The Contingent in Afghanistan, or the Indochinese Syndrome
Corporal Eric was chosen to accompany the body of his friend Vincent, who died in Afghanistan, on his repatriation. On the flight back to the mainland, he imagines that cheers, similar to what U.S. Marines receive, will accompany his arrival at the airport. It is not to be.
Then he dreams of the journey to the cemetery and he envisions that, as in Canada, there will be many compatriots along the way with flags and signs, giving thanks. But he cannot make out a single person. "They must be waiting for us at the cemetery," he thinks.
His expectations will be fulfilled by the presence of Vincent’s family, the Minister of Defense, local dignitaries and veteran's associations. Surprised by the anonymity of their return, he learns that the latest poll confirms a tendency toward agnosticism related to the involvement of French soldiers in Afghanistan.
In 1951, General de Lattre expressed his concerns over the future of the French presence in Indochina, stating that he could not solve everything alone and that the expeditionary forces needed the support of the French people. The risk of seeing our country faced with the same syndrome of detachment between the forces engaged in Afghanistan and the general population, is obvious. It is perhaps already a reality.
This comparison serves as a seed for many observers of the French army’s commitment in Afghanistan. However, this apparent indifference begs for consideration because it could, in the future, affect our units’ capacity to act effectively.
The geographic remoteness of the “land of Afghans” — although a smaller distance than that which separates us from Indochina — is one explanation for neglect. Nevertheless, this neglect is largely due to our difficulty in understanding the reasons for our presence in Afghanistan.
Our leaders, who decided to commit troops, must put genuine effort toward explaining these reasons. This is particularly true in France because the French people do not differentiate between support of the army and support of the politics of the army's mission.
The Americans, on the other hand, infallibly support their “boys” despite, in 2003 for example, the faltering attempts of political leaders to justify the engagement in Iraq.
As in Indochina, a democratically elected government decided upon the operation in Afghanistan. The mission was confirmed by a parliamentary debate after the first four months of engagement. In addition, the intervention in Afghanistan is mandated by a resolution of the United Nation's Security Council. It is difficult nowadays to find a broader legitimacy.
Both operations were declared and conducted without resorting to the draft. In the Far East, it was colonial troops and the Foreign Legion. The war in Afghanistan is led by a young professional army composed of volunteers. This argument, although presented in both cases to explain the detachment syndrome, is not admissible because in any case, it is the sons of France who are fighting on behalf of the French people. Considering it the other way would mean that the French army is not an expression of the nation.
An Indochinese Syndrome has taken shape for our troops in Afghanistan. The most convincing factor lies in politicians who are still struggling to explain our engagement. Yet our continued commitment depends on its effectiveness.
In addition, the people's support is vital to our armed forces, particularly their psychological support at the time of return. Dr. Claude Barrois explains that collective endorsement is a major factor in the full reintegration of soldiers returning from operations. This helps to prevent a gap between soldiers marked by conflict conducted on behalf of the nation and a country that cares little.
Ignorance and neglect are two forerunners of future crises. Our leaders must continue their efforts to explain our involvement in the resolution of the Afghan conflict. We must also not forget that when the Taliban was in power, its regime was a sanctuary for international terrorism.
This war is, indeed, France’s war. It is ironic that the Afghan people increasingly support the coalition's presence, allowing it some measure of security, while the countries engaged there seem to care less and less about their soldiers.
Corporal Eric has experienced all of this on a daily basis since his return to Afghanistan. He did not understand the return he received, so let us help him now by showing him the support of the French people and enabling him to continue proudly bearing the arms of his country.
Antoine Fleuret is the Colonel Commander of the [French] Army
Then he dreams of the journey to the cemetery and he envisions that, as in Canada, there will be many compatriots along the way with flags and signs, giving thanks. But he cannot make out a single person. "They must be waiting for us at the cemetery," he thinks.
His expectations will be fulfilled by the presence of Vincent’s family, the Minister of Defense, local dignitaries and veteran's associations. Surprised by the anonymity of their return, he learns that the latest poll confirms a tendency toward agnosticism related to the involvement of French soldiers in Afghanistan.
In 1951, General de Lattre expressed his concerns over the future of the French presence in Indochina, stating that he could not solve everything alone and that the expeditionary forces needed the support of the French people. The risk of seeing our country faced with the same syndrome of detachment between the forces engaged in Afghanistan and the general population, is obvious. It is perhaps already a reality.
This comparison serves as a seed for many observers of the French army’s commitment in Afghanistan. However, this apparent indifference begs for consideration because it could, in the future, affect our units’ capacity to act effectively.
The geographic remoteness of the “land of Afghans” — although a smaller distance than that which separates us from Indochina — is one explanation for neglect. Nevertheless, this neglect is largely due to our difficulty in understanding the reasons for our presence in Afghanistan.
Our leaders, who decided to commit troops, must put genuine effort toward explaining these reasons. This is particularly true in France because the French people do not differentiate between support of the army and support of the politics of the army's mission.
The Americans, on the other hand, infallibly support their “boys” despite, in 2003 for example, the faltering attempts of political leaders to justify the engagement in Iraq.
As in Indochina, a democratically elected government decided upon the operation in Afghanistan. The mission was confirmed by a parliamentary debate after the first four months of engagement. In addition, the intervention in Afghanistan is mandated by a resolution of the United Nation's Security Council. It is difficult nowadays to find a broader legitimacy.
Both operations were declared and conducted without resorting to the draft. In the Far East, it was colonial troops and the Foreign Legion. The war in Afghanistan is led by a young professional army composed of volunteers. This argument, although presented in both cases to explain the detachment syndrome, is not admissible because in any case, it is the sons of France who are fighting on behalf of the French people. Considering it the other way would mean that the French army is not an expression of the nation.
An Indochinese Syndrome has taken shape for our troops in Afghanistan. The most convincing factor lies in politicians who are still struggling to explain our engagement. Yet our continued commitment depends on its effectiveness.
In addition, the people's support is vital to our armed forces, particularly their psychological support at the time of return. Dr. Claude Barrois explains that collective endorsement is a major factor in the full reintegration of soldiers returning from operations. This helps to prevent a gap between soldiers marked by conflict conducted on behalf of the nation and a country that cares little.
Ignorance and neglect are two forerunners of future crises. Our leaders must continue their efforts to explain our involvement in the resolution of the Afghan conflict. We must also not forget that when the Taliban was in power, its regime was a sanctuary for international terrorism.
This war is, indeed, France’s war. It is ironic that the Afghan people increasingly support the coalition's presence, allowing it some measure of security, while the countries engaged there seem to care less and less about their soldiers.
Corporal Eric has experienced all of this on a daily basis since his return to Afghanistan. He did not understand the return he received, so let us help him now by showing him the support of the French people and enabling him to continue proudly bearing the arms of his country.
Antoine Fleuret is the Colonel Commander of the [French] Army