Obama Should Negotiate with the Taliban
After hesitating for some weeks, President Barack Obama revealed his new strategy for Afghanistan, announcing his intention to send 30,000 extra troops to bolster forces already present in the country while promising to withdraw troops in 2011.
The president’s plan contains a fundamental contradiction quite impossible to fathom. It is the decision to increase of troops while setting a schedule for withdrawal. This contradiction could well have negative effects on military operations and the American political vision for the country.
Perhaps Obama, by promising to withdraw after two years, is attempting to reassure the American people who oppose the war and deem it difficult, if not impossible, to win. But his Afghan allies will be angered by this decision since they want the American forces to stay for as long as possible and withdraw only once they complete their mission and establish a strong and flourishing state.
Opponents of the Taliban, who fight alongside their NATO allies, will feel that the United States is abandoning them in two years. This will demoralize their fighting spirit and push them to curb their hostility towards the Taliban, with the possibility even of conciliation, since the Taliban could well end up being the winning horse at the end of the race.
President Obama did not entirely satisfy the request made by the head of forces in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, by sending only 30,000 troops rather than the 40,000 desired. This is because Obama knows well that sending the extra 10,000 would not change the military balance on the ground to a large extent.
Afghanistan is not Iraq and comparison here is misplaced. One cannot graft the same strategies used in Iraq, which Americans consider to have succeeded, onto Afghanistan. In Iraq, the U.S. war plan obtained two-thirds support, i.e. the Kurds and the Shi’a population, at the start of the invasion. The story is different in Afghanistan where more than 90 percent of the Afghani population is Sunni Muslim and followers of the strict Hanifiyya Sect (founded by Abu Hanifah), with over 50 percent of the population being either from the Pashtun tribe or having close relations with them. Thus the degree of support for the Pashtun Taliban movement is very high among these people.
It is correct to say that President Obama inherited this Afghani quagmire from the previous administration. But this also means that Obama, because of this reality, is able to make bold decisions and therefore withdraw immediately in order to stem the bloodletting and material loss. This would save America’s reputation, which has struggled to rid itself of the stains caused by its wars and subsequent losses in Iraq and Afghanistan.
President Obama announced that the age of American hegemony over other peoples has ended. These are wise words reflecting a new approach. The first step in correctly translating this approach onto the ground would be by admitting error and withdrawing, thus putting an end to the bloodbaths resulting from U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.
If the goal of U.S. forces in increasing troop numbers is to put an end to Al-Qaeda, it would not be achieved even if the U.S. doubled its troop numbers in Afghanistan. The U.S. troops are simply fighting Al-Qaeda on the wrong battlefield.
Afghanistan is no longer the priority for Al-Qaeda inasmuch as it is no longer its only safe refuge. It would be an exaggeration to say that Afghanistan is very low on Al-Qaeda’s list of priorities. It is, rather, currently behind Yemen, Somalia and the Islamic Maghreb in order of importance, as Al-Qaeda has opened strong branches closer to the Arabic world and Europe.
Our advice to President Barack Obama is that he makes negotiations with the Taliban a priority for the coming period to ensure a safe withdrawal for U.S. forces. Waging his bet on the corrupt Hamid Karzai will not lead to anything other than defeat.
If Obama does not want to make Afghanistan the Vietnam of his administration, he should cede power in Afghanistan to the Taliban movement as soon as possible.
The president’s plan contains a fundamental contradiction quite impossible to fathom. It is the decision to increase of troops while setting a schedule for withdrawal. This contradiction could well have negative effects on military operations and the American political vision for the country.
Perhaps Obama, by promising to withdraw after two years, is attempting to reassure the American people who oppose the war and deem it difficult, if not impossible, to win. But his Afghan allies will be angered by this decision since they want the American forces to stay for as long as possible and withdraw only once they complete their mission and establish a strong and flourishing state.
Opponents of the Taliban, who fight alongside their NATO allies, will feel that the United States is abandoning them in two years. This will demoralize their fighting spirit and push them to curb their hostility towards the Taliban, with the possibility even of conciliation, since the Taliban could well end up being the winning horse at the end of the race.
President Obama did not entirely satisfy the request made by the head of forces in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, by sending only 30,000 troops rather than the 40,000 desired. This is because Obama knows well that sending the extra 10,000 would not change the military balance on the ground to a large extent.
Afghanistan is not Iraq and comparison here is misplaced. One cannot graft the same strategies used in Iraq, which Americans consider to have succeeded, onto Afghanistan. In Iraq, the U.S. war plan obtained two-thirds support, i.e. the Kurds and the Shi’a population, at the start of the invasion. The story is different in Afghanistan where more than 90 percent of the Afghani population is Sunni Muslim and followers of the strict Hanifiyya Sect (founded by Abu Hanifah), with over 50 percent of the population being either from the Pashtun tribe or having close relations with them. Thus the degree of support for the Pashtun Taliban movement is very high among these people.
It is correct to say that President Obama inherited this Afghani quagmire from the previous administration. But this also means that Obama, because of this reality, is able to make bold decisions and therefore withdraw immediately in order to stem the bloodletting and material loss. This would save America’s reputation, which has struggled to rid itself of the stains caused by its wars and subsequent losses in Iraq and Afghanistan.
President Obama announced that the age of American hegemony over other peoples has ended. These are wise words reflecting a new approach. The first step in correctly translating this approach onto the ground would be by admitting error and withdrawing, thus putting an end to the bloodbaths resulting from U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.
If the goal of U.S. forces in increasing troop numbers is to put an end to Al-Qaeda, it would not be achieved even if the U.S. doubled its troop numbers in Afghanistan. The U.S. troops are simply fighting Al-Qaeda on the wrong battlefield.
Afghanistan is no longer the priority for Al-Qaeda inasmuch as it is no longer its only safe refuge. It would be an exaggeration to say that Afghanistan is very low on Al-Qaeda’s list of priorities. It is, rather, currently behind Yemen, Somalia and the Islamic Maghreb in order of importance, as Al-Qaeda has opened strong branches closer to the Arabic world and Europe.
Our advice to President Barack Obama is that he makes negotiations with the Taliban a priority for the coming period to ensure a safe withdrawal for U.S. forces. Waging his bet on the corrupt Hamid Karzai will not lead to anything other than defeat.
If Obama does not want to make Afghanistan the Vietnam of his administration, he should cede power in Afghanistan to the Taliban movement as soon as possible.