Behind the Curtain: Russia and America’s Agreement against Iran
Two recent events in the months following the START ll treaty have perhaps done an outstanding job in pointing out nuances in the new relationship between America and Russia. One recent development was the position the Russian leadership in Moscow took a few months ago regarding the Islamic Republic’s nuclear case, despite the common economic and security interests of Russia and Iran in the past. The second is the arrest of Russian spies in the U.S.
Recent Russian policies will occupy the minds of every listener and informed political analyst. The latest position of the country, according to Dmitry Medvedev, is especially provoking. The president of Russia remarked for the first time, “The Republic of Iran is closer to the ability to produce a nuclear weapon.” He continued, “The way in which Iran can produce atomic energy will lead them closer to bombs.”
These words were heard for the first time from a Russian senior official and were followed by Russia, with U.S. and the European Union issuing the fourth resolution of the UN Security Council with sanctions against Tehran.
On the one hand, Tehran’s declaration on Iran’s nuclear dossier, which was ratified with the presence of Brazil and Turkey and tested by fire, was decided by the leadership in Moscow to be neither good nor welcomed. On the other hand, a Russian official recently used harsh language in response to Iran’s government.
However, the Russians, taking a different stance, pointed to Busheher (southwest of Iran) and claimed it will deliver a nuclear power plant there. The Iranian Atomic Energy Organization announced the completion time as the end of summer.
The importance of all this, in this writer’s opinion, is that there must be a connection between the 10 people recently arrested in America as Russian spies and Medvedev’s recent position, but the question is: What is it?
Has any agreement between Moscow and Washington behind the curtain been made based upon the freeing of the Russian spies from U.S.? Is that the reason why Russia had to take a uniquely hard stance against the Iranian nuclear program? Has Russia revised its position once more towards the delivery of the Busheher nuclear power plant, and could it make an excuse to refuse delivery? If Moscow is deferring to Washington to obtain more spies, will there be an increase of pressure on the Islamic Republic?
Recent Russian policies will occupy the minds of every listener and informed political analyst. The latest position of the country, according to Dmitry Medvedev, is especially provoking. The president of Russia remarked for the first time, “The Republic of Iran is closer to the ability to produce a nuclear weapon.” He continued, “The way in which Iran can produce atomic energy will lead them closer to bombs.”
These words were heard for the first time from a Russian senior official and were followed by Russia, with U.S. and the European Union issuing the fourth resolution of the UN Security Council with sanctions against Tehran.
On the one hand, Tehran’s declaration on Iran’s nuclear dossier, which was ratified with the presence of Brazil and Turkey and tested by fire, was decided by the leadership in Moscow to be neither good nor welcomed. On the other hand, a Russian official recently used harsh language in response to Iran’s government.
However, the Russians, taking a different stance, pointed to Busheher (southwest of Iran) and claimed it will deliver a nuclear power plant there. The Iranian Atomic Energy Organization announced the completion time as the end of summer.
The importance of all this, in this writer’s opinion, is that there must be a connection between the 10 people recently arrested in America as Russian spies and Medvedev’s recent position, but the question is: What is it?
Has any agreement between Moscow and Washington behind the curtain been made based upon the freeing of the Russian spies from U.S.? Is that the reason why Russia had to take a uniquely hard stance against the Iranian nuclear program? Has Russia revised its position once more towards the delivery of the Busheher nuclear power plant, and could it make an excuse to refuse delivery? If Moscow is deferring to Washington to obtain more spies, will there be an increase of pressure on the Islamic Republic?