Edited by Laura Berlinsky-Schine
Iran: Obama’s Hopes Dashed
Obama is retracting the hand he offered to the Iranian regime. The tone is changing. The words are not the same. “Iran is moving towards a military dictatorship,” Hillary Clinton declared yesterday.
The time of rupture with the Bush era has thus passed. Washington is beefing up its discourse on the majority of diplomatic subjects. The harsh reality of power relations has beaten out the candid humanism promoted one year ago. It was foreseeable.
In its standoff with Iran, the new American administration had two hopes: either the restoration of dialogue that Bush had interrupted would lead Iran to be frank with regard to its nuclear ambitions and thereby normalize its relations with the international community, or internal conflict within the Iranian regime over the rigging of June’s presidential election would contribute to the dissolution of the Iranian regime, to the point of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s possible fall.
Today, neither of these two scenarios has materialized. Regarding the nuclear question, Tehran alternates between hot and cold, feigning one day the acceptance of Western conditions for the enrichment of its uranium, before closing the door the next day. In fact, Iran has profited from the divisions of its interlocutors and has tested President Obama’s resistance.
As for Ahmadinejad’s opponents’ green revolution, it seems to be tiring itself out. Without a doubt, it lacks a charismatic leader. But it comes up against a regime perfectly organized around the guardians of the revolution — a force that is underestimated abroad, even while it holds the country under its iron thumb.
Lest he be accused of weakness, Obama must change his attitude. The ultimatum issued to Tehran on the nuclear question has expired. Nevertheless, Washington hopes above all to be able to count on Moscow. Ever on China’s wavelength, Russia now raises the possibility of reinforcing sanctions. There are three reasons for this: the abandonment of the American anti-missile shield in Central Europe, the will to play a conciliatory role in the Middle-East and that there are a few missing elements in Iran’s nuclear partnership with Moscow.
Beijing must still be convinced to cast an honest and solid vote at the UN Security Council. The Americans want to be optimistic. Yet there are many reasons to be less optimistic than they are.
The time of rupture with the Bush era has thus passed. Washington is beefing up its discourse on the majority of diplomatic subjects. The harsh reality of power relations has beaten out the candid humanism promoted one year ago. It was foreseeable.
In its standoff with Iran, the new American administration had two hopes: either the restoration of dialogue that Bush had interrupted would lead Iran to be frank with regard to its nuclear ambitions and thereby normalize its relations with the international community, or internal conflict within the Iranian regime over the rigging of June’s presidential election would contribute to the dissolution of the Iranian regime, to the point of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s possible fall.
Today, neither of these two scenarios has materialized. Regarding the nuclear question, Tehran alternates between hot and cold, feigning one day the acceptance of Western conditions for the enrichment of its uranium, before closing the door the next day. In fact, Iran has profited from the divisions of its interlocutors and has tested President Obama’s resistance.
As for Ahmadinejad’s opponents’ green revolution, it seems to be tiring itself out. Without a doubt, it lacks a charismatic leader. But it comes up against a regime perfectly organized around the guardians of the revolution — a force that is underestimated abroad, even while it holds the country under its iron thumb.
Lest he be accused of weakness, Obama must change his attitude. The ultimatum issued to Tehran on the nuclear question has expired. Nevertheless, Washington hopes above all to be able to count on Moscow. Ever on China’s wavelength, Russia now raises the possibility of reinforcing sanctions. There are three reasons for this: the abandonment of the American anti-missile shield in Central Europe, the will to play a conciliatory role in the Middle-East and that there are a few missing elements in Iran’s nuclear partnership with Moscow.
Beijing must still be convinced to cast an honest and solid vote at the UN Security Council. The Americans want to be optimistic. Yet there are many reasons to be less optimistic than they are.
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