The New G2’s Disappointingly Tepid Pressure on North Korea
Published in Financial Times
(South Korea) on 20 January 2011
by SeongHo Kim (link to original)
(South Korea) on 20 January 2011
by SeongHo Kim (link to original)
Translated from
by Moctar Aboubacar.
Edited by Sam Carter.
On Jan. 19, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese Premier Hu Jintao highlighted their summit meeting with a joint statement that included some 41 key points. The statement, which included ample mention of the relationship of mutual respect and mutual benefit between the two countries, stressed Chinese-American cooperation. Speaking at a press conference held after the end of the meeting, President Obama praised his counterpart’s country, saying that “China’s peaceful rise is good for the world, and it’s good for America.” Premier Hu Jintao, for his part, declared that “China-U.S. relations will enjoy smooth and steady growth when the two countries handle well issues involving each other's major interests.”
What are we to make of this rhetoric? This was nothing other than an official hailing of China’s rise to the elite group of two (G2) world powers. Den Xiaopeng’s January 1979 visit to the United States signaled China’s reform and economic opening to the world. Thirty-two years later it is Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States that shows both countries debating world issues as equals.
China and the United States remain as apart as ever with regard to their respective world views. Whereas the U.S laid suggestive emphasis on human rights as universal values which transcend cultures, China defended itself by stating that each country’s particular situation must be taken into account and that international interference in domestic affairs was to be avoided. The U.S also expressed the desire for an appreciation of the yuan, but China simply stated that it was following the principle of currency reform and flexibility maximization.
However, the two countries were able to reach many points of agreement on the Korean Peninsula issue. One of the points in the joint statement was to underline the need for serious and constructive dialogue between North and South Korea. Echoing an earlier joint statement from September 2009, the two heads of state renewed the call for specific and effective measures to discourage any North Korean nuclear program. Citing concern at the prospects of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program, the statement also called for a resumption of the Six Party Talks.
But with such soft and intangible pressure, can we really expect North Korea to abandon its stubborn posture? While a ‘concern’ regarding uranium enrichment may eventually translate into harsher UN sanctions on the country, North Korea may simply yet again declare that all current diplomatic impasses are of the South’s doing. However, in this joint statement China’s true intentions came spilling out. Still, any hope for a solution to the Korean Peninsula’s problems to come out of this meeting has been dashed. Now, bringing up the North Korean nuclear threat or North Korea’s provocations in the Yellow Sea is just another drop in the bucket. The only question now is to see whether South Korean diplomacy has the ability to overcome this crisis.
What are we to make of this rhetoric? This was nothing other than an official hailing of China’s rise to the elite group of two (G2) world powers. Den Xiaopeng’s January 1979 visit to the United States signaled China’s reform and economic opening to the world. Thirty-two years later it is Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States that shows both countries debating world issues as equals.
China and the United States remain as apart as ever with regard to their respective world views. Whereas the U.S laid suggestive emphasis on human rights as universal values which transcend cultures, China defended itself by stating that each country’s particular situation must be taken into account and that international interference in domestic affairs was to be avoided. The U.S also expressed the desire for an appreciation of the yuan, but China simply stated that it was following the principle of currency reform and flexibility maximization.
However, the two countries were able to reach many points of agreement on the Korean Peninsula issue. One of the points in the joint statement was to underline the need for serious and constructive dialogue between North and South Korea. Echoing an earlier joint statement from September 2009, the two heads of state renewed the call for specific and effective measures to discourage any North Korean nuclear program. Citing concern at the prospects of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program, the statement also called for a resumption of the Six Party Talks.
But with such soft and intangible pressure, can we really expect North Korea to abandon its stubborn posture? While a ‘concern’ regarding uranium enrichment may eventually translate into harsher UN sanctions on the country, North Korea may simply yet again declare that all current diplomatic impasses are of the South’s doing. However, in this joint statement China’s true intentions came spilling out. Still, any hope for a solution to the Korean Peninsula’s problems to come out of this meeting has been dashed. Now, bringing up the North Korean nuclear threat or North Korea’s provocations in the Yellow Sea is just another drop in the bucket. The only question now is to see whether South Korean diplomacy has the ability to overcome this crisis.