Obama and the Rationale for a Bumbling Foreign Policy
Published in Liberation
(France) on 12 November 2009
by Olivier Debouzy (link to original)
(France) on 12 November 2009
by Olivier Debouzy (link to original)
Translated from
by Lauren Messina.
Edited by Harley Jackson.
For the last 9 months, the Obama administration has suffered from many problems that have prevented it from implementing a coherent foreign defense policy. There is no indication that this situation is going to change in the near future.
The first problem is that, unlike presidents Nixon or George W. Bush, Barack Obama does not have a strategist comparable to Henry Kissinger or Brent Scowcroft. In other words, Obama lacks a man capable of thinking in the long-term and reflecting on the type of strategy necessary to achieve the kind of global role that the United States would like to have in ten or twenty years. General Jones, his national security advisor, is a crisis administrator whose presence wards off urgency, but from whom the president never demands any conceptual input. In addition, it seems that the main circle of the president’s advisors, composed mainly of David Axelrod and Rahm Emanuel, are interested only in internal affairs. The National Security Council (NSC), which has grown to its largest since creation, only assists in the security area. This has created frictions within the State Department, the Pentagon and the diverse czars nominated to take care of more specific problems (the ongoing evolution of Israeli-Palestinian peace, the Afghanistan-Pakistan zone, etc.).
Secondly, the Obama Administration is characterized by its many strong personalities and account heads which, too often, encroach upon one another. Examples are the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, seen as imposing herself on the czars, with whom relations are difficult; Richard Holbrooke (who preferred Clinton’s position) and George Mitchell, among others. Obama gives the impression of considering himself to be the only arbitrator of these personalities; someone who can serve various personality types and the opinions they bring. Thus, Obama essentially becomes responsible for military and diplomatic action in all areas. Even though his time is important and questions of internal politics (economic and social) take up most of this time, Obama makes no decision on the subject of foreign defense policy and can only make speeches of great generality regarding defense.
Finally, despite his origins, Obama has, like all American politicians, very limited international experience. Therefore, he has the tendency to envisage a strictly American rationale to his foreign representatives-this is particularly visible in the case of Iran. This results in difficulties forming relations with foreign governments for the U.S. This last characteristic, combined with problems likely to be directly involved in the issues of foreign defense policy, show that American politics are in a state of indecision and chronic inefficiency, particularly in the foreign relations domain.
Euro-American relations at the governmental level are otherwise characterized, at least in Washington, by indifference, misunderstanding and even a sort of irritation. First, the indifference is that Europe is clearly not the priority of the new U.S. administration. The idea of the G2 summit with China (at least in the minds of Americans), eclipses the European allies, who have been judged as archaic and chilly by Americans. The Obama administration thinks that the Europeans' only purpose is to comply with the injunctions of Washington, either collectively (in the sense of NATO), or in smaller affairs. As a result, the majority of Europeans are reluctant to contribute to the military effort in Afghanistan, which is seen by America as confirmation that they are not useful in any way.
Next, the misunderstanding is that the Obama Administration does not comprehend more than its predecessors did about the social and economic equilibrium in Europe. The administration does not attempt to understand the reluctance of some Europeans regarding the idea of the nuclear disarmament, and it refuses to understand the problems met by Europeans (including the French), concerning the G2 summit and Russia. These are both objects of the administration’s attentions in their attempts to rediscover a structured framework for foreign policy and achieve a reduced defense budget. The U.S. defense budget was critiqued relentlessly by U.S. Democratic voters for being both too large and detrimental to social programs.
Finally, the Obama administration's irritation is caused by European firmness on the question of the TNP (Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Arms) and Iran, shedding light on both America’s inconsistency and procrastination. In the case of America's military problem, some have the impression that the United States will have to assume the main burden of defending the Gulf States, a task of which they are currently incapable due to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. With the weak American position, it is very unlikely the Senate will ratify the treaty banning nuclear trials by 2011. This would lead to a paradox in which the United States, at the Review Conference of Non-Proliferation 2010, would advocate non-proliferation while being incapable of implementing non-proliferation themselves.
On a more personal level, Obama, both cerebral and rarely demonstrative, seems to sometimes think that the European leaders look to exploit U.S. domestic policy and international reconnaissance objectives. He has a keen awareness of American superiority; therefore his own ego is tidy compared with his peers. Obama expresses an unusual separation from American politicians. This is what makes personal relationships with him complicated; something to which both a national leader and the European government can attest.
The preceding analysis drives relatively short-term pessimism about the evolution of Euro-American relations and the possible results of Obama’s foreign security policy. Moreover, the American political cycle depends on factors over which Europeans have little control, and foreign policy is not a deciding factor on who will win the midterm U.S. elections of 2010. With this in mind, the European allies of the United States could possibly find themselves missing George W. Bush.
The first problem is that, unlike presidents Nixon or George W. Bush, Barack Obama does not have a strategist comparable to Henry Kissinger or Brent Scowcroft. In other words, Obama lacks a man capable of thinking in the long-term and reflecting on the type of strategy necessary to achieve the kind of global role that the United States would like to have in ten or twenty years. General Jones, his national security advisor, is a crisis administrator whose presence wards off urgency, but from whom the president never demands any conceptual input. In addition, it seems that the main circle of the president’s advisors, composed mainly of David Axelrod and Rahm Emanuel, are interested only in internal affairs. The National Security Council (NSC), which has grown to its largest since creation, only assists in the security area. This has created frictions within the State Department, the Pentagon and the diverse czars nominated to take care of more specific problems (the ongoing evolution of Israeli-Palestinian peace, the Afghanistan-Pakistan zone, etc.).
Secondly, the Obama Administration is characterized by its many strong personalities and account heads which, too often, encroach upon one another. Examples are the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, seen as imposing herself on the czars, with whom relations are difficult; Richard Holbrooke (who preferred Clinton’s position) and George Mitchell, among others. Obama gives the impression of considering himself to be the only arbitrator of these personalities; someone who can serve various personality types and the opinions they bring. Thus, Obama essentially becomes responsible for military and diplomatic action in all areas. Even though his time is important and questions of internal politics (economic and social) take up most of this time, Obama makes no decision on the subject of foreign defense policy and can only make speeches of great generality regarding defense.
Finally, despite his origins, Obama has, like all American politicians, very limited international experience. Therefore, he has the tendency to envisage a strictly American rationale to his foreign representatives-this is particularly visible in the case of Iran. This results in difficulties forming relations with foreign governments for the U.S. This last characteristic, combined with problems likely to be directly involved in the issues of foreign defense policy, show that American politics are in a state of indecision and chronic inefficiency, particularly in the foreign relations domain.
Euro-American relations at the governmental level are otherwise characterized, at least in Washington, by indifference, misunderstanding and even a sort of irritation. First, the indifference is that Europe is clearly not the priority of the new U.S. administration. The idea of the G2 summit with China (at least in the minds of Americans), eclipses the European allies, who have been judged as archaic and chilly by Americans. The Obama administration thinks that the Europeans' only purpose is to comply with the injunctions of Washington, either collectively (in the sense of NATO), or in smaller affairs. As a result, the majority of Europeans are reluctant to contribute to the military effort in Afghanistan, which is seen by America as confirmation that they are not useful in any way.
Next, the misunderstanding is that the Obama Administration does not comprehend more than its predecessors did about the social and economic equilibrium in Europe. The administration does not attempt to understand the reluctance of some Europeans regarding the idea of the nuclear disarmament, and it refuses to understand the problems met by Europeans (including the French), concerning the G2 summit and Russia. These are both objects of the administration’s attentions in their attempts to rediscover a structured framework for foreign policy and achieve a reduced defense budget. The U.S. defense budget was critiqued relentlessly by U.S. Democratic voters for being both too large and detrimental to social programs.
Finally, the Obama administration's irritation is caused by European firmness on the question of the TNP (Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Arms) and Iran, shedding light on both America’s inconsistency and procrastination. In the case of America's military problem, some have the impression that the United States will have to assume the main burden of defending the Gulf States, a task of which they are currently incapable due to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. With the weak American position, it is very unlikely the Senate will ratify the treaty banning nuclear trials by 2011. This would lead to a paradox in which the United States, at the Review Conference of Non-Proliferation 2010, would advocate non-proliferation while being incapable of implementing non-proliferation themselves.
On a more personal level, Obama, both cerebral and rarely demonstrative, seems to sometimes think that the European leaders look to exploit U.S. domestic policy and international reconnaissance objectives. He has a keen awareness of American superiority; therefore his own ego is tidy compared with his peers. Obama expresses an unusual separation from American politicians. This is what makes personal relationships with him complicated; something to which both a national leader and the European government can attest.
The preceding analysis drives relatively short-term pessimism about the evolution of Euro-American relations and the possible results of Obama’s foreign security policy. Moreover, the American political cycle depends on factors over which Europeans have little control, and foreign policy is not a deciding factor on who will win the midterm U.S. elections of 2010. With this in mind, the European allies of the United States could possibly find themselves missing George W. Bush.
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