Why the U.S. Supports Independent Southern Sudan
On February 7, over 98 percent of voters in Southern Sudan chose independence. U.S. President Barack Obama immediately acknowledged the new country. News from the White House even indicates that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will accept an invitation to visit Sudan. She will be the highest U.S. government official to have visited Sudan in recent years.
That the Southern Sudan referendum took place as scheduled, peacefully and successfully, proves to the U.S. government that America’s new strategy in Sudan is working. While the Obama administration maintains the use of deterrence diplomacy in the case of Sudan, the new strategy announced by the Obama administration in September 2010 replaces sanctions, isolation and big stick diplomacy with encouragement, rewards and a pro-engagement carrot policy.
The U.S. State Department explicitly states that the new Sudan strategy will focus on the timely implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between the North and South. The desired result would either be a united and peaceful Sudan after 2011, or two separate and viable states at peace with each other.
The other objectives include ending human rights violations, genocide and preventing Sudan from becoming once again a safe harbor for international terrorists. If the U.S. perceives that Sudan is performing satisfactorily in these areas, it will in turn reward Sudan in the following ways: It will remove Sudan from the terrorism list, increase aid and debt relief to Sudan and partially or fully lift sanctions.
Recently, the U.S. has even joined France in seriously considering the proposal by the African Union to delay the arrest of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, for whom the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant.
Of course, the U.S. has not forgotten to continue its warnings to the Sudanese government. Hillary Clinton cautioned that in the upcoming six-month transition period toward Southern Sudan’s independence, Northern Sudan has to maintain cooperation (implying that there should be no “small incidents”) and that there must be strict implementation of peace agreements and post-referendum arrangements.
Other high officials have also threatened that if Sudan’s performance is not up to U.S. expectations, Sudan may have to face serious consequences, such as sanctions.
It is not difficult to realize that even though the U.S. has incorporated antiterrorism and human rights protection into its new Sudan policy, ensuring Southern Sudan’s independence realizes the intention behind the new strategy. The larger motive behind the strategy highlights two of the United States’ long-term strategic considerations: greed for Sudan’s rich oil resources, and not allowing the Islamic regime in Northern Sudan to further penetrate the African continent.
As all are aware, Sudan possesses rich oil and natural gas resources, conservatively estimated to be at least 80-100 billion barrels, and of which a majority of the reserves are in the South. American firms such as Chevron and Exxon used to tap into these resources in the 1970s and 1980s, but have had to keep away from this treasure trove due to U.S. government sanctions.
Over the years, the U.S. government and major oil companies have never been content to be spectators in the exploration and exploitation of Sudan’s natural resources, and have long wished to return to the field. Now, with Southern Sudan’s impending independence, U.S. oil companies will lead the way out of sanction imprisonment, and will cause a reshuffling of the allocation of oil resources in the region.
From the perspectives of geopolitics and preventing the spread of the Islamic influence after 9/11, Sudan’s geographical position has gained geopolitical importance to U.S. antiterrorism. U.S. antiterrorism efforts in Africa are concentrated in the Horn of Africa and the Central and Western Saharan regions. Sudan is the key link between the two above regions.
From the mid-1990s, Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda have used Sudan as a base in planning terrorist attacks against the U.S. In addition, al-Bashir’s Islamic regime (98 percent of Northern Sudanese are Muslim) led the U.S. government to worry that Islamic extremist groups will use Sudan as a base to further penetrate the African continent.
Thus, a secular, independent Southern Sudan with followers of Christianity and indigenous religions could no doubt become a buffer zone against Islamic expansion in the region.
About the author: He Wen Ping is Chair of the Institute of West Asian & African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Science.
That the Southern Sudan referendum took place as scheduled, peacefully and successfully, proves to the U.S. government that America’s new strategy in Sudan is working. While the Obama administration maintains the use of deterrence diplomacy in the case of Sudan, the new strategy announced by the Obama administration in September 2010 replaces sanctions, isolation and big stick diplomacy with encouragement, rewards and a pro-engagement carrot policy.
The U.S. State Department explicitly states that the new Sudan strategy will focus on the timely implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between the North and South. The desired result would either be a united and peaceful Sudan after 2011, or two separate and viable states at peace with each other.
The other objectives include ending human rights violations, genocide and preventing Sudan from becoming once again a safe harbor for international terrorists. If the U.S. perceives that Sudan is performing satisfactorily in these areas, it will in turn reward Sudan in the following ways: It will remove Sudan from the terrorism list, increase aid and debt relief to Sudan and partially or fully lift sanctions.
Recently, the U.S. has even joined France in seriously considering the proposal by the African Union to delay the arrest of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, for whom the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant.
Of course, the U.S. has not forgotten to continue its warnings to the Sudanese government. Hillary Clinton cautioned that in the upcoming six-month transition period toward Southern Sudan’s independence, Northern Sudan has to maintain cooperation (implying that there should be no “small incidents”) and that there must be strict implementation of peace agreements and post-referendum arrangements.
Other high officials have also threatened that if Sudan’s performance is not up to U.S. expectations, Sudan may have to face serious consequences, such as sanctions.
It is not difficult to realize that even though the U.S. has incorporated antiterrorism and human rights protection into its new Sudan policy, ensuring Southern Sudan’s independence realizes the intention behind the new strategy. The larger motive behind the strategy highlights two of the United States’ long-term strategic considerations: greed for Sudan’s rich oil resources, and not allowing the Islamic regime in Northern Sudan to further penetrate the African continent.
As all are aware, Sudan possesses rich oil and natural gas resources, conservatively estimated to be at least 80-100 billion barrels, and of which a majority of the reserves are in the South. American firms such as Chevron and Exxon used to tap into these resources in the 1970s and 1980s, but have had to keep away from this treasure trove due to U.S. government sanctions.
Over the years, the U.S. government and major oil companies have never been content to be spectators in the exploration and exploitation of Sudan’s natural resources, and have long wished to return to the field. Now, with Southern Sudan’s impending independence, U.S. oil companies will lead the way out of sanction imprisonment, and will cause a reshuffling of the allocation of oil resources in the region.
From the perspectives of geopolitics and preventing the spread of the Islamic influence after 9/11, Sudan’s geographical position has gained geopolitical importance to U.S. antiterrorism. U.S. antiterrorism efforts in Africa are concentrated in the Horn of Africa and the Central and Western Saharan regions. Sudan is the key link between the two above regions.
From the mid-1990s, Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda have used Sudan as a base in planning terrorist attacks against the U.S. In addition, al-Bashir’s Islamic regime (98 percent of Northern Sudanese are Muslim) led the U.S. government to worry that Islamic extremist groups will use Sudan as a base to further penetrate the African continent.
Thus, a secular, independent Southern Sudan with followers of Christianity and indigenous religions could no doubt become a buffer zone against Islamic expansion in the region.
About the author: He Wen Ping is Chair of the Institute of West Asian & African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Science.