The Key to Resolving the Diaoyu Islands Issue

Published in Lianhe Zaobao
(Singapore) on 30 September 2010
by Ah Hui (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Edward Seah. Edited by Gheanna Emelia.
The present conflict between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands — sparked by the detention of a Chinese fishing boat — touched the tense nerve between China and Japan right from the start. The public focus was immediately on whether the captain of the boat, Captain Zhan, would be released and when. The two governments’ diplomatic confrontation has also grown in intensity and is becoming unstoppable. This has quickly turned the emotions of the two nations’ people toward an intense confrontation. After Captain Zhan was released, the focus quickly shifted to whether the Japanese would apologize.

To resolve the conflict on the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan is not simply a military issue. Neither is it simply a diplomatic issue. It is certainly not a simple economic issue. It is a major strategic issue bound by the geopolitical structure in Southeast Asia between China, Japan and the U.S. To determine victory on the Diaoyu Islands conflict simply by the determination of military might, the toughness of diplomatic methods or the losses and gains of economic interests helps neither in gaining a grasp on the nature of things nor finding the key to resolving the issue.

Whether this crisis was a chance occurrence or the result of the intentional planning of one of the parties would require more time and the disclosure of more information in order to be verified. However, the development of the situation has people confounded. From Japan’s point of view, the Diaoyu Islands are, in fact, already under its military control. Logically, there was no need to intentionally create an incident about a Chinese fishing boat trespassing boundaries to catch fish and give rise to a conflict between the two nations without any practical benefits. From China’s point of view, expending such huge diplomatic, economic and political resources, whether actively or passively, cannot change the fact that the Diaoyu Islands are already under Japan’s practical control.

It is precisely practical control that is China’s key to regaining the Diaoyu Islands. The Chinese fishing boat captain had to be released sooner or later. Whether there would be apologies is a dilemma for both sides. With the eyes of the agitated people of the two nations — as well as the eyes of the entire world — on China and Japan, both sides would choose to continue the standoff if neither of them could make a graceful exit. The Japanese are worried that if they have to apologize, even after they have released the captain, would they continue to vie for the Diaoyu Islands after the apology? The Chinese are worried that since the Japanese wanted to try Captain Zhan with their domestic law this time around — even if they have released him — it would still leave the bad record of Japan practically owning the Diaoyu Islands. Japan had to release the man, but even after they had done so, the matter is still not resolved! What can be done if the case is not closed? Unless China is already determined to fight for the Diaoyu Islands, there is no practical benefit in fighting with the Japanese for an apology.

The winding and uncertain development of the situation probably has to do with the Naoto Kan administration’s lack of diplomatic experience in handling the highly sensitive Sino-Japan issues, as well as Naoto Kan’s personal extreme fear of America. It could also be due to the lack of a major, comprehensive and implementable future strategy for repossessing the Diaoyu Islands, or even an in-depth study of the future strategic direction of China, the U.S. and Japan in the entire East Asian region. After the incident had occurred, it was unavoidable that, under the pressure of public discourses in their own countries, both sides lost their cool, misjudged each other and fought over long-term strategic considerations and lack of details. Whatever the cause may be, such an incident has become hard to contain since its inception. In the end, when the two nations head toward a larger-scale confrontation, it is of no benefit to the people of China and Japan.

If we retrace the history of the formation of the Diaoyu Islands issue, we can easily see that the U.S. was the hand behind everything. To divide and conquer was a strategy taken from the treasured book of conquest handed down by the Anglo-Saxons, the forefathers of the U.K. and the U.S. who dominated the world for a few centuries. When China and Japan fight over an island to the point that both sides suffer losses — if they did not have the wisdom to understand the strategic meaning of the knot that America tied more than 40 years ago — neither of these nations is fit to be a world leader, no matter how large their economies have become. Once China and Japan have the Diaoyu Islands to vie for, the U.S. will have a firm hold of the strategic initiative of the interaction among China, America and Japan. Due to the special alliance formed between Japan and the U.S. after World War II, unless the integrated strength of the politics, economy and military affairs of both China and Japan, or either one of the two, have reached or exceeded America’s level, China and Japan cannot leave the U.S. out of the picture and establish deep strategic cooperation by themselves. Even if the Diaoyu Islands dispute is resolved, they cannot escape the influence of the American factor.
 
To regain the Diaoyu Islands, China would have to pressure Japan at the right time, and Japan would have to lean on the U.S. and seek the protection of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. If China were not able to mend the Sino-U.S. relationship at this point, the U.S. would surely use Japan to hold down China and cause the price for China to regain the Diaoyu Islands through its military to be exceedingly high — or even face such unfathomable risks that it has to be abandoned. If Japan tries to shake off the U.S. and heads toward political and military independence, the U.S. can, in the same way, claim that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China, and that it merely handed the jurisdiction of the Diaoyu Islands over to Japan in 1972, thus using China’s power to hold down Japan and benefiting from the situation.

In the foreseeable 10 to 30 years, the gap in the national powers between China and the U.S. will gradually close, while the gap between China and Japan will gradually be widened. The rise of China is unstoppable, and when the U.S.’ effort to hold it down proves ineffective, the U.S. will have no choice but to start cooperating with China to obtain the maximum benefits and minimize the risks. In actuality, the Sino-U.S. relationship has been progressing exactly along this line. During the process, holding down Japan will be to the mutual benefit of China and the U.S. The first thing that former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton did when he took office in August 2005 was to meet China’s Ambassador to the United Nations Wang Guangya, and they reached a consensus on stopping Japan from applying to be permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, instantly shattering Japan’s dream to be a permanent member. If the cooperation between China and the U.S. on this important matter of national interest is ignored, and the two nations are engaged in a vicious collision, the strategic balance between the three nations will be damaged. The one that will suffer the most will be China.

Going by the present development, Japan’s national power will gradually decline. In contrast to China’s development prospects, Japan’s potential has been exhausted. In the contest between China, the U.S. and Japan in the days ahead, Japan will become the weakest of the three. If China can, in this difficult development process, withstand America’s pressure and clearly admit America’s leadership status, maintaining with the U.S. all the strategic cooperation that is of common interest within the scope of the world, a necessary strategic space for China’s peaceful rise will be created. We can foresee that if Sino-U.S. relations are smooth, we will not see too many complications in Sino-Japan relations.

In regaining the Diaoyu Islands, China should also survey the strategic setup between the three major powers that are China, the U.S. and Japan once again and work out a national strategy that is far-sighted, yet operable. When the national powers of China can stand toe-to-toe with the U.S., it is totally possible for China to have certain strategic exchanges with the U.S. to gain America’s support and regain the Diaoyu Islands without shedding a drop of blood.



此次中日在钓鱼岛因中方渔船被扣所引发的争端,从一开始便牵动着中日两国紧张的神经。公众的视线,立即聚焦在詹船长是否被释放,何时被释放的问题 上。两国政府的外交对抗,也一浪高过一浪,欲罢不能,迅速把两国民众的情绪引向激烈的对抗。詹船长被放之后,又迅速对峙在是否道歉上。

  要解决中日钓鱼岛争端,不是简单的军事问题,也不是简单的外交问题,更不是简单的经济问题,而受制中日美三国在东北亚地缘政治格局的大 战略。单纯从军事实力的计算,外交手段的软硬,经济利益的得失来评估中日在钓鱼岛争端中的输赢,将无助于把握事物的本质,无助于找到解决问题的钥匙。

  这次危机究竟是偶发事件,还是由某一方刻意策划所致,尚需待以时日,更多资料披露出来后,方有机会求证。不过事件从发生到演变至今,却 令人觉得如坠云雾,莫名其妙。从日方的角度来看,钓鱼岛已经在其实际军事控制之下,按常理,无需刻意炒作一个中方渔船越界捕鱼的事件,徒增两国争执而无实 际收益。从中方的角度来看,动用如此巨大的外交、经济和政治资源,无论是主动还是被动为之,均无助于改变钓鱼岛已经被日本实际控制这个事实。恰恰是实际控 制,才是中国拿回钓鱼岛的关键。中方船长,早晚都要放回来。道歉与否,对双方来讲,更是两难。在两国情绪激动的民众乃至全世界的瞩目下,任何一方下不了 台,都会选择再继续对抗下去。日方担心,已经放人了,又要道歉,那么道了歉以后,是否还要继续索取钓鱼岛呢?中方则担心,日方此次欲以国内法审判詹船长, 即使人放回来,也会留下日本实际拥有钓鱼岛的恶例。不放人不行,放了人,事情也没完!没完,又能怎么办呢?除非中国已经决心为钓鱼岛一战,为道歉与否再斗 下去也别无实际收益。

  从事态峰回路转而又摇摆不定的发展过程来判断,恐与菅直人政府处理中日高度敏感问题的外交经验匮乏,以及其个人极度的恐美情结有关;也 可能与中国缺乏一整套面向未来、切实可行的收复钓鱼岛的大战略,乃至缺乏整个东亚地区,未来中美日战略走向的深刻研究有关。事发后双方在各自国内公众舆论 的压力下,难免意气用事,误判对方,争执细节而缺乏长远战略考量。无论出于何因,如此一事件自此一发而不可收,走向两国更大规模的对立,终究非中日两国人 民之福。

  追溯中日钓鱼岛问题形成的历史,不难知道,美国才是幕后推手。分而治之,乃先后统治世界几百年的英美两国的祖先,盎格鲁撒克逊人祖传下 来的治世宝典。当中日两国为一个小岛斗得两败俱伤的时候,如果再无智慧,深刻理解美国四十年前所系的这个结的战略含义,则中日两国无论经济规模发展到多么 大,都不配做世界领袖。中日有了钓鱼岛这个领土争端,美国将牢牢掌握中美日三国互动的战略主动权。鉴于美日战后所形成的特殊结盟关系,除非中日两国或者两 国之一的政治、经济和军事综合实力达到甚至超过美国,中日两国将不可能将美国排除在外,而单独达成深层次的战略合作关系。即便钓鱼岛争端的解决,也摆脱不 了美国因素的影响。

  中国要收回钓鱼岛,必然要适时挤压日本,而日本则必然倒向美国而寻求《美日安保条约》的安全保护。此时如果中国不能修好中美关系,美国 必然拉日本以牵制中国。使中国军事夺回钓鱼岛的代价过于高昂,甚至风险莫测而废止。如果日本试图摆脱美国而走向政治和军事独立,美国同样可以祭出钓鱼岛是 中国的,美国1972年只是把管辖权交给日本的说法,利用中国的力量牵制日本,从中渔利。

  在可以预见的未来十年至三十年间,中美之间的国力差距将逐步拉近,而中日之间的国力差距将逐步拉大。中国的崛起之势不可阻挡,美国在压 制无法奏效时,将不得不转而合作以谋取利益最大化和风险最小化。事实上近年来中美关系的发展,正是沿着这样的轨迹在曲线中前进的。在这个过程中,压制日本 将是中美两国共同的战略利益。2005年8月美国驻联合国大使博尔顿上任后的第一件事,就是约见中国住联合国大使王光亚,就阻止日本的入常申请达成一致看 法,令日本的入常梦想瞬间瓦解。若无视中美在这个重大国家利益上的交集,恶性碰撞,将会破坏三国的战略平衡关系。受伤最重的,将是中国。

  以目前的发展趋势看,日本的国力将逐渐落后。与中国的发展前景相反,日本的潜力已发挥殆尽,在今后中美日三国的角逐中,将逐步沦为最弱 的一极。中国如果能在这个艰难的发展进程中,即顶住美国的压力,又明确承认美国的领导地位,保持与美国在世界范围内所有共同利益的战略合作,将为中国的和 平崛起创造必要的战略空间。可以预见,如果中美关系顺畅,中日关系将不会出现大的周折。

  钓鱼岛的收回,中国亦应在中美日三国大的战略格局中重新审视,制定出既有长远战略眼光,又具操作性的国家战略。当中美两国的国力可以比肩的时候,中国完全有可能与美国做某种战略交换,换取美国的支持,从而兵不血刃,收回钓鱼岛。
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