The Nationalist Drift of World Powers

Published in Jurnalul Naţional
(Romania) on 7 April 2010
by Adrian Severin (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Adriana Iotcov. Edited by Laura Berlinsky-Schine.
When neoconservatism failed to take roots in the U.S., it generated a double sense of insecurity typical of great powers in decline. This insecurity masks domestic struggles (the U.S. economic and cultural domination is slowly fading, while military supremacy cannot attain peace because of the absence of military success). It also masks the increasingly frequent external threats (in the midst of a global war against the terrorists who stand in opposition to the world order that America wants to impose, the nation is psychologically reminiscent of a citadel under siege, while the society whose dynamism was once fueled by immigration is closing its frontiers to newcomers).

Consequently, the American people are trying to muster their strength from nationalism, an archaic means of socializing and a source of metaphysical certainty. Although this is a nation which went through a process of globalization before globalization itself even existed, the U.S. is now ever more nationalist. Conversely, the other countries are following the example of the U.S. and forming unions. The democratic background of the U.S. means that it is more likely to revert to isolationism, in spite of the fact that nationalism generally leads to war. Emerging powers can steer toward nationalism as well. First, there is China.

With a record-high economic growth and demographic advantages consisting of a large, patient and disciplined population that is content with its elites, China may appear to some as more and more confident. This newly acquired confidence provides the country with excessive courage and decisiveness in its international relations.

Others, however, interpret China’s stubborn refusal to cooperate in order to clarify certain issues (such as the Yuan evaluation, the growth of domestic consumption, compliance with trademark regulations and the freedom of internet communications) as the manifestation of the lack of confidence in its own powers. This insecurity could stem from domestic socio-economic discrepancies, or the social threats that cannot be avoided when a market economy meets an authoritarian political regime.

Both the people who are afraid of this new superpower and the ones who point out its weaknesses often consider that the security of traditional powers would increase if the rise of China came to a stop. For this purpose, human rights have become a means to an aim. The global competitiveness of the country would diminish if the Chinese society became less cohesive. And one way to achieve that is by convincing Chinese citizens that the only happiness they can obtain lies in the division of power between the individual and the state, as found in the Western notion of human rights. A notion that the Chinese have not become acquainted with and have therefore been unable to miss.

If faced with a cultural and political humiliation of such caliber, China will surely choose the path of nationalism. And this path will change the relationship between the leaders and the people, and will affect not only its domestic development, but the security of the entire world.

The European Union is interested in a Chinese superpower that can contribute to global equilibrium, that opts for universalism, with its archetypal myths, instead of nationalism, with its tribal myths; the universalism that makes it possible for the Chinese to be part of a peaceful world order, instead of the nationalism that triggers exclusion and confrontations. The EU must not let this interest slip from view when it formulates its policies towards Beijing.


Deriva naţionalistă a puterilor globale

Eşecul neoconservatorismului american a creat SUA o dublă nesiguranţă caracteristică superputerilor în declin. Ea reflectă sporirea neputinţelor structurale interne (protagonismul economic şi cultural se stinge, în timp ce supremaţia militară nu poate trece de succesul militar spre a câştiga şi pacea subsecventă), precum şi sporirea ameninţărilor externe (în război cu terorismul global care îi contestă modelul de ordine mondială, America trăieşte psihologia cetăţii asediate, şi societatea care şi-a alimentat dinamismul din imigraţie îşi închide frontierele).

Americanii îşi caută, de aceea, noi forţe în naţionalism ca formă arhaică de socializare şi sursă de securitate metafizică. Globalizate înainte de globalizare, SUA se naţionalizează, pe când paradigma lor se universalizează. În condiţiile tradiţiilor democrate ale ţării, pericolul unei atari evoluţii constă mai mult în revenirea la izolaţionism, deşi, de principiu, naţionalismul înseamnă război. Spre naţionalism pot fi împinse şi superputerile emergente. În primul rând, China.

Cu o creştere economică record şi atuuri demografice incluzând o populaţie numeroasă, răbdătoare, disciplinată şi mulţumită de elitele sale, China este văzută de unii ca dobândind o încredere în sine care îi conferă cutezanţă şi fermitate excesive în relaţiile internaţionale.

Alţii, dimpotrivă, văd în refuzul obstinat al cooperării în domenii sensibile (precum evaluarea yuanului, creşterea consumului intern, respectul drepturilor de proprietate industrială sau liberalizarea comunicării pe internet) expresia neîncrederii în propriile puteri subsecventă disparităţilor economico-sociale interne, precum şi ameninţărilor sociale născute la contactul între un sistem economic de piaţă şi unul politic de comandă.

Atât cei care se tem de noua putere a Chinei, cât şi cei care îi acuză slăbiciunile socotesc adesea că frânând ascensiunea acestei superputeri emergente sporesc securitatea superputerilor tradiţionale. Întru aceasta drepturile omului au fost transformate din ţel în mijloc. A-i convinge pe chinezi că singura fericire constă în împărţirea puterii între individ şi comunitatea organizată statal, după modelul euroatlantic al drepturilor omului, pe care ei nu l-au cunoscut spre a-i duce lipsa, fără a le da timpul spre a-l asimila, înseamnă să şubrezeşti coeziunea societăţii reducându-i competitivitatea globală.

În faţa unei asemenea umiliri cultural-politice, China va alege calea naţionalismului. O cale care va modifica relaţia dintre lideri şi masă, afectând atât dezvoltarea internă, cât şi securitatea lumii.

UE este interesată într-o superputere chineză ca factor de echilibru global, care optează pentru universalism, cu miturile sale arhetipale, iar nu pentru naţionalism, cu miturile sale tribale; universalismul includerii într-o ordine mondială armonioasă, iar nu naţionalismul excluderii şi confruntării. UE nu trebuie să uite acest interes când îşi defineşte politica faţă de Beijing.
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