The U.S. and Iran in a Fateful Stage

Through two years of work by the Obama administration, the United States has made progress in strengthening the sanctions against the Iranian regime, but it is necessary to do more to change Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Despite the new sanctions, Iran continues gaining influence in Iraq and Afghanistan and stirring unrest in Lebanon, all while making progress in its attempts to enrich uranium. Now it is unlikely that Iran will view the U.S., which is busy withdrawing from the region and attempting to treat its feeble economy, as a true threat to order in Iran or to its nuclear ambitions. The USA must put in place a successful policy for Iran that emphasizes the importance of international efforts and at the same time defines clear sanctions for the continued Iranian challenge.

Despite the new rounds of sanctions troubling the Iranian economy, they are far from debilitating. Tehran continues to withstand much of the pressure. Despite the new sanctions that sought to undermine power, including strict financial control over new investments, Iran is still capable of selling considerable amounts of oil to nations in need of it, most especially China and India. While the sanctions have forced Iran to make serious cutbacks in the oil sector and others, which include subsidies that could cause anxiety and unrest in the nation, Iran has proven its harshness in the suppression of opposition to the Islamic Republic. The violent actions of the Basij during the uprising that surrounded the contested presidential elections in 2009 clearly revealed that the Iranian government will not easily change its course and will work with all that it is capable of to maintain its grasp on power. Although leading religious figures have certainly noticed the benefits that an end to international isolation might bring, from an ideological standpoint, the government is very committed. Also, because of internal competition and quarreling, it is no longer capable of finding a way out of this predicament to join the international community. Regardless of how aggressive, sanctions will most likely not subjugate Iran unless replaced by other means that the U.S. must be prepared to adopt.

While Iran works to limit the effects of the international sanctions, it prepares itself for the possibility of military opposition and works at undermining American interests in the region.

Although there is an effective ban on arms to Iran, Iran has taken great pains to update its military power, including comprehensive updates for the local manufacture of armaments, such as surface to air missiles, in an attempt to build a little modicum of deterrence capabilities in the event of an Israeli or U.S. attack on its nuclear installations. At the same time, Iran continues to intervene in the affairs of Iraq and Afghanistan and — depending on the report — to train members of the Taliban while offering financial aid to the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai.

The goal is simple: Iran is very interested in keeping the United States engaged in regional crises and conflicts that prevent it from threatening Iran militarily. Iran has learned that the American people are weary of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and will not support a third war in the Middle East unless the U.S. were facing an imminent threat that could not be assuaged or contained. Iran doesn’t have the intention to provoke the U.S. publicly. From the Iranian perspective, as long as the U.S. is incapable of progress and remains mired in Iraq and Afghanistan, the situation is better for Iran.

Considering the lack of a credible threat of military action and its successful attempts to limit the effects of the new sanctions, Iran has grown accustomed to a United States that promises much but does little. The recent WikiLeaks make clear that the Iranian forces played an important role in inciting violence in Iraq — even in fighting U.S. military forces directly — and all that without a coherent American response. This confirms that the principle “promise much and do little,” which was applied in successive administrations in the U.S., is still in place, despite the fact that the situation now is clearly more urgent and threatening. Regardless of the determination of the Obama administration, external and internal constraints prevent the U.S. from undertaking steps in escalating the military threat, and the credibility of the U.S. has been diminished in an essential way. Recognizing that, the Israeli P.M. Benjamin Netanyahu expressed his support for a military strike during his last visit to the U.S. This raises fears that if the U.S. does not do something tangible, then Israel will escalate matters by attacking Iran.

Moving forward, the Obama administration must choose a new strategy from among the following incomplete group of choices.

First, it could allow Iran to keep its uranium enrichment program, but under a strict system of observation built with the help of the international community. The option to maintain a nuclear program on its soil would be a source of national pride regardless of which regime is in power. This scenario assumes that Iran does not have any negative intentions to creating nuclear weapons, and that it is better to enable an Iranian nuclear program under strong observation than to continue this dangerous game without end. Obama’s administration could permit Iran to maintain its nuclear enrichment program, and at the same time make it clear that it is not interested in changing the power system in Iran, but that a different climate in the region would increase stability. This choice, in any case, is elusive for a number of reasons. Iran has not revealed any preparations for opening its nuclear installations to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is not possible that the currently elected Congress will support such a step with a majority from the Republican Party. Israel, without a doubt, will strongly refuse this notion, as the Israelis are convinced that Iran seeks to acquire nuclear arms, and it will not relinquish its aspirations to become the hegemonic power in the region. In Cairo, President Obama said “any nation — including Iran — should have the right to access peaceful nuclear power if it complies with its responsibilities under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That commitment is at the core of the treaty, and it must be kept for all who fully abide by it.” But the question is: Is it within Obama’s power to convince all parties of conflict that this is indeed a formula that can be applied in practice?

Second, the U.S. could heed the call of P.M. Netanyahu to strengthen the credibility of the military option against Iran. This would necessarily mean that the U.S. would begin preparations for emergency situations and begin joint military exercises with Israel. With Israel on one side and the Gulf states on the other, this could give Iran an indication of the seriousness of the military option. The Iranians strongly refuse negotiations from one side and intimidation from the other. Because the credibility of the Obama administration has fallen in the realm of doubt, it might be necessary to undertake actions to demonstrate that the military option is serious this time. Despite all of this, this option might not be enough to coerce Iran because it doubts the resolve of the U.S. However, the hosting of military maneuvers and the quick transfer of advanced weapons to America’s friends in the Gulf might lead to the desired message.

Third, the U.S. could take into consideration the possibility of reprisals on a limited basis against some of the sources of Iranian power that are working to defeat American interests in the region, whether in Afghanistan or Iraq. But this suggestion does not send signals to Iran clearly stating that it cannot oppose American interests without punishment; thus, the result will only be an escalation of bad behavior. The U.S. could attack certain Iranian resources, whether military or financial, but only in response to Iranian actions clearly designed to impede U.S. interests, even to kill U.S. servicemen. It is doubtful that the Obama administration is ready to head in this direction. This is a part of the problem, as Iran does not see a reason for serious negotiations if there won’t be punishments for its continued challenges and provocations.

Fourth, if negotiations are resumed, as is expected, the U.S. must give the negotiations a limited time frame and use Turkey as a direct intermediary with the Iranians. The Iranians must recognize that the process of negotiation is not endless. During that time, the Obama administration must work to rebuild trust with Turkey regarding negotiations with Iran. The agreement to exchange enriched uranium that was completed by Turkey and Brazil did not go as far as the U.S. wanted, and Turkish opposition to the sanctions decided by the U.N. has left American-Turkish relations tense. Turkey could be a valuable channel for the Iranians to determine the potential consequences of continually challenging the international community. The talks between Ankara and Tehran do not have to settle the negotiations of the five nations (the permanent members of the Security Council in addition to Germany), but rather direct them and offer a way for Tehran to save face while ending international isolation through its relationship with Turkey.

The progress of these negotiations could help develop the structure of the nuclear exchange that Turkey began previously and strengthen the agreement where it addresses the primary fears of America and the international community in general. It is possible that there may be some opposition to the central role of Turkey from some of members of the U.S. Senate who propose the possibility of Turkey becoming a regional power in the East. Also, Israel is very doubtful right now of Ankara, after the deep rift in Turkish-Israeli relations following the Israeli attack on the Freedom Flotilla. In any case, if Turkey worked in cooperation with the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany, and especially the USA, it might achieve success in these endeavors, especially since Turkey wants to prevent Iran from possessing nuclear weapons just as much as the U.S., or perhaps more, and therefore avoid the possibility of a new war in the Middle East with unpredictable consequences.

And finally there are those who advise patience. Those who say that Iran is experiencing many difficulties, that its nuclear program is progressing much slower than what was once thought, and that Iranian attempts are handicapped because of a number of factors. Among these factors is the damage that foreign powers have caused its nuclear program, its inability to import nuclear technology, a grumbling and restless populace as a result of the political crisis that followed the elections, and the international pressure and conflicts among the various centers of power regarding the general direction the nation should take. President Obama must continue focusing on strengthening the sanctions and making them more effective. Moreover, the U.S. should continue to elevate external and internal pressure with the help of the Green movement and other groups like the Arabs, Turks, the Baloch and others, unless it obtains clear indications that Tehran truly desires to enter into serious negotiations to reach an agreement.

This final suggestion deserves examination on the condition that the U.S. aligns its strategies completely with Israel. If the Obama administration does not make it clear that it is truly determined to stop Iran by any means — including the military option — and if Israel concludes that Iran is about to reach production ability, then it is probable that Israel will act in agreement with America or without it. When it comes to Israel’s national security, Israel doesn’t know any “sacred cows”, including the American-Israeli relationship. Both nations must be on the same level.

President Obama should not make the mistake of believing that the actions of the Netanyahu administration or other Israeli governments are guaranteed. There has not once been an Israeli government that defended party politics above national security, whether the Likkud Party, Labor, Kadima, or any other group or party. They all maintain the same notions when it comes to national security, and especially with regard to the Iranian threat. If Israel were attacked, the U.S. would be entangled, and the U.S. must be prepared to face this fact.

If the U.S. is truly serious about preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear arms, it must prove it. The road before it will be difficult and treacherous, and Iran believes that the U.S. will not take this path. Proving to Iran that the U.S. is determined to do that and that there are punishments for challenging the U.S. is essential to reduce the military option, which would be a terrible punishment to keep nuclear weapons beyond the reach of the Islamic Republic.