The U.S. Game Plan
The aftershocks are continuing to take place in Ankara, despite the fact that it has been a week since the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives passed the resolution regarding the incidents of 1915. Turkish-American political relations and Turkish-Armenian normalization are being discussed in detail simultaneously. Clearly, the U.S. is trying to figure out its game plan. In reality, it is known that U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who met with Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan in Qatar a while ago, admitted that “the resolution may pass the Committee; however, it will not make it to full Congress.” Ever since that day, the general opinion has been that the U.S. administration did not actively step in, and is planning to apply “indirect pressure” to get the approval of the signed protocols between Turkey and Armenia. However, the “short-, mid- and long-term” positions that have been developed by the Foreign Affairs Committee and shared with congressmen point to different circumstances.
Foremost, the decision of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives has been incorporated into the issue of Highland Karabakh and the Armenian Supreme Court’s speculation, which was against the ideals of the protocols that left the relations at a stalemate. The roles have been changed as a result of the complications that originated in the U.S. The Obama administration, which did not sincerely argue against the resolution, saw its strategy to compel Turkey’s backlash. If the bill was rejected, Turkey would have been indebted to the U.S., so to speak. Now, it is being told that the project to bring peace to the Caucasus region has been sabotaged by a resolution passed by the council of a country that does not hold the right to judge history. Naturally, two critical thresholds have emerged in Ankara.
1. The language President Obama will use on April 24. In other words, not to even slightly touch the allegations of genocide.
2. The genocide argument should not reach the House floor.
Turkey’s cards in hand are as follows.
1. The Turkish ambassador to Washington, Namik Tan, can remain in Ankara through April 24 if required, until a concrete message is received from President Obama.
2. Russia’s significance in the equation may excel, since the Turkish-Armenian normalization is tied to Karabakh and the Azeri-Armenian convergence.
3. Turkey may not have to pick sides with regard to the sanctions against Iran, which are expected to be discussed at the United Nations General Council.
4. Restrictions may be implemented at the Incirlik air base, which is of vital importance to the U.S. forces in Iraq from a logistics standpoint.
Without a doubt, given the present traumatic circumstances, the radical decision-making that could take over the lien of the Turkish-American Model Partnership is not desired. However, Ankara does not even want to stare at an Obama portrait, with the thawing of the Armenian issue and a unilateral compromise over Turkey contributing to his international success. That is why it can risk gradual tension!
Foremost, the decision of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives has been incorporated into the issue of Highland Karabakh and the Armenian Supreme Court’s speculation, which was against the ideals of the protocols that left the relations at a stalemate. The roles have been changed as a result of the complications that originated in the U.S. The Obama administration, which did not sincerely argue against the resolution, saw its strategy to compel Turkey’s backlash. If the bill was rejected, Turkey would have been indebted to the U.S., so to speak. Now, it is being told that the project to bring peace to the Caucasus region has been sabotaged by a resolution passed by the council of a country that does not hold the right to judge history. Naturally, two critical thresholds have emerged in Ankara.
1. The language President Obama will use on April 24. In other words, not to even slightly touch the allegations of genocide.
2. The genocide argument should not reach the House floor.
Turkey’s cards in hand are as follows.
1. The Turkish ambassador to Washington, Namik Tan, can remain in Ankara through April 24 if required, until a concrete message is received from President Obama.
2. Russia’s significance in the equation may excel, since the Turkish-Armenian normalization is tied to Karabakh and the Azeri-Armenian convergence.
3. Turkey may not have to pick sides with regard to the sanctions against Iran, which are expected to be discussed at the United Nations General Council.
4. Restrictions may be implemented at the Incirlik air base, which is of vital importance to the U.S. forces in Iraq from a logistics standpoint.
Without a doubt, given the present traumatic circumstances, the radical decision-making that could take over the lien of the Turkish-American Model Partnership is not desired. However, Ankara does not even want to stare at an Obama portrait, with the thawing of the Armenian issue and a unilateral compromise over Turkey contributing to his international success. That is why it can risk gradual tension!