‘False Friendship’ Badly Sums Up Sino-American Relations
Recent developments in Sino-American relations are a cause for concern. The U.S. strategy toward China is said to be reaching a new turning point. A “strategic contest” between the U.S. and China is hard to avoid. The “false friendship” between the two nations is also said to be some kind of “partnership” just "for effect.” This is actually quite a complicated discussion to touch upon, and one which certainly cannot be considered or handled in a simplified manner.
Over the last 40 years, the Sino-American relationship has been able to weather the storms and travel rough roads, and yet it has developed into today’s complex relationship. The most fundamental reason for this is “common interest.” One could say that common interest is what drives Sino-American relations. Times are just different, and this “vehicle” of common interest is just different, nothing more. Before the Cold War ended, the common interest shared by China and the U.S. stemmed primarily from the strategic interest against a “common enemy” (the Soviet Union); following the events of 9/11, the countries united in a “common mission” (anti-terrorism); since the 2008 financial crisis, they have primarily found common ground in responding to a “common challenge,” global in nature, in order to shape a wide-ranging common interest.
From the sidelines, the complexity of Sino-American relations appears, first of all, to be very difficult by its nature to pinpoint in a simple manner. So then, what is the nature of the Sino-American relationship after all? Since they are neither simply “friends” nor “enemies,” there is the old expression “neither friends nor enemies.” The term “partnership” quite nicely reflects a neutral relationship; “cooperation” and “competition,” as well as “friendship” and “opposition,” are already found in it. It does not merely indicate “friendship” or “opposition” or other singular aspects. The emergence of this way of speaking comes from a practical need of the two nations to think about ways of considering and handling whatever problems the other may have. The term “partnership” happens to fit this need. A scholar recently said that this term is used just “for effect.” I myself do not dare to be as thoughtless as to start using the term “false friendship” to sum up the complexity of the Sino-American relationship. The instability of this relationship is determined by its complexity, as well as by its expression, but not at all by any “false friendship.”
The U.S. has recently carried out unusual activities around China’s periphery, but it is inadvisable to consider simple thoughts in an extreme manner. One must stick with concrete problems and concrete analyses. These U.S. actions are not the same as past incidents involving the blowing up of buildings, collisions, or other random accidents. They are obviously pre-planned strategic actions. What will America’s true intentions turn out to be? Aside from the temporary factor of U.S. midterm elections putting pressure on Sino-American relations, it is quite possible that the U.S. is indeed accelerating adjustments to its strategies for China and Asia. And so relations between China and the U.S. will henceforth carry some variables. With Hillary Clinton in Hanoi raising difficulties for China regarding South China Sea concerns, and then with the reception at a Vietnamese harbor of an American warship on maneuvers, the U.S. wishes to stir up trouble with China and its allies and to cause friction in Sino-American relations so as to restrain China. But if it is true what the media says, that the U.S. plans on building an “Asian version of NATO” in order to contain China, then would a “strategic contest” between the U.S. and China actually be avoidable?
Looking at the current situation, I believe it is still unlikely to come to that. Since the strategic relationship between China and the U.S. has not significantly changed thus far, the common interest of both parties remains greater than their differences. Additionally, even if the U.S. were already determined to do so, drawing the nations of East Asia into creating an “Asian version of NATO” to contain China would objectively be difficult to achieve. The mindset of East Asian nations is a complicated one. They hope the U.S. will not evacuate completely. They want to draw in the U.S. as a counterweight to China, and yet they are not necessarily willing to stand together with the U.S. to do so. Moreover, although America’s military might is the world's greatest, today’s world has not been rampant with gunboats for a while. The era of “might makes right” is finished. The U.S. is not going it alone in the South China Sea and does not have the leeway to do as it pleases. Finally, with regard to U.S. midterm elections, a very likely factor could be that the “hawks” will make themselves known. After the midterm elections, American mainstream opinion may start to change. I therefore believe that Sino-American relations will be troubling; of course I am mentally prepared. But, taken as a whole, Sino-American relations will not worsen.
Over the last 40 years, the Sino-American relationship has been able to weather the storms and travel rough roads, and yet it has developed into today’s complex relationship. The most fundamental reason for this is “common interest.” One could say that common interest is what drives Sino-American relations. Times are just different, and this “vehicle” of common interest is just different, nothing more. Before the Cold War ended, the common interest shared by China and the U.S. stemmed primarily from the strategic interest against a “common enemy” (the Soviet Union); following the events of 9/11, the countries united in a “common mission” (anti-terrorism); since the 2008 financial crisis, they have primarily found common ground in responding to a “common challenge,” global in nature, in order to shape a wide-ranging common interest.
From the sidelines, the complexity of Sino-American relations appears, first of all, to be very difficult by its nature to pinpoint in a simple manner. So then, what is the nature of the Sino-American relationship after all? Since they are neither simply “friends” nor “enemies,” there is the old expression “neither friends nor enemies.” The term “partnership” quite nicely reflects a neutral relationship; “cooperation” and “competition,” as well as “friendship” and “opposition,” are already found in it. It does not merely indicate “friendship” or “opposition” or other singular aspects. The emergence of this way of speaking comes from a practical need of the two nations to think about ways of considering and handling whatever problems the other may have. The term “partnership” happens to fit this need. A scholar recently said that this term is used just “for effect.” I myself do not dare to be as thoughtless as to start using the term “false friendship” to sum up the complexity of the Sino-American relationship. The instability of this relationship is determined by its complexity, as well as by its expression, but not at all by any “false friendship.”
The U.S. has recently carried out unusual activities around China’s periphery, but it is inadvisable to consider simple thoughts in an extreme manner. One must stick with concrete problems and concrete analyses. These U.S. actions are not the same as past incidents involving the blowing up of buildings, collisions, or other random accidents. They are obviously pre-planned strategic actions. What will America’s true intentions turn out to be? Aside from the temporary factor of U.S. midterm elections putting pressure on Sino-American relations, it is quite possible that the U.S. is indeed accelerating adjustments to its strategies for China and Asia. And so relations between China and the U.S. will henceforth carry some variables. With Hillary Clinton in Hanoi raising difficulties for China regarding South China Sea concerns, and then with the reception at a Vietnamese harbor of an American warship on maneuvers, the U.S. wishes to stir up trouble with China and its allies and to cause friction in Sino-American relations so as to restrain China. But if it is true what the media says, that the U.S. plans on building an “Asian version of NATO” in order to contain China, then would a “strategic contest” between the U.S. and China actually be avoidable?
Looking at the current situation, I believe it is still unlikely to come to that. Since the strategic relationship between China and the U.S. has not significantly changed thus far, the common interest of both parties remains greater than their differences. Additionally, even if the U.S. were already determined to do so, drawing the nations of East Asia into creating an “Asian version of NATO” to contain China would objectively be difficult to achieve. The mindset of East Asian nations is a complicated one. They hope the U.S. will not evacuate completely. They want to draw in the U.S. as a counterweight to China, and yet they are not necessarily willing to stand together with the U.S. to do so. Moreover, although America’s military might is the world's greatest, today’s world has not been rampant with gunboats for a while. The era of “might makes right” is finished. The U.S. is not going it alone in the South China Sea and does not have the leeway to do as it pleases. Finally, with regard to U.S. midterm elections, a very likely factor could be that the “hawks” will make themselves known. After the midterm elections, American mainstream opinion may start to change. I therefore believe that Sino-American relations will be troubling; of course I am mentally prepared. But, taken as a whole, Sino-American relations will not worsen.