Political Implications of the Arms Deal with Saudi Arabia
In the coming days the U.S. secretary of defense will send a notification to Congress pertaining to an arms deal with Saudi Arabia, which was agreed upon in the last few months and that will last for the next 10 years. The deal is worth up to $60 billion and includes, along with training and mechanical parts, the purchase of 84 F-15 fighter jets and the upgrade of 70 similar planes already belonging to Saudi Arabia. The deal also includes 178 helicopters, navy ships and various types of missiles.
Since this deal is considered the largest arms deal in the history of the United States, it is only natural that it would garner a great deal of media attention. News of the deal quickly turned from a topic calling for much analysis and speculation into one raising many questions. Some have questioned whether Saudi Arabia’s decision to enter into a deal of such magnitude carries with it a political message from Riyadh to Washington, asserting the depth of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, especially considering present circumstances on both a regional and international level. This was the least intelligent analysis of the deal.
There are also those who see this deal as an attempt by the Saudis to help the Obama administration, which is in the middle of a financial crisis that is shaking the U.S. economy. Quick thinking is evident in this analysis, for it tied the event to surrounding circumstances. However, notwithstanding the soundness of these types of analyses, they have one thing in common: They don’t take into account facts more closely linked to the nature of the deal’s circumstances and facts that could be behind a deal of such magnitude and at such a time as this.
Among these facts are Saudi political and security interests as a major player in a region facing grave dangers, which, if they become reality, would leave the Saudis worse off than before. That the Obama administration benefits politically from this deal, or that it could serve to lessen the weight of the American financial crisis to some extent, is only natural and an expected occurrence. The more important question is: How does Saudi Arabia benefit from this deal?
To answer this question we must place the event in its regional context. It is well-known that the Gulf region is suffering from a chronic case of instability that has spanned four decades. Without going into too much detail, the region has been affected by border disputes, political and sectarian crises, military expeditions, destructive wars and alliances between nations fed by wild ambitions. It is well-known that the main reason behind the lack of stability in the Gulf region — just like any other region in the world — goes back to an imbalance of power stretching back over four decades.
Since the British withdrawal from the region in the early ‘70s, the balance of power was concentrated in Iraq and Iran, which means that it was a delicate equation. America was one of the sides in this equation; however, it took part from a distance — or as they say, from the horizon — through its naval presence on the high seas and its naval base at Diego Garcia in the south of the Gulf and its base at Incirlik, in Turkey, to the north. That was until 1990.
The Iranian revolution ended that delicate balance of power. Because of the continued imbalance in the power equation, coupled with a lack of security arrangements, the temptation arose for both Iraq and Iran to impose their dominance on the region. Iraq, under the previous Baathist rule, went after this ambition and entered into expeditions moved by endless aspirations, demands and disputes. Iran was no different than Iraq in its regional ambitions. It, however, was waiting for the perfect opportunity.
The strange thing is that this opportunity for Iran would come at the hands of the Americans in 2003, when they occupied Iraq, deposed Tehran’s number one enemy, Saddam Hussein, and gave ruling power to Iran’s allies there. In other words, the U.S. didn’t just remove Iraq from the balance of power in the Gulf, but also from the Arab region.
Here the Gulf region entered into the era of Iranian ambition, with its goal of increased gains for Tehran in Iraq first, and then in the region as a whole, and benefiting from an Arab weakness that left Iraq to face its destiny alone in the face of the Americans and Iranians, and in front of an internal collapse that has yet to cease. Parallel to Iran’s need to increase its gains in the Gulf region was its need to maintain and protect these gains. This protection can only come by developing and increasing its military power, and the truth is that Iran might be the only country to benefit militarily from its long war with Iraq during the ‘80s. What is remarkable in this respect is that the Iranian nuclear program came back with unsurpassed vigor immediately after the fall of Baghdad. Even before that, and continuing after, there was feverish activity in Tehran in developing its weapons systems, especially in the realms of missile and air defense.
The question then is what happened to the balance of power in the region after the fall of Iraq and after the United States completed what it called the end of its military operations in Iraq last month with the withdrawal of most of its forces? According to estimates by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington for the year 2010, the total size of Iran’s military is 560,000 troops. According to these same estimates, the total number of troops making up the armed forces of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries combined comes to 347,000. These numbers encompass all of the different branches of those countries with respected militaries. The total number of troops in the GCC militaries, excluding Saudi Arabia, is only 120,700, while the number of troops in the Saudi military alone reaches 226,500, or 65 percent of the combined military forces of the six GCC nations.
As far as air capabilities, the Center estimates the number of Iranian planes to be 312. However, it estimates that 40 to 60 of these planes are inoperable, apparently due to the sanctions. The Saudi air force, on the other hand, has 280 planes of both American and European varieties, including the latest F-15 fighter jets. The United Arab Emirates is next, after Saudi Arabia, in terms of the size of its air capabilities, according to the Center’s estimates, with an air force of 184 planes.
These estimates give us the impression that the difference isn’t large when it comes to the size of both armed forces. The difference is one that could be compensated or removed completely with the size or types of military systems owned by the GCC nations, especially Saudi Arabia. However, the report indicates that the GCC nations suffer from a clear lack of coordination and integration. In addition, they suffer from the lack of a specific mission and a shared goal behind it. There is also a lack of a unified foreign policy, especially toward Iran and its nuclear program. In this regard it appears that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are on one side, and Oman and Qatar are on another. More importantly, if the estimates of the Center are correct, then Iran only has to possess a nuclear weapon in order to maintain and increase its gains in the region and to impose its ambitions on others.
In light of these facts and others, the importance of the arms deal and its indications are evident. The exit of Iraq from the scene as a regional power not only added to Iran’s power, but it also practically placed Saudi Arabia — and along with it, the nations of the GCC — in the position of the balancing power in the region. This development had its own prerequisites; the first is that the equation of the balance of power in the region has resulted in these two sides before any others, along with the countries of the GCC. It is true that the only direct confrontation is between the U.S. and Iran, but note that this confrontation is taking place in the Gulf. Note also that both parties in this confrontation exist near one another and share influence in Iraq. This fact must have implications and results when it comes to their future relations.
No one can predict the form these implications and results will take in the future. One of the results could be the conclusion of a regional understanding between the two. In this respect, Saudi Arabia must increase its military capabilities in a way that: compensates for the exit of Iraq from the regional equation, as well as the lack of cohesion inside the GCC; serves as a credible deterrent in the face of Iran; and finally, acts as a counterweight for regional influence in order to deal with any possible developments, including what could happen between its ally, the Americans, and its counterpart, Iran.
What remains is one question and remark. The question is why F-15s and not the latest generation of fighter planes, the F-35? Those were recently acquired by Israel. As for the remark, we must remember that any balance-of-power equation is not limited to one country by way of military strength alone; it encompasses the political and economic spheres as well, but that’s a story for another day.
Since this deal is considered the largest arms deal in the history of the United States, it is only natural that it would garner a great deal of media attention. News of the deal quickly turned from a topic calling for much analysis and speculation into one raising many questions. Some have questioned whether Saudi Arabia’s decision to enter into a deal of such magnitude carries with it a political message from Riyadh to Washington, asserting the depth of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, especially considering present circumstances on both a regional and international level. This was the least intelligent analysis of the deal.
There are also those who see this deal as an attempt by the Saudis to help the Obama administration, which is in the middle of a financial crisis that is shaking the U.S. economy. Quick thinking is evident in this analysis, for it tied the event to surrounding circumstances. However, notwithstanding the soundness of these types of analyses, they have one thing in common: They don’t take into account facts more closely linked to the nature of the deal’s circumstances and facts that could be behind a deal of such magnitude and at such a time as this.
Among these facts are Saudi political and security interests as a major player in a region facing grave dangers, which, if they become reality, would leave the Saudis worse off than before. That the Obama administration benefits politically from this deal, or that it could serve to lessen the weight of the American financial crisis to some extent, is only natural and an expected occurrence. The more important question is: How does Saudi Arabia benefit from this deal?
To answer this question we must place the event in its regional context. It is well-known that the Gulf region is suffering from a chronic case of instability that has spanned four decades. Without going into too much detail, the region has been affected by border disputes, political and sectarian crises, military expeditions, destructive wars and alliances between nations fed by wild ambitions. It is well-known that the main reason behind the lack of stability in the Gulf region — just like any other region in the world — goes back to an imbalance of power stretching back over four decades.
Since the British withdrawal from the region in the early ‘70s, the balance of power was concentrated in Iraq and Iran, which means that it was a delicate equation. America was one of the sides in this equation; however, it took part from a distance — or as they say, from the horizon — through its naval presence on the high seas and its naval base at Diego Garcia in the south of the Gulf and its base at Incirlik, in Turkey, to the north. That was until 1990.
The Iranian revolution ended that delicate balance of power. Because of the continued imbalance in the power equation, coupled with a lack of security arrangements, the temptation arose for both Iraq and Iran to impose their dominance on the region. Iraq, under the previous Baathist rule, went after this ambition and entered into expeditions moved by endless aspirations, demands and disputes. Iran was no different than Iraq in its regional ambitions. It, however, was waiting for the perfect opportunity.
The strange thing is that this opportunity for Iran would come at the hands of the Americans in 2003, when they occupied Iraq, deposed Tehran’s number one enemy, Saddam Hussein, and gave ruling power to Iran’s allies there. In other words, the U.S. didn’t just remove Iraq from the balance of power in the Gulf, but also from the Arab region.
Here the Gulf region entered into the era of Iranian ambition, with its goal of increased gains for Tehran in Iraq first, and then in the region as a whole, and benefiting from an Arab weakness that left Iraq to face its destiny alone in the face of the Americans and Iranians, and in front of an internal collapse that has yet to cease. Parallel to Iran’s need to increase its gains in the Gulf region was its need to maintain and protect these gains. This protection can only come by developing and increasing its military power, and the truth is that Iran might be the only country to benefit militarily from its long war with Iraq during the ‘80s. What is remarkable in this respect is that the Iranian nuclear program came back with unsurpassed vigor immediately after the fall of Baghdad. Even before that, and continuing after, there was feverish activity in Tehran in developing its weapons systems, especially in the realms of missile and air defense.
The question then is what happened to the balance of power in the region after the fall of Iraq and after the United States completed what it called the end of its military operations in Iraq last month with the withdrawal of most of its forces? According to estimates by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington for the year 2010, the total size of Iran’s military is 560,000 troops. According to these same estimates, the total number of troops making up the armed forces of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries combined comes to 347,000. These numbers encompass all of the different branches of those countries with respected militaries. The total number of troops in the GCC militaries, excluding Saudi Arabia, is only 120,700, while the number of troops in the Saudi military alone reaches 226,500, or 65 percent of the combined military forces of the six GCC nations.
As far as air capabilities, the Center estimates the number of Iranian planes to be 312. However, it estimates that 40 to 60 of these planes are inoperable, apparently due to the sanctions. The Saudi air force, on the other hand, has 280 planes of both American and European varieties, including the latest F-15 fighter jets. The United Arab Emirates is next, after Saudi Arabia, in terms of the size of its air capabilities, according to the Center’s estimates, with an air force of 184 planes.
These estimates give us the impression that the difference isn’t large when it comes to the size of both armed forces. The difference is one that could be compensated or removed completely with the size or types of military systems owned by the GCC nations, especially Saudi Arabia. However, the report indicates that the GCC nations suffer from a clear lack of coordination and integration. In addition, they suffer from the lack of a specific mission and a shared goal behind it. There is also a lack of a unified foreign policy, especially toward Iran and its nuclear program. In this regard it appears that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are on one side, and Oman and Qatar are on another. More importantly, if the estimates of the Center are correct, then Iran only has to possess a nuclear weapon in order to maintain and increase its gains in the region and to impose its ambitions on others.
In light of these facts and others, the importance of the arms deal and its indications are evident. The exit of Iraq from the scene as a regional power not only added to Iran’s power, but it also practically placed Saudi Arabia — and along with it, the nations of the GCC — in the position of the balancing power in the region. This development had its own prerequisites; the first is that the equation of the balance of power in the region has resulted in these two sides before any others, along with the countries of the GCC. It is true that the only direct confrontation is between the U.S. and Iran, but note that this confrontation is taking place in the Gulf. Note also that both parties in this confrontation exist near one another and share influence in Iraq. This fact must have implications and results when it comes to their future relations.
No one can predict the form these implications and results will take in the future. One of the results could be the conclusion of a regional understanding between the two. In this respect, Saudi Arabia must increase its military capabilities in a way that: compensates for the exit of Iraq from the regional equation, as well as the lack of cohesion inside the GCC; serves as a credible deterrent in the face of Iran; and finally, acts as a counterweight for regional influence in order to deal with any possible developments, including what could happen between its ally, the Americans, and its counterpart, Iran.
What remains is one question and remark. The question is why F-15s and not the latest generation of fighter planes, the F-35? Those were recently acquired by Israel. As for the remark, we must remember that any balance-of-power equation is not limited to one country by way of military strength alone; it encompasses the political and economic spheres as well, but that’s a story for another day.
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