Financial analysts are still debating whether the world economy requires another substantial dose of fiscal stimuli; considering that the global unemployment rate has soared and that the future looks grim as well.
In the U.S., the crisis was so severe that it was necessary to adopt the emergency measure of a stimulus package that pumped $787 billion into the economy in February. At that point, it would have been feasible to have an even larger stimulus package. However, according to Bruce Bartlett’s recent Forbes magazine article, all similar measures would be extremely risky now.
The economy was only able to recover from the Great Depression through the massive spending of World War II. But, people drew the wrong conclusion from this piece of history. They started to think that fiscal stimuli are the answer for any economic downturn.
Just like in the 1970’s, the result could eventually be stagflation. History will repeat itself unless people have some forethought and avoid the overuse of such fiscal policies, as these measures can only be justified under extreme circumstances.
After the Great Depression, economists understandably tried to do all they could to prevent similar disasters from reoccurring, especially because some theories at that time stated the crisis would shortly return after the initial recovery.
In the U.S., Congress ensured the stability of workplaces through the Employment Act of 1946. Thus, the U.S. government took all measures necessary in order to provide jobs for every American citizen and avoid another depression.
Although there were no precise “instructions,” John Maynard Keynes laid out the general objectives of this theory. He said that when spending by the populace decreases dramatically during a recession, public spending should increase in order to fill that gap and prevent, or at least moderate, a possible new crisis.
In an essay published in 1951, the economist Milton Friedman cast doubt on Keynes’ theory, arguing that his suggestions could only function if the prognoses were exact and the stimuli were perfectly calculated and synchronized. If these conditions were not met, the stimuli would come either too late, or too early, and in the wrong dose, which would only deepen the crisis.
Therefore, instead of ending the recession, the stimuli would create a never-ending cycle of economic rise and fall.
Unfortunately, Friedman was right. Economists have rarely been able to foresee a recession early enough to prepare a fiscal stimulus program. Moreover, they have denied that problems existed, even when the effects of the crisis on the economy were already visible.
And when the signs of the recession were identified, the economists’ delayed reactions meant it was impossible to put any rehabilitation plan into practice. Even after they managed to act, the government would take too long in preparing the legislation necessary before implementing any measures.
This is the vicious cycle that will continue without end, no matter how many recessions we face and how many crises threaten us with bankruptcy.
Analistii economici dezbat in aceasta perioada daca economia globala are nevoie de inca o doza substantiala de stimuli fiscali, avand in vedere mai ales rata inacceptabil de mare a somajului la nivel mondial si perspectivele sumbre ce se intrevad in viitor.
In SUA, pachetul de stimuli din februarie ce a pompat in economie 787 de miliarde de dolari a fost o masura de urgenta necesara la criza ce lovise atat de puternic. Ar fi putut fi chiar si mai mult atunci, insa orice masura asemanatoare acum nu se poate dovedi decat extrem de riscanta, considera Bruce Bartlett, intr-un articol din Forbes.
Economia a iesit din Marea Depresiune doar prin consumul masiv provocat de cel de-Al Doilea Razboi Mondial. Insa lumea a invatat o lectie gresita din aceasta bucata de istorie. S-a ajuns sa se creada ca stimulii fiscali sunt raspunsul pentru orice cadere economica.
Rezultatul ar fi, in cele din urma, o stagflatie asemanatoare celei din anii 1970. Si istoria se va repeta daca nu exista prudenta si nu se evita suprafolosirea politicilor fiscale de acest gen, masuri ce isi gasesc justificarea doar in circumstante extreme.
Dupa Marea Depresiune, era de inteles ca economistii sa faca orice pentru a se asigura ca un asemenea dezastru nu se mai repeta, mai ales ca existau multe teorii conform carora criza va reveni imediat dupa ce bunastarea temporara se va sfarsi.
In SUA, Congresul a asigurat stabilitatea pietei locurilor de munca prin Codul Muncii, in 1946. Astfel, Guvernul SUA trebuia sa se asigure ca o alta Depresiune nu se va mai repeta si ca vor exista locuri de munca pentru fiecare american.
Desi nu exista nicio "instructiune" exacta in legatura cu modul in care se vor atinge aceste obiective, singurul principiu enuntat atunci a fost cel al lui John Maynard Keynes. El a spus ca atunci cand consumul populatiei scade dramatic in timpul unei recesiuni, cheltuielile publice trebuie sa creasca pentru a umple acel gol si a preveni sau macar a modera o eventuala noua criza.
Intr-un eseu publicat in 1951, economistul Milton Friedman a pus la indoiala teoria lui Keynes, aratand ca aceasta nu ar putea functiona decat daca prognozele ar fi exacte si stimulii ar fi calculati si sincronizati perfect. In lipsa acestor conditii, stimulii ar fi aplicati fie prea tarziu, fie prea devreme si intr-un dozaj gresit, ceea ce ar duce la adancirea crizei.
Asadar, rezultatul nu ar fi cel dorit, de eliminare a recesiunii, ci mai degraba de creere a unui ciclu de crestere si descrestere economica.
Din pacate, Friedman avea dreptate. Economistii rareori au vazut semnele venirii unei recesiuni la timp pentru a putea fi pus la punct un program de stimuli fiscali, ba chiar de multe ori criza eroda de ceva timp economia inainte ca acestia sa recunoasca existenta problemelor.
Si chiar si atunci cand semnele recesiunii erau dibuite, timpul de reactie al economistilor facea imposibila punerea in aplicarea a vreunui plan de redresare. Si daca reuseau si sa faca asta, dura foarte mult pana cand guvernele puneau la dispozitie legislatia necesara pentru ca masurile sa poata fi luate.
Si acest cerc vicios va dura la nesfarsit, oricate recesiuni ar trece peste noi si oricate crize ne-ar aduce in pragul falimentului.
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