How to Give Afghanistan Back to the Afghans
We cannot hope to "win the war" in Afghanistan without asking ourselves what we want and against whom we are fighting. What is the use of sending more Western troops? Officially, the goal is only to prevent Al Qaeda from planning terrorist attacks with Afghanistan as a base. But Osama bin Laden’s former organization is weak; international operations of a terrorist nature are no longer organized from this country. Only small groups claim to be part of Al Qaeda, but they do not receive their orders from within Afghanistan. The terrorist attacks in Pakistan are the work of local Islamist militants and recent actions against India were masterminded in Pakistan. Afghan Taliban nationalists are not looking to plan operations outside of Afghanistan.
Are these “insurgents” really “the ruthless adversary who represents a direct menace to Americans and our allies” (Barack Obama, October 10 speech)? In addition to the simple but numerous thugs who are profiting from the situation through racketeering and abductions, the “rebels” are probably mostly nationalists who want a just social order and the departure of the foreign military, and will continue to fight as long as it remains in Afghanistan. It is true there are also extremists who wish to regain total control of the country and “internationalist” foreigners who would like to impose their backward conceptions onto it. Those are the ones who must be neutralized.
The weakness of the Afghan state and the presence of troops, often looked upon as an occupying force, are creating the problem. Afghans of all origins feel dispossessed of their country, even if a small minority is getting rich through corrupt means. To consolidate the state, we must restore the economy, the dams, the irrigation systems, the agriculture, small industries; develop micro-credits for individuals, rather than patrol incessantly in front of villagers. We must also build a responsible Afghan army. Today, the soldiers don’t see the advantage of fighting other Afghans in order to help foreigners remain. Doubling the salaries ($1,000 annually) of 50,000 Afghan soldiers would cost $50 million per year; a trifle compared to the sums spent on the war. As it was done in Iraq, the announcement of a set departure date for the foreign military coalition (in four or five years?) would also perhaps be an encouragement to them. The same goes for policemen, who are asked to defend a foreign presence and a discredited administration.
To once again give the means of action to a government that would finally be efficient, one must take into account the geographical and historical realities, rather than hope for a centralized Afghan state. In fact, most foreign countries that are members of the coalition live under federal or highly decentralized regimes. One solution could be to reinforce moderate nationalist groups: to weaken the traditional structures of power is to give free reign to armed extremists who have retreated into the mountains. Neither President Hamid Karzaï nor the coalition forces can govern faraway provinces without relying on what used to unite local society: village and tribal councils. In a country where relations between neighbors, alliances and reciprocity are fundamental, this should be done without reinstating authority to well established leaders. Personalities with some influence, or at least those that didn’t participate in the horrors of the power struggle in Kabul between 1992 and 1994, whatever we might think of them (such as some with whom Karzaï forged an alliance to ensure his re-election), could be fit to assume local authority. For example, provincial administrators at the time of the war against the Soviet Union could fill the current power vacuum.
Afghans cannot always be led by foreigners who want to impose their “liberal democratic” model on other countries. They should emphasize economic development assistance, and therefore pacification. This would entail contributing to infrastructure restoration, boosting the economy and giving Afghans jobs. More than making the war “Afghanized,” we need to “Afghanize” peace. If not that, then what? Continue the cycle of bombings followed by reprisal attacks, and hatred of the West?
Additional signatories: Mariam Abou Zahab, Bernard Dupaigne, Johan Freckhaus, Philippe Gautier, Edouard Lagourgue, Titouan Lamazou, Laurent Marechaux, Louis Meunier, Jérôme Veyret, researchers, artist, humanitarian, and consultants who worked in Afghanistan.
Are these “insurgents” really “the ruthless adversary who represents a direct menace to Americans and our allies” (Barack Obama, October 10 speech)? In addition to the simple but numerous thugs who are profiting from the situation through racketeering and abductions, the “rebels” are probably mostly nationalists who want a just social order and the departure of the foreign military, and will continue to fight as long as it remains in Afghanistan. It is true there are also extremists who wish to regain total control of the country and “internationalist” foreigners who would like to impose their backward conceptions onto it. Those are the ones who must be neutralized.
The weakness of the Afghan state and the presence of troops, often looked upon as an occupying force, are creating the problem. Afghans of all origins feel dispossessed of their country, even if a small minority is getting rich through corrupt means. To consolidate the state, we must restore the economy, the dams, the irrigation systems, the agriculture, small industries; develop micro-credits for individuals, rather than patrol incessantly in front of villagers. We must also build a responsible Afghan army. Today, the soldiers don’t see the advantage of fighting other Afghans in order to help foreigners remain. Doubling the salaries ($1,000 annually) of 50,000 Afghan soldiers would cost $50 million per year; a trifle compared to the sums spent on the war. As it was done in Iraq, the announcement of a set departure date for the foreign military coalition (in four or five years?) would also perhaps be an encouragement to them. The same goes for policemen, who are asked to defend a foreign presence and a discredited administration.
To once again give the means of action to a government that would finally be efficient, one must take into account the geographical and historical realities, rather than hope for a centralized Afghan state. In fact, most foreign countries that are members of the coalition live under federal or highly decentralized regimes. One solution could be to reinforce moderate nationalist groups: to weaken the traditional structures of power is to give free reign to armed extremists who have retreated into the mountains. Neither President Hamid Karzaï nor the coalition forces can govern faraway provinces without relying on what used to unite local society: village and tribal councils. In a country where relations between neighbors, alliances and reciprocity are fundamental, this should be done without reinstating authority to well established leaders. Personalities with some influence, or at least those that didn’t participate in the horrors of the power struggle in Kabul between 1992 and 1994, whatever we might think of them (such as some with whom Karzaï forged an alliance to ensure his re-election), could be fit to assume local authority. For example, provincial administrators at the time of the war against the Soviet Union could fill the current power vacuum.
Afghans cannot always be led by foreigners who want to impose their “liberal democratic” model on other countries. They should emphasize economic development assistance, and therefore pacification. This would entail contributing to infrastructure restoration, boosting the economy and giving Afghans jobs. More than making the war “Afghanized,” we need to “Afghanize” peace. If not that, then what? Continue the cycle of bombings followed by reprisal attacks, and hatred of the West?
Additional signatories: Mariam Abou Zahab, Bernard Dupaigne, Johan Freckhaus, Philippe Gautier, Edouard Lagourgue, Titouan Lamazou, Laurent Marechaux, Louis Meunier, Jérôme Veyret, researchers, artist, humanitarian, and consultants who worked in Afghanistan.