The Obama Trappist Monastery
The American administration hastily turned its back on Mubarak’s rule, but facing the slaughter Gadhafi is performing in Libya — where there are American oil-related interests — the American president has shown an embarrassing indifference. This state of affairs may lead other Arab partners of America to look for another ally.
In complete contrast to the resolute strategy that President Ronald Reagan adopted in light of Libya’s involvement in the terror activities against American targets, which culminated in the air bombing on April 15, 1986, in Tripoli and Benghazi, the current proceedings of President Obama in the face of the barbarous massacre executed by Muammar Gadhafi’s regime are characterized by an incomprehensible enervation.
Moreover, at the same time that the old loyal ally Hosni Mubarak is offhandedly abandoned to his fate after only three days from the moment demonstrations were launched against him — and not only this, the American administration did not hesitate to threaten with delaying an aid package to Cairo, as a leverage of blatant pressure on the so-called vital regional partner — the White House demonstrates an exaggerated forgiveness and an absolute impotence against the fiery and brutal Gadhafi, who is carrying out indiscriminate atrocities toward his citizens.
For instance, Obama avoided any mention of the murderous goings-on in Tripoli and Benghazi in his speech at Ohio State University just three days ago — and this despite reports, which were already available in Washington D.C., of the scale of harm to the civilian population.
It was only the day before yesterday that this thundering silence was finally broken — when President Obama insistently demanded that Libyan authorities stop the violence and respect human rights. However, beyond the tough rhetoric, there were no obligations, or even references, contained in Obama’s words regarding concrete punitive measures — and this in view of the ferocity continuing to rage in the streets of Libyan cities.
It’s true that Secretary of State Clinton condemned the developments in Libya in the course of the Security Council deliberations and called for the immediate ending of the bloodshed. Nevertheless, the United States hasn’t applied real influence on the members of the council aimed at bringing to approval a proposed resolution that would include economic sanctions on Gadhafi. Instead, it chose to join a practically meaningless declaration, devoid of any enforcing and punishing content, which reflected the business-like and utilitarian approach of the majority of council members.
It’s true that compared to the Egyptian stage, the reach of American influence on Libya is much more limited, because American aid to Gadhafi’s regime in 2010 did not even surpass $1 million.
Still, considering the liberal core of the 44th president, and in the light of the fact that he gave such a sweeping tailwind to the Egyptian revolution, it’s a wonder that at least so far, he hasn’t completed his consultations with representatives of the international community regarding the action required in this crisis. Even if mitigating circumstances could be identified — with some effort — that can shed light on the roots and origins of the conduct of the American hegemon (including the fear that Americans who are still in Libya may become hostages of Gadhafi’s loyalists), it is not justifiable.
And indeed, the impression is that only when the web of lofty values and ideals is congruent with the complex web of interests, considerations and goals will there open up a desired window of opportunity for the administration to translate them into practical policy.
In other cases, contrarily, when interests of power and dominance are involved in shaping the present-day American policy toward Tripoli, especially the interests of oil companies (for whom imposing sanctions against the regime, including cessation of their presence on the land of Libya as long as violence continues there, is the last thing they want), the ideological level in the thinking of the Obama administration remained in terms of a utopia empty of all content.
The fact is that the big league oil corporations such as Occidental Petroleum continue to be busy in Libya even today, which imparts a key contribution to sterilization of the American response of any tangible content.
A Hard Line against Friends
Contrary to the long-term policy of economic sanctions run by U.S. governments in the wake of the exposure of the “Libyan connection,” which in 1988 led to the airborne attack on a Pan Am flight over the skies of Lockerbie, Scotland, the Washington of 2011 exhibits once again the growing weakness of Gulliver, against a radical and belligerent camp in the wide-open space of the Middle East.
The era of détente in the relations of Washington with Tripoli, launched in 2003, was contingent on the explicit Libyan commitment to abstain from the development of WMDs and terrorist activity. Nonetheless, doesn’t the fact of Gadhafi’s exploitation of diverse conventional weapons (both from the air and the sea) against the civilian population make their use a form of state terror, mocking the agreements of 2003?
The impression made by Obama’s America is one of an uncompromising toughness and decisiveness mainly toward her partners in the region. Mubarak has been thrown to the dogs in spite of the three decades of close strategic cooperation with him; and Israel too, with all the necessary differences, has become a target of outright pressure and humiliating governmental treatment during the “construction freeze crisis,” which broke out between March and April 2010 and soured the administration’s relationship with its Israeli ally.
On the other hand, when it comes to especially “dark” regimes such as Libya and Iran (toward which Obama has revealed especially lenient attitude during the course of the demonstrations of 2009), American patience seems to have no limit.
The only hope is that a harsh reaction in the international system, including the Arab world, in face of the bloody events unfolding on Libyan soil will bring the White House to adopt a harder political line. A political line comprised of a wide spectrum of far-reaching sanctions, including the freezing of overseas Libyan assets and the banning of strategic raw materials sales to Libya.
A Reverse Policy
What is especially regrettable in this American tragedy is the fact that this possible hardening of policy would be the result of external factors rather than a proactive move by the one still at the top of the world pyramid. Not less regrettable is the fact that this kind of demeanor from the side of the government that had raised the banner of establishing a moderate inter-Arab coalition might wreck this vision.
This is because these expressions of powerlessness and flaccidity are expected to actually drive away the possible natural partners on this front line of containment — with Saudi Arabia at their head — from tying their fate yet more tightly to the Gulliver who radiates weakness instead of reliable leadership. Abandonment of Mubarak, on the one hand, and ongoing indecision toward Tehran and Tripoli, on the other, cannot but deliver to the stormy regional front a message of worrisome American decline, requiring a profound soul-searching and drawing of lessons.
The possible outcome of this inward analysis could be a decision to keep a distance from the American patron. Even if this process does not result in unilateral disengagement from Washington, the ramifications of this inward analysis (particularly regarding Egypt, depending on the nature of the regime that will crystallize in Cairo, but also concerning Saudi Arabia) are likely to give a tailwind to precisely the radical camp Obama has striven to contain.
Should this threatening and risk-abundant scenario start materializing over the current year, there is a huge doubt about whether Obama will be able to prepare for the dangers at the gate. This is because in January 2012, the campaign for the primaries will commence and siphon off most of the time and resources of the White House. Therefore the Middle East is going to need to wait — whatever its future character will be.
(Professor Abraham Ben-Zvi is the author of a new book — “From Truman to Obama: The Rise and Early Decline of American–Israeli Relations.”)
In complete contrast to the resolute strategy that President Ronald Reagan adopted in light of Libya’s involvement in the terror activities against American targets, which culminated in the air bombing on April 15, 1986, in Tripoli and Benghazi, the current proceedings of President Obama in the face of the barbarous massacre executed by Muammar Gadhafi’s regime are characterized by an incomprehensible enervation.
Moreover, at the same time that the old loyal ally Hosni Mubarak is offhandedly abandoned to his fate after only three days from the moment demonstrations were launched against him — and not only this, the American administration did not hesitate to threaten with delaying an aid package to Cairo, as a leverage of blatant pressure on the so-called vital regional partner — the White House demonstrates an exaggerated forgiveness and an absolute impotence against the fiery and brutal Gadhafi, who is carrying out indiscriminate atrocities toward his citizens.
For instance, Obama avoided any mention of the murderous goings-on in Tripoli and Benghazi in his speech at Ohio State University just three days ago — and this despite reports, which were already available in Washington D.C., of the scale of harm to the civilian population.
It was only the day before yesterday that this thundering silence was finally broken — when President Obama insistently demanded that Libyan authorities stop the violence and respect human rights. However, beyond the tough rhetoric, there were no obligations, or even references, contained in Obama’s words regarding concrete punitive measures — and this in view of the ferocity continuing to rage in the streets of Libyan cities.
It’s true that Secretary of State Clinton condemned the developments in Libya in the course of the Security Council deliberations and called for the immediate ending of the bloodshed. Nevertheless, the United States hasn’t applied real influence on the members of the council aimed at bringing to approval a proposed resolution that would include economic sanctions on Gadhafi. Instead, it chose to join a practically meaningless declaration, devoid of any enforcing and punishing content, which reflected the business-like and utilitarian approach of the majority of council members.
It’s true that compared to the Egyptian stage, the reach of American influence on Libya is much more limited, because American aid to Gadhafi’s regime in 2010 did not even surpass $1 million.
Still, considering the liberal core of the 44th president, and in the light of the fact that he gave such a sweeping tailwind to the Egyptian revolution, it’s a wonder that at least so far, he hasn’t completed his consultations with representatives of the international community regarding the action required in this crisis. Even if mitigating circumstances could be identified — with some effort — that can shed light on the roots and origins of the conduct of the American hegemon (including the fear that Americans who are still in Libya may become hostages of Gadhafi’s loyalists), it is not justifiable.
And indeed, the impression is that only when the web of lofty values and ideals is congruent with the complex web of interests, considerations and goals will there open up a desired window of opportunity for the administration to translate them into practical policy.
In other cases, contrarily, when interests of power and dominance are involved in shaping the present-day American policy toward Tripoli, especially the interests of oil companies (for whom imposing sanctions against the regime, including cessation of their presence on the land of Libya as long as violence continues there, is the last thing they want), the ideological level in the thinking of the Obama administration remained in terms of a utopia empty of all content.
The fact is that the big league oil corporations such as Occidental Petroleum continue to be busy in Libya even today, which imparts a key contribution to sterilization of the American response of any tangible content.
A Hard Line against Friends
Contrary to the long-term policy of economic sanctions run by U.S. governments in the wake of the exposure of the “Libyan connection,” which in 1988 led to the airborne attack on a Pan Am flight over the skies of Lockerbie, Scotland, the Washington of 2011 exhibits once again the growing weakness of Gulliver, against a radical and belligerent camp in the wide-open space of the Middle East.
The era of détente in the relations of Washington with Tripoli, launched in 2003, was contingent on the explicit Libyan commitment to abstain from the development of WMDs and terrorist activity. Nonetheless, doesn’t the fact of Gadhafi’s exploitation of diverse conventional weapons (both from the air and the sea) against the civilian population make their use a form of state terror, mocking the agreements of 2003?
The impression made by Obama’s America is one of an uncompromising toughness and decisiveness mainly toward her partners in the region. Mubarak has been thrown to the dogs in spite of the three decades of close strategic cooperation with him; and Israel too, with all the necessary differences, has become a target of outright pressure and humiliating governmental treatment during the “construction freeze crisis,” which broke out between March and April 2010 and soured the administration’s relationship with its Israeli ally.
On the other hand, when it comes to especially “dark” regimes such as Libya and Iran (toward which Obama has revealed especially lenient attitude during the course of the demonstrations of 2009), American patience seems to have no limit.
The only hope is that a harsh reaction in the international system, including the Arab world, in face of the bloody events unfolding on Libyan soil will bring the White House to adopt a harder political line. A political line comprised of a wide spectrum of far-reaching sanctions, including the freezing of overseas Libyan assets and the banning of strategic raw materials sales to Libya.
A Reverse Policy
What is especially regrettable in this American tragedy is the fact that this possible hardening of policy would be the result of external factors rather than a proactive move by the one still at the top of the world pyramid. Not less regrettable is the fact that this kind of demeanor from the side of the government that had raised the banner of establishing a moderate inter-Arab coalition might wreck this vision.
This is because these expressions of powerlessness and flaccidity are expected to actually drive away the possible natural partners on this front line of containment — with Saudi Arabia at their head — from tying their fate yet more tightly to the Gulliver who radiates weakness instead of reliable leadership. Abandonment of Mubarak, on the one hand, and ongoing indecision toward Tehran and Tripoli, on the other, cannot but deliver to the stormy regional front a message of worrisome American decline, requiring a profound soul-searching and drawing of lessons.
The possible outcome of this inward analysis could be a decision to keep a distance from the American patron. Even if this process does not result in unilateral disengagement from Washington, the ramifications of this inward analysis (particularly regarding Egypt, depending on the nature of the regime that will crystallize in Cairo, but also concerning Saudi Arabia) are likely to give a tailwind to precisely the radical camp Obama has striven to contain.
Should this threatening and risk-abundant scenario start materializing over the current year, there is a huge doubt about whether Obama will be able to prepare for the dangers at the gate. This is because in January 2012, the campaign for the primaries will commence and siphon off most of the time and resources of the White House. Therefore the Middle East is going to need to wait — whatever its future character will be.
(Professor Abraham Ben-Zvi is the author of a new book — “From Truman to Obama: The Rise and Early Decline of American–Israeli Relations.”)
Next article![]( "Gadhafi Is the Best")
