertain. Real problems are cropping up at the nuclear facilities of the Department of Energy. There are also serious differences between the White House and the Pentagon's nuclear policies.
Robert Gates, whom Obama has left at the post of secretary of Defense, has demonstrated his loyalty on issues such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and a freeze on strategic missile defense. But Gates holds traditional views on the role of nuclear weapons. This was reflected in the development of the Nuclear Policy Review. The Pentagon's version did not envision a radical change in the approach to nuclear deterrence, and was rejected by the White House. However, the Department of Defense has continued to persist. As a result, it was announced that the document would be ready later than expected - no sooner than March of next year.
All this puts Barack Obama, who won the Nobel Prize for his peaceful rhetoric, in an extremely difficult position. If the new nuclear doctrine of the U.S. does not provide for a major reduction in nuclear weapons (e.g. 1000 warheads) and at least a vague discussion of disarmament, the president's prestige will suffer a serious blow. Of course, the prospects for a new treaty on strategic offensive arms will be even more questionable. The Obama administration will not be able to ensure American leadership in strengthening the nonproliferation regime.
Clearly, Obama needs to use all of his political capital to escape from this trap. This will be difficult, when his popularity among voters has fallen. If the Obama administration makes concessions at Geneva, the Republicans will accuse the president of weakness and incompetence. In addition, the Democratic Party is likely to have heavy losses in the Congressional election in November this year.
At an Impasse: Is There a Way Out?
During the Cold War, and at its final stage, an arms control regime was formed. It was considered to be a cornerstone of strategic stability. This regime was based on five components: the ABM and START (SALT), INF, CFE and the NPT. Today, three of them - ABM, START and CFE - do not operate anymore, the Non-Proliferation Treaty is in doubt, and the prospects of INF are vague.
It seems that the end of the world is coming. But apparently, no one except a few specialists is taking any notice. Other issues - such as the global economic crisis and global climate change (either global warming or cooling) - are dominating. The approaches to solving these problems aren't very successful. Decisions made by G20 are just wishful thinking, and the Copenhagen summit ended in failure.
Does this mean that the era of treaties on arms control is history? After all, there were no agreements between the two superpowers on arms control prior to the Cold War. But armed confrontations between these two centers of power were considered the norm. The balance of power in a multipolar world has always been precarious. And it always led to conflicts.
Polycentric chaos is once again rising in a multipolar world. For now, there are no military clashes among the key players. But even before World War I, people believed that economic interdependence would prevent military clashes among the great powers. Will history repeat itself in the 21st century, when almost every central power has nuclear weapons?
Today, the world has entered a new arms race, which is multilateral. For Russia, this scenario represents a particular threat. After all, we do not have a chance of winning this race due to our current economic, scientific, and technical capabilities. Therefore, Moscow has given priority to the preservation of nuclear deterrence. Although, the decline of our industry creates serious problems here as well (as exemplified by the long story surrounding the Bulava missile).
In Russia today it is difficult to find supporters of nuclear disarmament. In circumstances where we are lagging behind in creating the newest conventional weapons, reliance on nuclear deterrence seems logical. This will be reflected in Moscow's new military doctrine. But Russia is not in any way interested in the spread of nuclear weapons, even though it does not consider (and never will) Iraq, Iran, or North Korea as potential adversaries.
In my opinion, a new bilateral treaty on strategic offensive arms between Russia and the United States is the indispensable first step to establishing a new multilateral security system corresponding to the realities of today's multipolar world. Only once a new Russo-American treaty is established will it be possible to include in this process other nuclear powers, creating a new global regime of strategic stability.
Can Russia and the United States overcome existing differences at the Geneva talks? I believe that compromise is possible if they find a mutually acceptable solution to the verification problem. But it cannot be found in the new treaty on strategic offensive arms, due to the asymmetry in the life cycles of strategic offensive arms of the two countries. The U.S. has nothing to offer Russia in return that would reverse the unilateral nature of the old regime of verification.
But Moscow remains interested in detailed information about American missile defense. Washington argues that its program of missile defense does not threaten Russia. But meanwhile, the Pentagon is planning to establish by 2018 a modification of "Aegis" (missile SM-3 Block 2b), which will be able to intercept ICBMs in the middle portion of the flight. It is likely that this will not happen. But after the United States exited the ABM Treaty in 2002, Russia has reason to suspect the American side's intention to break the system of mutual nuclear deterrence, and to achieve absolute military superiority.
The U.S. could demonstrate in practice the link between strategic offensive and defensive weapons. It could propose to establish a missile defense regime of transparency, similar to what Americans want to have for the offensive weapons. I believe that such a regime of transparency, including exchanges of telemetry data, could be part of a Russo-American agreement on cooperation in missile defense. Naturally, Moscow will never help the establishment of missile defense, which would undermine Russia's nuclear potential. But the interaction to protect against medium-range missiles (which Russia and the United States destroyed as part of the INF Treaty) is possible. After all, virtually all countries with medium-range missiles are located near the Russian border. However, Washington must provide convincing evidence that we are not talking about creating a strategic missile defense.
The technical parameters of separating strategic and nonstrategic missile defense were identified in 1997, in a protocol signed by Primakov and Albright. But this protocol has not been activated, due to the failure of START-2. Now, this document could be used as a basis for a new agreement.
Of course, it will take time to finally agree on the details of the agreement regarding cooperation in missile defense. But Russia and the United States could quickly prepare a "Memorandum of Understanding", which would contain the principles of cooperation on missile defense. Such a memorandum could be signed together with a new treaty on strategic offensive arms. It's possible to do so before the Conference on Non-Proliferation.
If this window of opportunity is not used, then the Geneva talks could drag on for a long time, and end in vain. Meanwhile, Russo-American relations will once again start to accumulate problems (like the restrictions on exports of chicken legs, or recognition of Ukrainian election results). There is a large spectrum of opportunities to disrupt the "reset" of Russo-American relations.
The complete collapse of the bilateral arms control regime, which operated until now, does not meet Russia's security interests. This applies not only to the possible attempt by Washington to take advantage of the lack of legally binding constraints to achieve military superiority and increase pressure on Moscow. If the strategic parity between the U.S. and Russia will no longer be enshrined in an official contract, our prestige on the world stage will be substantially weakened.
A new treaty on strategic offensive arms will not be perfect. But the previous agreements on arms control were not ideal either. We must soberly assess the pros and cons of the new agreement. After all, it would allow us to implement all of the planned programs to modernize strategic weapons, and maintain tactical nuclear weapons. Today, Russia has a real opportunity to preserve the military-strategic stability in relations with the U.S. based on mutual nuclear deterrence until the end of this decade. And this opportunity must be seized.
*Richard Lugar is actually a senator from Indiana.
2009 did not live up to the expectations for a radical improvement in Russo-American relations. However, there was a noticeable decrease in tension. Hostile rhetoric disappeared. Serious negotiations on strategic arms began. But it can't be said yet that Washington and Moscow were able to overcome mutual mistrust and lay down a solid foundation for a long-term partnership.
Russo-American summits, at which the presidents of these two countries declared their intentions, started to take place on a regular basis again. But these declarations are stuck in a bureaucratic vacuum. In practice, very little is happening. Either there is no action, or it's very slow. Consequently, there are no results.
This situation is beginning to look like a rerun. After all, following the end of the Cold War, Russian and American leaders have repeatedly proclaimed a strategic partnership. But the good personal relations between the two presidents did not automatically create an effective mechanism of interaction between the two countries. Moreover, each time there were high expectations, which invariably lead to mutual frustration and alienation. The reason is the enormous asymmetry in the United States and Russia's power.
Washington was not ready for equal partnership with Moscow, and hoped that Russia's foreign and domestic policy would develop according to American instructions. This kind of partnership was unacceptable to Russia. However, Moscow did not have political, economic, or military capability to force the U.S. to take Russia's interests into account. Nevertheless, it's too early to predict another Russo-American detente failure.
Formation of Obama's Military Doctrine
Barack Obama (unlike Bill Clinton and George W. Bush) is forced to operate in a rapidly emerging multi-polar world. Apparently, the current U.S. president has no illusions about the omnipotence of America. In the new international environment, Washington cannot place its bets on unilateral action. The United States did not live up to the role of the "sole superpower." U.S. forces were over-expanded. In a poly-centric system of international relations, U.S. policy must become more flexible and sophisticated.
The Obama administration's new approach will be set out in its National Security Strategy, which should be published in early February. It is believed that the essence of Obama's strategy is: maintaining U.S. leadership by keeping the world's balance of power favorable to the U.S., and by avoiding the emergence of rival powers that equal the U.S., or coalition of powers that could counterbalance American power.
In reality, no country can compare to the U.S. in terms of total force, although China might be able to come close in the foreseeable future. In these circumstances, acquisition of nuclear weapons (which inherently have a deterrent function) is particularly important. Nuclear weapons violate the classical power hierarchy; a weaker country with nuclear weapons can hinder a stronger opponent's use of military force against it.
After the Cold War, one of America's top priorities has become preventing access to nuclear weapons by potential adversaries. In recent years, this has been the reason for its preemptive strike on Iraq, and threats to use military force against North Korea and Iran. Active steps to prevent access to nuclear weapons have been called "counterproliferation." However, the Bush administration was unable to handle this task. The U.S. got bogged down in endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which limited a military solution to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues.
After inheriting these problems from the previous administration, the new leadership of the U.S. announced its intention to focus on diplomatic means to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Moreover, Obama declared that U.S. policy aims to completely destroy nuclear weapons in the distant future. Undoubtedly, such a slogan requires a radical revision of U.S. nuclear policy. In the 65 years after Hiroshima, Washington saw nuclear weapons as the basis of its military might. The new approach is based not on nuclear dominance, but on the overwhelming U.S. superiority in the field of high-precision conventional weapons. The ability to make a "global strike" using conventional means makes the use of nuclear weapons excessive.
Similar ideas have emerged prior to Obama's election. It's significant that high-precision conventional weapons were one of the components of the "new" strategic triad of the Bush administration. It seems that this concept will be further developed in the Quadrennial Defense Review, in which the Obama administration must present its military doctrine. This document, which will be published in late January, is inextricably linked to another key doctrinal document - the Nuclear Posture Review. It is assumed that in this document the Obama administration will set out its vision for the transition to a nuclear-free world, or at least a radical change in approach to nuclear deterrence.
Geneva Talks
The Russo-American talks on a new treaty that would reduce strategic offensive weapons began in the spring of last year, before the U.S. formulated a new military doctrine. The reason for such an early start was that the term of the START-1 Treaty, as well as the related test procedures and verification, ended on December 5, 2009. Unlike the Bush administration, the new U.S. leadership does not consider arms control "obsolete." Moreover, Obama and his associates understand that without a new U.S.-Russian treaty the forthcoming conference on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in May 2010 could have unpredictable consequences. After all, if the nuclear superpower demonstrates that it's not willing to fulfill its obligation under the 6th Article of the disarmament treaty, it could undermine the non-proliferation regime, which is already not very effective.
Under these circumstances, Washington did not propose anything radical in the area of nuclear weapons reduction. Instead, it tried to get quick acceptance from Moscow on an agreement that combines elements of SORT and START-1. There are fundamental differences between these agreements. SORT has only one provision (1700-2200 "deployed" warheads); START-1 has a detailed description of the rules of set-off, the timing and procedures for reductions, and the rules of inspection and verification (including on-site inspections and exchange of telemetric data).
The Obama administration showed that it's ready to make certain concessions, particularly with respect to setting limits not only on warheads, but also the means of strategic weapons delivery. Additionally, it's ready to acknowledge the relationship between offensive and defensive weapons. Moreover, outside the scope of the negotiations, the Pentagon announced a freeze on creating strategic missile defense. Thus, the U.S. has moved away from the rigid position that the Bush administration took on these issues.
In return, Washington has been pushing Moscow to agree to rules concerning strategic delivery system "discharge" that would be favorable to the United States. These terms would allow the U.S. to maintain a huge breakout potential and preserve procedures for testing and verification under START-1. However, during the talks in Geneva, the two sides' positions were very different, which stalled the negotiations.
Russia has sought to drastically reduce the number of carriers. 1100 carriers, as suggested by the American side, means preserving the current structure of U.S. strategic forces, and the possibility of reloading more than 3000 stockpiled nuclear warheads. Moscow proposed setting the limit at 500 carriers. Compromise can be reached at 700-800 units, if the Pentagon in its new Nuclear Policy Review would adopt such a standard.
The difference between the two sides' positions with respect to warheads is small. An agreement in the range of 1500-1600 units is possible, provided that the U.S. agrees to consider conventional warheads as strategic, intended for a "global strike" (about 100 units). In turn, Russia's side will probably have to agree to exclude from this limit four strategic submarines Trident-2, which re-launch cruise missiles.
The issues of verification and validation are the greatest differences in Moscow and Washington's positions. Both sides have verbally agreed that START-1 procedures are too cumbersome. But while the Russian side wants a radical change in these procedures, the American side disagrees. The problem is that the land component of the parties' strategic forces has substantially changed since the signing of START-1 in 1991. Not only has the U.S. abandoned mobile-based ICBMs MX, but also ended their production and removed them from service (although some components and stored). So in recent years, the verification measures relating to mobile ICBMs have been asymmetrical and one-sided.
After all, since the U.S. doesn't have these missiles, the restrictions on where they are based relate only to Russia. Before dispersing, the vulnerability of mobile Topol is very high. In connection with the end of the life cycles of missiles built in Soviet times, Russia has modernized its strategic forces, including new types of ICBMs and SLBMs. The U.S. will proceed with the modernization of its strategic missiles during the 2018-2020 period. Therefore, intrusive verification measures provided by START-1 do not give any valuable information to the Russian side. However, by preserving the inspections along the perimeter of the plant in Votkinsk, Americans will be able to track the production of not only the ICBM Topol-M, but also the short-range missiles Iskander, and in the future, the new Russian MIRVed and SLBM Bulava. Considering that the American IDB manufacturing plant was closed 14 years ago, the Russian side has demanded the unconditional cessation of inspections in Votkinsk.
A similar situation exists with the exchange of telemetric data. The U.S. is very interested in receiving information about the testing of new Russian strategic missiles. Russia gains nothing from telemetry, because Americans still do not have new types of ICBMs and SLBMs. American intelligence and the Pentagon supported arms control because it makes Russia's development of strategic nuclear forces transparent. Russia's situation is different. But, apparently, Washington was convinced that Moscow would agree to American demands. This is evidenced, for example, by Vice President Joseph Biden's scandalous interview given last summer. He said that Russia is too weak to reject the U.S. proposal and will inevitably make concessions.
But this did not happen. Soon, the Geneva talks stalled. It would seem that a compromise was possible, but neither side took the initiative, expecting that the other side would make concessions first. As a result, the new agreement was not signed until December 5, and temporary agreements were not reached.
Thus, for the first time in nearly four decades, a vacuum was created in the field of strategic arms control. While the Treaty on DPR is still formally operational, the parties are not obliged to do anything until December 31, 2012 (and there is no consistent definition of what constitutes a deployed warhead or the mechanism for verifying the reductions). After that, each side can do what it pleases. The Geneva talks will resume in the second half of January. But so far there is no evidence that Moscow or Washington's positions will make serious progress.
Debates on Nuclear Deterrence
Meanwhile, sharp debate on the issue of nuclear weapons is unfolding on the American political scene. On the one hand, the idea of universal and complete nuclear disarmament, which George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn and William Perry proposed three years ago, has received an overwhelming response not only in pacifist circles, but also among many in the American political elite. But aside from generalities about the need to prevent a nuclear catastrophe, no detailed proposals on the plan to eliminate nuclear weapons have followed. In the U.S., there was no mass movement to renounce it.
On the other hand, in recent months, nuclear weapons advocates have been clearly trying to seize the initiative. Their main argument is that there's a need to maintain, rather than weaken, reliable nuclear deterrents while international instability grows. Thus, the magazine "Foreign Policy" has recently published an article in which the author argues that nuclear deterrence remains the foundation of strategic stability, and the probability of nuclear war or nuclear terrorism is very low. Another influential magazine, "Foreign Affairs," has published an article alleging that the U.S. should not reduce nuclear weapons. Instead, it should make their use more effective, allowing the U.S. to safely hit any target, including super-protected targets.
In addition, some experts expressed a concern that major reductions may encourage China to enhance its nuclear capability. But the United States is not interested in having to recognize a "mutual nuclear deterrence" with China.
In general, opponents of revising nuclear strategy do not object to placing emphasis on high-precision conventional weapons. But they think it's possible to achieve absolute excellence in both conventional and nuclear armaments. This specific alignment of forces is emerging in the U.S. Congress as well. Although the Democratic Party controls both chambers of the American supreme legislative body, and Democratic leaders in the House and Senate are advocates of arms control, the White House is facing serious challenges on Capitol Hill.
First, in light of the severe economic crisis that has engulfed the U.S., some American congressmen began to consider questions of strategic arms reductions as a threat to jobs (which would be lost as a result of military base closures and the loss of defense orders). The bipartisan Institute for Defense & Business, which supports U.S. nuclear capabilities, is particularly active, calling for Obama not to reduce the current number of missiles (450 units) in the new treaty on strategic offensive arms. Similar groups operate to protect strategic submarines and heavy bombers.
Second, the Republican Party has an extremely negative attitude towards any of the Obama administration's policies. This applies to issues of arms control. Republicans have strongly condemned the White House for its decision to reduce spending on strategic missile defense, and for refusing to deploy a third missile defense position area in Eastern Europe. But Republicans failed to get these programs included in the budget. However, Republicans have enough votes to prevent the Senate from ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as well as the future START II with Russia. Republicans have 40 out of 100 seats in the Senate, and 67 votes are necessary for the ratification.
The far-right Republican Senator Jon Kyl (Arizona) leads the opposition to the new treaty on strategic offensive arms. In the summer of 2009, he managed to get the heads of the committees on defense and foreign relations to write a letter to Obama, demanding that he provide a detailed plan for the modernization of U.S. nuclear forces. In September, the Republican Senate committee issued a report that put forward some conditions for a new treaty on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on tactical nuclear weapons, the development of new nuclear warheads, and an unlimited deployment of missile defense. Similar requirements were set out in December in a letter to Obama, which was signed by all 40 Republican senators and former Democrat, now independent, Senator Joseph Lieberman (Connecticut).
Of course, this does not mean that the ratification of the new treaty is doomed to failure. Some influential Republican senators, such as Richard Lugar (Illinois*) and John McCain (Arizona), may support it. But apparently, the price that the White House will have to pay will include the modernization of weapons-grade nuclear complex and the creation of new nuclear weapons systems.
There are serious concerns that in a few decades, the reliability of nuclear warheads may be uncertain. Real problems are cropping up at the nuclear facilities of the Department of Energy. There are also serious differences between the White House and the Pentagon's nuclear policies.
Robert Gates, whom Obama has left at the post of secretary of Defense, has demonstrated his loyalty on issues such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and a freeze on strategic missile defense. But Gates holds traditional views on the role of nuclear weapons. This was reflected in the development of the Nuclear Policy Review. The Pentagon's version did not envision a radical change in the approach to nuclear deterrence, and was rejected by the White House. However, the Department of Defense has continued to persist. As a result, it was announced that the document would be ready later than expected - no sooner than March of next year.
All this puts Barack Obama, who won the Nobel Prize for his peaceful rhetoric, in an extremely difficult position. If the new nuclear doctrine of the U.S. does not provide for a major reduction in nuclear weapons (e.g. 1000 warheads) and at least a vague discussion of disarmament, the president's prestige will suffer a serious blow. Of course, the prospects for a new treaty on strategic offensive arms will be even more questionable. The Obama administration will not be able to ensure American leadership in strengthening the nonproliferation regime.
Clearly, Obama needs to use all of his political capital to escape from this trap. This will be difficult, when his popularity among voters has fallen. If the Obama administration makes concessions at Geneva, the Republicans will accuse the president of weakness and incompetence. In addition, the Democratic Party is likely to have heavy losses in the Congressional election in November this year.
At an Impasse: Is There a Way Out?
During the Cold War, and at its final stage, an arms control regime was formed. It was considered to be a cornerstone of strategic stability. This regime was based on five components: the ABM and START (SALT), INF, CFE and the NPT. Today, three of them - ABM, START and CFE - do not operate anymore, the Non-Proliferation Treaty is in doubt, and the prospects of INF are vague.
It seems that the end of the world is coming. But apparently, no one except a few specialists is taking any notice. Other issues - such as the global economic crisis and global climate change (either global warming or cooling) - are dominating. The approaches to solving these problems aren't very successful. Decisions made by G20 are just wishful thinking, and the Copenhagen summit ended in failure.
Does this mean that the era of treaties on arms control is history? After all, there were no agreements between the two superpowers on arms control prior to the Cold War. But armed confrontations between these two centers of power were considered the norm. The balance of power in a multipolar world has always been precarious. And it always led to conflicts.
Polycentric chaos is once again rising in a multipolar world. For now, there are no military clashes among the key players. But even before World War I, people believed that economic interdependence would prevent military clashes among the great powers. Will history repeat itself in the 21st century, when almost every central power has nuclear weapons?
Today, the world has entered a new arms race, which is multilateral. For Russia, this scenario represents a particular threat. After all, we do not have a chance of winning this race due to our current economic, scientific, and technical capabilities. Therefore, Moscow has given priority to the preservation of nuclear deterrence. Although, the decline of our industry creates serious problems here as well (as exemplified by the long story surrounding the Bulava missile).
In Russia today it is difficult to find supporters of nuclear disarmament. In circumstances where we are lagging behind in creating the newest conventional weapons, reliance on nuclear deterrence seems logical. This will be reflected in Moscow's new military doctrine. But Russia is not in any way interested in the spread of nuclear weapons, even though it does not consider (and never will) Iraq, Iran, or North Korea as potential adversaries.
In my opinion, a new bilateral treaty on strategic offensive arms between Russia and the United States is the indispensable first step to establishing a new multilateral security system corresponding to the realities of today's multipolar world. Only once a new Russo-American treaty is established will it be possible to include in this process other nuclear powers, creating a new global regime of strategic stability.
Can Russia and the United States overcome existing differences at the Geneva talks? I believe that compromise is possible if they find a mutually acceptable solution to the verification problem. But it cannot be found in the new treaty on strategic offensive arms, due to the asymmetry in the life cycles of strategic offensive arms of the two countries. The U.S. has nothing to offer Russia in return that would reverse the unilateral nature of the old regime of verification.
But Moscow remains interested in detailed information about American missile defense. Washington argues that its program of missile defense does not threaten Russia. But meanwhile, the Pentagon is planning to establish by 2018 a modification of "Aegis" (missile SM-3 Block 2b), which will be able to intercept ICBMs in the middle portion of the flight. It is likely that this will not happen. But after the United States exited the ABM Treaty in 2002, Russia has reason to suspect the American side's intention to break the system of mutual nuclear deterrence, and to achieve absolute military superiority.
The U.S. could demonstrate in practice the link between strategic offensive and defensive weapons. It could propose to establish a missile defense regime of transparency, similar to what Americans want to have for the offensive weapons. I believe that such a regime of transparency, including exchanges of telemetry data, could be part of a Russo-American agreement on cooperation in missile defense. Naturally, Moscow will never help the establishment of missile defense, which would undermine Russia's nuclear potential. But the interaction to protect against medium-range missiles (which Russia and the United States destroyed as part of the INF Treaty) is possible. After all, virtually all countries with medium-range missiles are located near the Russian border. However, Washington must provide convincing evidence that we are not talking about creating a strategic missile defense.
The technical parameters of separating strategic and nonstrategic missile defense were identified in 1997, in a protocol signed by Primakov and Albright. But this protocol has not been activated, due to the failure of START-2. Now, this document could be used as a basis for a new agreement.
Of course, it will take time to finally agree on the details of the agreement regarding cooperation in missile defense. But Russia and the United States could quickly prepare a "Memorandum of Understanding", which would contain the principles of cooperation on missile defense. Such a memorandum could be signed together with a new treaty on strategic offensive arms. It's possible to do so before the Conference on Non-Proliferation.
If this window of opportunity is not used, then the Geneva talks could drag on for a long time, and end in vain. Meanwhile, Russo-American relations will once again start to accumulate problems (like the restrictions on exports of chicken legs, or recognition of Ukrainian election results). There is a large spectrum of opportunities to disrupt the "reset" of Russo-American relations.
The complete collapse of the bilateral arms control regime, which operated until now, does not meet Russia's security interests. This applies not only to the possible attempt by Washington to take advantage of the lack of legally binding constraints to achieve military superiority and increase pressure on Moscow. If the strategic parity between the U.S. and Russia will no longer be enshrined in an official contract, our prestige on the world stage will be substantially weakened.
A new treaty on strategic offensive arms will not be perfect. But the previous agreements on arms control were not ideal either. We must soberly assess the pros and cons of the new agreement. After all, it would allow us to implement all of the planned programs to modernize strategic weapons, and maintain tactical nuclear weapons. Today, Russia has a real opportunity to preserve the military-strategic stability in relations with the U.S. based on mutual nuclear deterrence until the end of this decade. And this opportunity must be seized.
*Richard Lugar is actually a senator from Indiana.
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