Obama and the End of Atlanticism
Published in Le Monde
(France) on 14 September 2010
by Álvaro Vermoet Hidalgo (link to original)
(France) on 14 September 2010
by Álvaro Vermoet Hidalgo (link to original)
Translated from
by Sarah Repucci.
Edited by Gheanna Emelia.
The popularity of President Obama in European countries without a doubt surpasses that of his predecessors. His multilateral approach to international issues and his desire to give emerging countries a place on the international scene were long awaited by the Europeans. Ironically, this policy has proved to be a major challenge for Europe and for its role in the world, just at the moment when we have Atlanticist leaders in Paris, London and Berlin.
During the Cold War, the United States represented not only economic and military power to the Europeans but also opposition to the communist bloc that oppressed the eastern half of Europe. Thus, Western Europe, under the protection of American troops, could leave misery behind, develop and prosper (in a way like Ancient Greece did during the pax romana). With the exception of Gaullism, the Atlanticist link was defended by the entire continental political spectrum — notably by the United Kingdom — and, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, by the Eastern countries that had been subjected to Soviet communism. Even after the tension sparked by the American intervention in Iraq, Europe remains Atlanticist: the Germans replaced Mr. Schroeder with Mrs. Merkel and the French elected Nicolas Sarkozy, who has reintegrated France into the NATO military command.
For all that, the Obama administration’s new conception of the world seems to have made Europe increasingly insignificant. This is not only the case for the European Union as a global actor (from this point given international legal personality), but also for the fall of the great powers of the continent from international relevance. One could see this displacement of American priorities in Copenhagen (where the final declaration was fashioned by the United States, China, India, Brazil and South Africa), in Eastern Europe (the United States and Russia reaching agreement on the suppression of the anti-missile shield) or in Madrid (where, for the first time in history, the president did not deign to go to the EU-United States summit). But it is seen most in American policy towards Europe.
First, on the subject of nuclear deterrence: Not long ago, when former President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev signed the treaty limiting intermediate-range nuclear weapons, Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Mitterand were opposed to disarmament beginning in Europe, while the two superpowers maintained the vast majority of nuclear arms in the world. London and Paris feared that a denuclearized Europe would be a less independent Europe, with less weight in the world and more threatened by the neighboring USSR. The new nuclear disarmament process sought by Mr. Obama will require strong leaders in Paris and London who defend the fact that France and England have already taken numerous steps in the reduction of nuclear arms. In effect, these countries have only kept the minimum required for the discussion, the “ultimate guarantee” which neither Russia nor the United States would ever renounce and which seems inevitable that Iran will produce for itself.
A second example is that of the integration of Turkey into the European Union. While it becomes increasingly evident that this country has decided to cut with its Kemalist heritage and play the role of regional power in the Islamic world, Mr. Obama — in the framework of his dialogue with the Muslim world and aiming to appease Ankara — does not cease to insist that the Europeans advance the integration of this country into the EU. A policy that, in spite of the evidence, seems to blame the Europeans for the Turkish change in direction and that is not at all interested in the effects that such integration would have for the political and cultural identity of Europe (a lack of interest already demonstrated when Washington criticized France on the subject of the banning of the burqa).
It is clear that the new rules of the international game accepted by the American president have made Atlanticism difficult to follow for the Europeans. The continent must provide itself with everything that Mr. Obama seems to be looking for in a country in order to accord it with a role on a realist international scene: a single voice, a desire to participate in world affairs while aiming for the defense of its own strategic interests, a strong weight in the world economy and a consequential military capacity. This scenario requires a stronger, more realist and more independent Europe, not limited to “soft power.” Thus energetic independence, support for the nuclear discussion, the reinforcement of armies and military and diplomatic cooperation of European powers advocated by France become indispensable in order to reinstate a certain equilibrium that gives sense back to the Atlanticist connection. In the absence of this, Europe seems to be condemned to insignificance in this new multi-polar world, as it becomes a sort of “cultural ruin,” like Greece was for the Romans.
During the Cold War, the United States represented not only economic and military power to the Europeans but also opposition to the communist bloc that oppressed the eastern half of Europe. Thus, Western Europe, under the protection of American troops, could leave misery behind, develop and prosper (in a way like Ancient Greece did during the pax romana). With the exception of Gaullism, the Atlanticist link was defended by the entire continental political spectrum — notably by the United Kingdom — and, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, by the Eastern countries that had been subjected to Soviet communism. Even after the tension sparked by the American intervention in Iraq, Europe remains Atlanticist: the Germans replaced Mr. Schroeder with Mrs. Merkel and the French elected Nicolas Sarkozy, who has reintegrated France into the NATO military command.
For all that, the Obama administration’s new conception of the world seems to have made Europe increasingly insignificant. This is not only the case for the European Union as a global actor (from this point given international legal personality), but also for the fall of the great powers of the continent from international relevance. One could see this displacement of American priorities in Copenhagen (where the final declaration was fashioned by the United States, China, India, Brazil and South Africa), in Eastern Europe (the United States and Russia reaching agreement on the suppression of the anti-missile shield) or in Madrid (where, for the first time in history, the president did not deign to go to the EU-United States summit). But it is seen most in American policy towards Europe.
First, on the subject of nuclear deterrence: Not long ago, when former President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev signed the treaty limiting intermediate-range nuclear weapons, Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Mitterand were opposed to disarmament beginning in Europe, while the two superpowers maintained the vast majority of nuclear arms in the world. London and Paris feared that a denuclearized Europe would be a less independent Europe, with less weight in the world and more threatened by the neighboring USSR. The new nuclear disarmament process sought by Mr. Obama will require strong leaders in Paris and London who defend the fact that France and England have already taken numerous steps in the reduction of nuclear arms. In effect, these countries have only kept the minimum required for the discussion, the “ultimate guarantee” which neither Russia nor the United States would ever renounce and which seems inevitable that Iran will produce for itself.
A second example is that of the integration of Turkey into the European Union. While it becomes increasingly evident that this country has decided to cut with its Kemalist heritage and play the role of regional power in the Islamic world, Mr. Obama — in the framework of his dialogue with the Muslim world and aiming to appease Ankara — does not cease to insist that the Europeans advance the integration of this country into the EU. A policy that, in spite of the evidence, seems to blame the Europeans for the Turkish change in direction and that is not at all interested in the effects that such integration would have for the political and cultural identity of Europe (a lack of interest already demonstrated when Washington criticized France on the subject of the banning of the burqa).
It is clear that the new rules of the international game accepted by the American president have made Atlanticism difficult to follow for the Europeans. The continent must provide itself with everything that Mr. Obama seems to be looking for in a country in order to accord it with a role on a realist international scene: a single voice, a desire to participate in world affairs while aiming for the defense of its own strategic interests, a strong weight in the world economy and a consequential military capacity. This scenario requires a stronger, more realist and more independent Europe, not limited to “soft power.” Thus energetic independence, support for the nuclear discussion, the reinforcement of armies and military and diplomatic cooperation of European powers advocated by France become indispensable in order to reinstate a certain equilibrium that gives sense back to the Atlanticist connection. In the absence of this, Europe seems to be condemned to insignificance in this new multi-polar world, as it becomes a sort of “cultural ruin,” like Greece was for the Romans.
President Obama went out of his way to snub and insult European leaders while fawning over US enemies. Your continued infatution with him is startling. However, as you pointed out, you did get what you asked for.
Best regards,
Gail S
http://www.backyardfence.wordpress.com