Understanding American Anti-China Sentiment

Published in Zaobao
(Singapore) on 12 June 2009
by Xue Haipei (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Nicholas van Heyst. Edited by Louis Standish.
A major figure behind anti-China influence in the United States Congress, Speaker Nancy Pelosi, visited China in what was seen as a very important event

Regardless of the delegation's composition (committee group members), or the items on the daily agenda (renewable energy and the atmosphere) or the low-key way in which they handled the media before the trip (they declined interviews), the visit revealed that she was painstakingly trying to construct the image of a pleasant atmosphere and trying desperately to show that relations with China were positive. While in the country itself, every word and action was made in a way that would avoid displeasing the Chinese. This caused many observers' jaws to drop in disbelief; it also caused some special interest groups to lose much hope. It is hard to believe that this is the very same Pelosi who unfurled a banner in protest of Tiananmen Square 17 years ago.

Before her trip, I had the opportunity to speak with her chief of staff about Chinese affairs. With regards to the speaker’s trip to China, he asked me what sort of advice I had. I said there is only one thing: I hope that she can transform from being a member of the Democratic Party into being a responsible politician. Judging by her words and deeds in China and at the press conference after her return, she accomplished the task.
  
Has Pelosi Been Anti-China in the Past?

This has caused me to experience many different thoughts and feelings. I couldn't help but consider the very meaningful questions behind Chinese politics and diplomacy: How should one regard foreigners and the West, especially the so-called “anti-China” forces or those who are unfriendly towards China? I figured that this is far too broad of an idea because one has to take everything that shows dissatisfaction with China, from the various pieces of anti-China legislation to those who sympathize with Chinese dissidents and place them into the same category – inducing whatever associated connotations and denotations. Furthermore, this type of label is easy to put on but very difficult to take off and is rather unsuitable for day-to-day use.

Language plays an extremely profound role in the way that people are impressed. You could say that each nation's syntax deeply influences each individual person’s character. While speaking with some representatives from nations friendly to China for the Chinese periodical “Baokan,” I was astonished to find out that the concepts or expressions of “anti-China" and "unfriendly towards China" have come into frequent use –used as one pleases in ways that can deeply impress a person’s thinking or the way people of differing opinions form their attitudes. This growing tendency of anti-China sentiment can actually take people who would not necessarily be anti-China and push them into a camp that is truly in opposition to China, while at the same time mislead those who firmly grasp onto Chinese foreign relationships.

Perhaps a more serious issue is the opposite position to the anti-China/ unfriendly towards China way of thinking does not only consist of the pro-China forces. Along this line of reasoning, it becomes very difficult to place an absolute majority into the middle or gray area – those who are neither in opposition nor in favor of China. It is also no help in clarifying or classifying what is true or false. For instance, if China is truly seeing any improvement in its position on certain issues, then by what means do you judge the motivations behind the opposition's criticism? If the opposition in one breath praises and then criticizes the next, how can this be a good thing? By looking at the issue from the perspective of the two factions, our constructive criticism and advice that is directed towards China might be considered anti-China or unfriendly towards China if we are not careful. It is like the "Anti-Revolutionary” law that was eliminated in 1997: the connotations and denotations were extreme, the definition was vague and the subjective and conceptual execution untimely.

Even though I don't have a suitable replacement label off-hand, there is one thing for which I am certain: one must strive for neutrality with labels and strive to use them less, especially with those that have the ability to intimidate or even cause great harm to oneself in a brief period of time when used often, such as “anti-China” or "unfriendly towards China.”

There is a very good expression in the English language, which is "self-fulfilling prophecy"; that is to say, if your whole mind is focused on anti-China sentiment, your eyes will seek out this type of enemy at every turn and ultimately you will succeed in bringing forth a truly anti-China sentiment. In the United States, we often use this type of criticism against right-wing groups, and to admonish them we will say that if you continue to view regard China as an imagined enemy day-in and day-out, you will one day actually cultivate China into America's actual enemy. Conversely, they might also have the same outcome in China.

Of course, the United States and the West have those who truly harbor anti-China sentiment, but these types of people actually make up an extreme minority. One still needs to carefully differentiate between them and know the source or motivation behind each person’s dissatisfaction, so that when confronting them, one is able to act in a way that is reasonable, sound and consistent.

For instance, those from the right wing who are anti-China differ greatly from those on the Left. The American right wing’s, or Republican Party's, opposition to China has been rooted in an anticommunist ideology from early on, and they are conditioned to react with the aim of preserving the United States’ global supremacy.

However the Left, or the Democratic Party, will not go for this type of behavior. The left wing in the United States does not identify with this idea of America being on top, and so it is not in their interest to use aggressive military tactics to counter China's abrupt rise; rather, they have a more pacifist leaning and support internationalism and pluralism. This has been very evident in the foreign policy of the Obama administration. Therefore, the anti-China sentiment that comes from the Left comes from the issue of human rights for the most part, and they follow the human rights situation in China from a perspective geared towards universal value and the progression of society. Despite this, they often seem to apply the wrong prescriptions. To put it in a more drastically, the Left's anti-Chinese sentiment arises from a bleeding heart ideology and is not a product of bad intentions; however, the Right’s anti-Chinese sentiment is much darker and complicated. One must begin with this background knowledge in order to fully grasp the various positions that Pelosi has held over the years on Chinese human rights and Tibet.

Would It Be Better to Call Mr. Chen Shuibian?

So how should we deal with those generally acknowledged to be unfriendly towards China? With them, it is also necessary to act with precaution. A reason for this is that these people are not inflexible, nor is China's position or interest unchanging. For example, there was the time when the governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, fired up China with his lofty tone towards political reform. As a result, every kind of propaganda machinery started operating and mass criticism lead to personal attacks. So what became of it all? Several years ago Patten, as a member of the Foreign Affairs branch of the European Commission, made a personal visit to China and severely rebuked the U.S.'s unilateralism while meeting with Chinese leaders. This common ground, which was regrettably unbeknownst to them until that time, caused China to change their impression towards him and increase their coordination with EU foreign affairs.

Of course the most famous example of this comes from the American president Nixon, who went from being America's most anti-communist and anti-China figure to one who later worked closely with the nation. This has resulted in the creation of a new expression in English: "Nixon Going to China," or “to do a Nixon going to China.” When placed in a certain context, those who say they are anti-China mean that "the more one is in opposition to China the more likely he or she will act favorable to them." Is this not worth pondering?  

One reason that one must also take a civilized approach towards those who brandish an iron rod in their anti-China disposition is that the more one judges others as the arch-enemy who is cursed throughout the ages – even to the point of belittling one’s own integrity – the more that person will display signs that he is irrational and uncivil; furthermore, it will result in a loss of one’s moral high ground or political integrity. Consider that in reaction to the pursuit of Taiwanese independence from Li Denghui and Chen Shuibian, we just need to calmly declare that we believe a severing between the two sides of the Taiwan strait is neither suitable for the Chinese people as a whole nor China's long term benefit, and that is all. Is it necessary to grind one’s teeth in hatred? What if we were a little more courageous in spirit, and formally addressed the two of them as Mr. Li Denghui and Mr. Chen Shuibian, allowing the world and especially the Taiwanese people to see that the Chinese government is magnanimous and civilized, which in turn would cause people to see that the rationale and character quality of both men is low, and from here we could win over more people’s minds.

While tracing back to the roots of the way in which the non-black and white nature and the sentimentality of issues between political enemies or those hold differing opinions are rectified, what comes to the surface is the lack of human sentiment in Chinese culture and the thousand-year struggle in Chinese politics that was driven by the attitude that "you die and I live." If only this page can be turned over in this generation.

As both the Chinese and United States governments struggle, especially with China’s disregard towards old grudges and a tolerant, open-minded attitude, China can take the initiative in extending a hand with the aim of good will and reconciliation. Pelosi's visit to China has resulted in the cordial interaction from both sides, and in what prime minister Wen Jiabao called "harmony without uniformity." This has carved a new, desirable and civil path that modern Chinese diplomacy can follow while dealing with political enemies.
  
Author is an American political activist of Chinese descent



薛海培(华盛顿)

  美国国会“反华势力”领军人物佩洛西以众议院议长身份访华,这是美中关系上的一件大事。

  此次访华无论从代表团的构成(理智派人物),还是日程安排(以能源和大气议题为主),或是行前对媒体的低调处理(不接受媒体采访),都能感觉到她在刻意营造良好气氛,力争实现与中方的良性互动。她在中国的一言一行很少提及令中方不快的话题。这令不少观察人士跌破眼镜,也使一些利益团体大失所望。很难想象这就是17年前在天安门广场上从怀里抽出抗议布条的佩洛西。

  在她行前,笔者曾与她的中国事务幕僚长谈。他问我对议长访华有什么建言,我说只有一条,希望她能完成从自由派议员到一个负责任的政治家的转型。从她在华的一言一行和回美后的记者会看,她是做到了。

佩洛西过去是否反华?

  这让笔者感触良多,不禁想到中国政治和外交中很有意思的问题:如何看待海外、西方,特别是美国所谓的“反华势力”或“对华不友好人士”。笔者一直认为这些是一个太笼统的超大概念,它把所有对华不满、投了“反华”法案票或同情中国“异议势力”的人都放到一个外延和内涵极广的概念里面了,而且这种标签贴上容易,拿下难,实不宜经常启用。

  语言对人的影响是极为深远的。可以说,一个民族的遣辞用句常常会深刻影响其民族个性。笔者在中国报刊和与国内一些人士交谈中惊讶发现“反华势力”、“对华不友好”这类词或概念目前依然使用频繁、随意,深深地影响了人们的思维方式和对待不同意见人士的处置态度。这种“反华势力”扩大化倾向既把许多不必然会成为“反华势力”的人推向真正的反华阵营,同时对准确把握中外关系也会有许多误导。

  也许更为严重的是,“反华势力/对华不友好”作为一种思维概念的对立面不就是“亲华势力”吗?在这种思维方式引导下,人们很难看到绝大多数占据中间灰色地带,既不反华也不亲华的人士。它也无助于厘清问题的是与非。假如中国确实在某些问题上存在有待改进之处,你又如何判断对方批评的动机呢?假如对方既批评又赞赏中国,那又该如何是好呢?以这种两分法眼光看问题,我们平时对中国的建设性批评和建言,一不小心,也可能被划入“对华不友好人士”之列。它像1997 年取消的“反革命罪”:内涵和外延极广,定义模糊,执行主观,概念不合时宜。

  尽管笔者一时也没有很好的替代标签,但有一点是清楚的:在对人的问题上,标签要尽量中性,尽量少用,特别是像“反华人士”或“对华不友好人士”这种可以拎起来打人的大棒,一旦常用会把自己伤害得更厉害些。

  英文中有个很好的表述概念,那就是“自我实现的预言”(self-fulfilling prophecy),讲的是如果你满脑子装的都是“反华势力”这样的概念,你的眼睛就会到处寻找这样的敌人,最终你就会造就一大批真正的“反华势力”出来。我们在美国常用这种说法来批评右翼人士的“反华”言行,告诫他们说你们天天把中国看成假想敌的话,那么你最终就很有可能把中国“培育”成美国的敌人。反之,在中国也会有这种可能。

  当然,美国及西方也确有逢中必反的反华人士,但那毕竟只是极少数。但就是对他们也要加以细化和分解,知道人家不满的出处和动机,这样才能在对应时做到有理有据有节。

  比如美国的右翼反华和左翼反华就很不一样。美国右翼或共和党反华,早期是作为一种意识形态的反共,眼下则是作为维持美国全球主导权的一种条件反射。

  但左翼或民主党并不会对此轻易买单。美国左翼并不认同这种“美国第一”或把穷兵黩武作为对付中国崛起的国策,他们更有和平主义倾向,支持国际主义和多边主义,这在奥巴马政府的对外政策中已十分明确。而左派在人权议题上的“反华”更多的是从这种普世价值、社会进步的角度来关注中国人权状况,尽管不时会开错药方。夸张点讲,左派是从“一颗流血的心”的角度来“反华”,常常并非恶意,而右翼反华则其用心要复杂和阴暗很多。只有放在这种大背景下了解佩洛西的“反华”才能把握好佩洛西多年来在中国人权和西藏议题上的种种表现。

称“陈水扁先生”会更好?

  那么,我们应该如何应对那些公认的“对华不友好人士”?对他们也要讲求方式方法。原因之一是这些人不是不变的,而中方的利益和观点也不是不变的。举个例子。当年港督彭定康因在走前高调搞“政改”,让中方很火。于是各类宣传机器一起开动,大批特批,甚至进行人身攻击。结果呢?几年前彭氏以欧盟外交专员身份访华,与中国国家领导人一起大骂美国搞单边主义,所谈甚欢,相见恨晚,中方一改对其印象,并期望加大与欧盟外交事务的协调。

  当然,这方面最有名的例子是人人皆知的美国总统尼克松。从美国最为反共反华人士到跟中国走很近,以至于英文为他老人家专门创立了一个表达法:Nixon going to China或说do a Nixon-going-to-China。放到“反华人士”语境的上下文里,意思就是“越反华的人越可能会亲华”。这不是值得深思吗?

  对铁杆“反华人士”也要文明相待的另一个原因是,你越是搞那种“千古罪人,遗臭万年”式的大批判,甚至对人格贬低,就越容易显示出你自己的非理性和不文明,反而容易失去道德制高点和政治上的优雅。试想,对李登辉和陈水扁要搞台独,我们只须以平常心申明我们认为台海两岸分离不符合中国人民的整体和长远利益就行了,有必要恨得咬牙切齿吗?但假如雅量再多点,在正式场合里坚持称其二位为“李登辉先生”或“陈水扁先生”,那会让世人,特别是台湾民众感到中国政府的雅量和文明,更反托出他们两位的理念偏执和人品低下,从而赢得更多的人心。

  对政敌或持不同意见者的不黑既白和情绪化处置,究其根源,其实是中国文化中相对缺少人性宽容和中国政治史上千百年来你死我活残酷斗争的反映。但愿这一页能在这一代最终被翻过。

  在中美两国政府的积极努力下,特别是中国政府不计前嫌,以宽容大度的心态,主动伸出善意和解之手,通过佩洛西议长的访华,达成了双方的良性互动,基本做到了温总理对佩洛西议长所说的“和而不同”。这在中国现代外交史上就如何对待自己的“政敌”开了一个良好而又文明的先河。

作者是美国华裔社会活动家
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