Obama Disregards China’s American Debt

Published in Nanfang Daily
(China) on 5 February 2010
by Tang Xuepeng (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Qu Xiao. Edited by Amy Wong.
As the depreciation of the U.S. dollar seems increasingly likely to be a long-term trend, Obama is behaving as though he doesn’t care much about China’s American debt.

Obama has recently stated that America would take a tough stand on China to achieve so-called fair trade and to prevent American jobs from being stolen.

Selling weapons to Taiwan, preparing to meet the separatist Dalai Lama, threatening to put pressure on the RMB exchange rate — overnight, Obama seemed to alter that suave image he has cultivated since his swearing-in. The change in Obama’s stance is just like a GDP inflexion point in the American economy: he is a modest and mild peacemaker during the financial crisis and when the quarterly GDP growth is negative and he acts like an overlord when GDP appears to be steadily growing incrementally for two quarters in a row. More importantly, though he is trying hard to be a peacemaker, Obama is trapped in a no-win situation dealing with the economic rescue package, health care reform and national security. Because of his conciliating attitude, his supporters have become disappointed in him and the Republican Party has taken advantage of this opportunity to eat away at the power of the Democratic Party. With his approval rating declining rapidly, Obama needs an attractive issue to gain the attention of his supporters — namely, the RMB exchange rate.

We must realize that the dynamic relation between the economic trends of China and America in the future will be the key factor that decides the RMB exchange rate.

We can make a simple hypothetical assessment with some statistics. Assuming that the growth rate of the American economy for the next 10 years will be 1.9 percent and the unemployment rate will drop from the current two figures to below five percent (the long-term unemployment rate), what would be the necessary conditions to achieve this? First of all, the labor force participation ration needs to remain around 70 percent. Because the American population grows slowly, the increasing rate of the labor force will drop from 12 percent to eight percent, which means the labor forces cannot sufficiently stimulate GDP growth. Hence, capital and the development of technology are necessary to assure GDP growth. Let’s talk about the capital account. The stock of capital depends on the savings rate of American families. We assume that the American savings rate will gradually grow; however, the government deficit (negative saving) will cancel it out. An outside source of capital is needed. Lastly, the development of technology is an immeasurable variable. The total factor productivity in America stimulated GDP growth by 1.4 percent in 2001 and 2008, which is much higher than its influence in 1995 and 2000 and was said to be the result of the new economy. To say the least, we assume that a new technological revolution is unlikely to occur within the next 10 years, so the current total factor productivity will give the American GDP a push of about 0.75 percent.

Therefore, the conclusion is fairly simple — capital account is the keyword. Foreign investors are unwilling to hold onto American capital because of the country’s huge deficit, causing the flow of global capital in the American market to decrease. Raising America’s level of domestic savings, an efficient way to increase the number of American exports higher than its imports, will drastically depreciate the U.S. dollar of the next 10 years and force foreign investors to dump American dollars. The U.S. will then enjoy the resulting competitiveness of its exports. Economist Martin Feldstein concludes that, conservatively estimated, the actual trade-weighted value of the U.S. dollar will slump by 25 percent in the next 10 years. Devaluing the U.S. dollar in order to balance the economy in America is incompatible with China’s current policy. Chinese analysts now generally agree that the rapid growth of the American GDP will cause the amount of Chinese exports to rocket. America’s economic uptick last December gave China’s exports a 17.7 percent increase compared with a year-by-year basis. If such a situation continues, exports in the first quarter of this year will increase by 25 percent on a year-by-year basis, which may give China over 13 percent GDP growth during the first quarter.

Apparently, Obama needs a quick appreciation of the RMB to counteract China’s increase in exports; otherwise, he cannot meet his goal of sustaining low growth over the next 10 years or controlling the unemployment rate. Mr. Obama certainly doesn’t care much about China’s American debt, as dumping American debt during times of growth is not as likely as it was during the financial crisis. The depreciation of the USD is a long-term trend. Selling off the American debt will contribute to this trend only with the depreciation of the RMB.


奥巴马为何不在乎中国人手握美国国债?

奥巴马的确不是很在乎中国人手握美债。美元贬值是一个长期趋势

奥巴马近日明确表示,将对中国采取强硬措施以保证所谓“贸易公平”,防止美国的就业岗位被“窃走”。

对台军售、准备会见分裂分子以及表态施压人民币汇率,奥巴马似乎一夜之间更改了其上任以来“温和形象”。奥巴马姿态出现“GDP拐点”,奥巴马在金融危机肆虐、季度GDP负增长的时候,他以“谦和的和事佬”面目出现,当美国GDP开始了连续2个季度的强劲增长之后,他恢复了一些霸气。更重要的是,他在“和事佬”任期内,无论是经济援救、医改、反恐,都处于“两头不讨好”。他的“调和性”导致原先的支持者背弃,共和党趁机“侵蚀”民主党势力,奥巴马支持率以罕见的速度下滑,他不得不寻找可以统一焦点的议题,人民币汇率是一个适时的选择。

必须意识到,未来中美经济趋势和的动态关系是确定人民币汇率问题的真正变量。

可以利用数据做一个简单的模拟预估。假设我们承认美国未来十年的增长率是1.9%、失业率将从现在两位数下降到5%(长期失业率)的结论,它的条件是什么呢?首先,劳动参与率要维持在70%左右的水平,但美国由于人口增长缓慢,劳动力增幅将会从过去的12%下降到8%,这意味着劳动力增长对GDP贡献不足要靠资本和技术进步来弥补。其次,我们再讨论资本项,资本存量靠美国家庭储蓄率的上升(假设美国储蓄率会缓慢上升),但政府的赤字(负储蓄)会抵消前者,也就是说,这就需要外部资本来“补充”。最后是技术进步,这是一个难测的变量,美国2001年-2008年的全要素生产率(技术进步)拉升GDP大约为1.4%,比1985年-2000年要高得多,据说是因为新经济原因。保险起见,我们认为2010年以后10年新技术革命的概率较低,维持美国2000年之前的全要素生产率促进GDP的增长率(大约是0.75%)。

结论很简单,资本项是关键,现在由于美国巨额赤字,外国投资者不愿意持续积累美元资产,那么全球流入美国资本总量将变小。那么美国就需要扩大国内储蓄水平,一个非常重要的途径是美国的出口增长要远远超过进口,这需要美元未来十年有一个显著贬值,驱使大量外部资本抛售美元,造成了“叠加效应”,反过来有利于美国的出口竞争力。经济学家费尔德斯坦认为,保守估计美元实际贸易加权价值未来十年要下跌25%。

美国经济平衡对美元贬值的要求恰好同中国目前的策略不兼容。现在中国分析师交口相传的都是美国GDP的强劲回升将带来中国出口的飙升,的确,美国经济强劲上升也导致中国去年12月份出口同比上升17.7%,如果这个态势延续,今年一季度出口同比增长25%(去年同期很低迷),出口的猛增将可能让中国一季度GDP增长超过13%。

很显然,奥巴马会要求人民币快速升值来抵消掉中国出口增长,他也会尽力迫使人民币升值,否则奥巴马就没法完成白宫所制定的“十年低速增长”以及“失业率控制”计划。从这个意义上说,奥巴马的确不是很在乎中国人手握美债,因为在经济强劲期间抛售美债的杀伤力要远远小于金融危机时期,美元的贬值是一个长期趋势,抛售美债将有利于美元的趋势要求,它的前提是人民币要对其上涨。

This post appeared on the front page as a direct link to the original article with the above link .

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