Weak Arab Regimes Like Iraq Invite Terror Attacks
Published in Azzaman
(Iraq) on 12 April 2007
by Fatih Abdulsalam (link to original)
(Iraq) on 12 April 2007
by Fatih Abdulsalam (link to original)
Translated from
by Mutasem Sinnokrot.
Edited by .
Any explosion of terrorism in the Arab World is a direct reflection of the ongoing war in Iraq. This is not an accusation against anyone nor is it a revelation. It has become apparent that most intelligence services are working to address the risks, and that their eyes are wide open to the danger of what is occurring in Iraq.
National reconciliation never materialized and the current government failed to fulfill its commitment to President George Bush, which was to seize a national vision beyond narrow factional and party-based resentments and grudges played out behind closed doors. Therefore, Iraq will remain a land ravaged by violence that could lead to a number of wars encompassing other nations, even those that are geographically remote.
For his part, President Bush has clearly expressed the need to achieve reconciliation in Iraq, which would help him schedule a withdrawal. This would be like a fruit in his hand rather than the government's empty promises.
The factions that comprise the Iraqi resistance have nothing in common with the ideas of al-Qaeda. The Iraqi resistance was never based on al-Qaeda ideology, nor had its members ever encountered such thinking until after the occupation, since it consists of former members of the Iraqi armed forces and other governmental bodies, who felt cornered by American forces at the beginning of the occupation. These are simply people who felt they had no other option but to resist, when American forces failed to recognize the importance of holding a dialogue with such a huge sector of the population.
[Editor's Note: The author refers to the decision of American Pro-Consul Paul Bremer to disband the Iraqi Armed forces and bar all Baath Party members from holding public office or a government job. These are the people that form the bulk of the Iraqi resistance].
The interests of Washington and those of the resistance coincide, and nothing enters into America’s daily calculations more than this fact.
Without national reconciliation, it's impossible to envision the resistance turning its guns toward the struggle against al-Qaeda, despite the existing ideological differences between them. To the contrary, they are more likely to intensify their gunfire against their common enemy in the field [the Americans].
The concept of reconciliation within the government has undergone several tests and has failed miserably. After its repeated failures to secure the nation's security and the collapse of its credibility, hope for a government solution has long been extinguished.
It seems that the Americans, based on statements by senior State Department officials responsible for Iraq, doubt the seriousness of Prime Minister al-Maliki to fulfill his obligations to Iraqis.
The failure in Iraq is a government one - more than it is an American one … That is also the reason for al-Qaeda's attacks in Casablanca and Algeria.
National reconciliation never materialized and the current government failed to fulfill its commitment to President George Bush, which was to seize a national vision beyond narrow factional and party-based resentments and grudges played out behind closed doors. Therefore, Iraq will remain a land ravaged by violence that could lead to a number of wars encompassing other nations, even those that are geographically remote.
For his part, President Bush has clearly expressed the need to achieve reconciliation in Iraq, which would help him schedule a withdrawal. This would be like a fruit in his hand rather than the government's empty promises.
The factions that comprise the Iraqi resistance have nothing in common with the ideas of al-Qaeda. The Iraqi resistance was never based on al-Qaeda ideology, nor had its members ever encountered such thinking until after the occupation, since it consists of former members of the Iraqi armed forces and other governmental bodies, who felt cornered by American forces at the beginning of the occupation. These are simply people who felt they had no other option but to resist, when American forces failed to recognize the importance of holding a dialogue with such a huge sector of the population.
[Editor's Note: The author refers to the decision of American Pro-Consul Paul Bremer to disband the Iraqi Armed forces and bar all Baath Party members from holding public office or a government job. These are the people that form the bulk of the Iraqi resistance].
The interests of Washington and those of the resistance coincide, and nothing enters into America’s daily calculations more than this fact.
Without national reconciliation, it's impossible to envision the resistance turning its guns toward the struggle against al-Qaeda, despite the existing ideological differences between them. To the contrary, they are more likely to intensify their gunfire against their common enemy in the field [the Americans].
The concept of reconciliation within the government has undergone several tests and has failed miserably. After its repeated failures to secure the nation's security and the collapse of its credibility, hope for a government solution has long been extinguished.
It seems that the Americans, based on statements by senior State Department officials responsible for Iraq, doubt the seriousness of Prime Minister al-Maliki to fulfill his obligations to Iraqis.
The failure in Iraq is a government one - more than it is an American one … That is also the reason for al-Qaeda's attacks in Casablanca and Algeria.