The Turkish-American Disagreement over Libya
The Obama White House, which is already feeling the heat over rising oil prices, now needs to convince Turkey not to veto a contemplated NATO intervention in Libya. Outside of humanitarian aid, however, Ankara is firmly opposed to any military incursion, a position that significantly constrains Washington's room to maneuver.
On Friday, Obama spoke with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and I received an e-mail summary of the main points that were discussed. The first thing that came to mind was that some of the conclusions presented as mutual might not ultimately be agreed to by Ankara, which is exactly what happened.
Erdogan and AK Party Assistant Secretary Ömer Çelik both voiced serious reservations, insisting that their consultations with the White House did not include any discussion of military action against the Libyan regime.
The prime minister in particular was careful to emphasize that he did not want any misunderstandings concerning plans for intervention in Libya and that talks were restricted exclusively to humanitarian aid.
Following this announcement, Erdogan released a statement that strongly criticized plans for sanctions, a position directly opposed to the views of the U.S. and other Western countries.
The fact that Obama has called Erdogan to discuss events in Libya three times already is a testament to Washington's recognition of Ankara's role as one of the most important actors in the Middle East.
For this reason, we can be sure that Erdogan's statements are being watched closely in Washington. The evolving situation in Libya has highlighted differences in foreign policy style between the two countries. And the fact that both governments are responding to pressure from their domestic constituencies as well as foreign constraints makes coordination all the more difficult.
In contrast to its approach toward Egypt, the U.S. was on top of events in Libya from the start, though it was initially cautious not to over-commit itself. The White House justified this early hesitancy, which the Republican opposition roundly criticized, by pointing to concerns for the safety of American citizens still in Libya. And sure enough, as soon as the American evacuations were complete Obama's approach became notably harsher.
Obama declared that Gadhafi must step down, and the White House announced unilateral sanctions ahead of a U.N. package of sanctions passed with strong support from Washington.
The possibility that the chaos in Libya will lead to a spike in oil prices and damage the U.S. economy makes finding a solution an urgent priority for the White House. And the violence Gadhafi is inflicting on Libya's people constitutes a moral inducement to act.
But Washington is still licking its wounds from its interventionist policies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Concerns over the budget have made the White House largely unresponsive to new calls for foreign intervention.
The latest development on this front is an open letter to President Obama signed by 40 analysts, many of whom are of the neo-conservative or liberal-hawk persuasion.
The letter calls on the White House to press NATO to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, to send the Navy into Libyan waters in order to facilitate aid and to undertake operations to prevent further attacks on civilians.
But if the Obama administration wants to apply to NATO for an intervention, which I personally do not think it will do, it will have a hard time dissuading Ankara from exercising its veto.
For this reason, calls by the Director of Policy Planning at the U.S. State Department, Anne-Marie Slaughter, for a Kosovo-style intervention do not seem very practicable at this time.
In short, Ankara's refusal to take any action beyond humanitarian aid renders the military option much more difficult.
One of the reasons Erdogan is so firmly opposed to even a sanctions regime is that he is still trying to protect Turkish citizens in Libya.
Washington faced the same pressures before the evacuation of American citizens was complete, but now that they have been extracted Washington has been freed from this constraint.
But there are still thousands of Turkish citizens residing in Libya. In addition, Ankara fears that if Libya is faced with sanctions it could bring on a new wave of sanctions against Iran.
And of course Ankara is not eager to see the millions of dollars worth of Turkish investment in Libya evaporate. As elections draw near, the ruling party does not want to take any steps that might damage the economy and create general discontent.
There is also a very prevalent concern about appearing too close to the United States, precipitating a loss in domestic image and prestige in the region.
Washington has been analyzing Ankara's overtures toward the Middle East in the context of the general thesis that Ankara is "shifting its alignments."
Now, especially after the crisis in Egypt, Washington is no longer questioning Turkey's clout in the region – instead, it wants to direct this new factor in a manner that plays into its own larger strategy.
I think that is the main reason Obama has been knocking on Ankara's door so much lately. In addition, Washington is clearly aware of Turkey's prestige and the esteem in which Erdogan is held by the masses rising up against their dictators.
In this way, giving the impression that Washington is acting with Erdogan's participation and consent is important in widening Washington's room to maneuver. And Washington is doing this even at the expense of alarming Israel and other Arab regimes who do not want Turkey to have a larger role in the region.
This represents a symbolic admission that, if nothing else, the U.S. prefers the Turkish model to the Iranian one.
In sum, the U.S. is trying to associate itself with Turkey, while Ankara finds it more prudent to keep its distance from Washington. That is why Washington and Ankara are not on the same page when it comes to sanctions on Libya.
On Friday, Obama spoke with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and I received an e-mail summary of the main points that were discussed. The first thing that came to mind was that some of the conclusions presented as mutual might not ultimately be agreed to by Ankara, which is exactly what happened.
Erdogan and AK Party Assistant Secretary Ömer Çelik both voiced serious reservations, insisting that their consultations with the White House did not include any discussion of military action against the Libyan regime.
The prime minister in particular was careful to emphasize that he did not want any misunderstandings concerning plans for intervention in Libya and that talks were restricted exclusively to humanitarian aid.
Following this announcement, Erdogan released a statement that strongly criticized plans for sanctions, a position directly opposed to the views of the U.S. and other Western countries.
The fact that Obama has called Erdogan to discuss events in Libya three times already is a testament to Washington's recognition of Ankara's role as one of the most important actors in the Middle East.
For this reason, we can be sure that Erdogan's statements are being watched closely in Washington. The evolving situation in Libya has highlighted differences in foreign policy style between the two countries. And the fact that both governments are responding to pressure from their domestic constituencies as well as foreign constraints makes coordination all the more difficult.
In contrast to its approach toward Egypt, the U.S. was on top of events in Libya from the start, though it was initially cautious not to over-commit itself. The White House justified this early hesitancy, which the Republican opposition roundly criticized, by pointing to concerns for the safety of American citizens still in Libya. And sure enough, as soon as the American evacuations were complete Obama's approach became notably harsher.
Obama declared that Gadhafi must step down, and the White House announced unilateral sanctions ahead of a U.N. package of sanctions passed with strong support from Washington.
The possibility that the chaos in Libya will lead to a spike in oil prices and damage the U.S. economy makes finding a solution an urgent priority for the White House. And the violence Gadhafi is inflicting on Libya's people constitutes a moral inducement to act.
But Washington is still licking its wounds from its interventionist policies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Concerns over the budget have made the White House largely unresponsive to new calls for foreign intervention.
The latest development on this front is an open letter to President Obama signed by 40 analysts, many of whom are of the neo-conservative or liberal-hawk persuasion.
The letter calls on the White House to press NATO to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, to send the Navy into Libyan waters in order to facilitate aid and to undertake operations to prevent further attacks on civilians.
But if the Obama administration wants to apply to NATO for an intervention, which I personally do not think it will do, it will have a hard time dissuading Ankara from exercising its veto.
For this reason, calls by the Director of Policy Planning at the U.S. State Department, Anne-Marie Slaughter, for a Kosovo-style intervention do not seem very practicable at this time.
In short, Ankara's refusal to take any action beyond humanitarian aid renders the military option much more difficult.
One of the reasons Erdogan is so firmly opposed to even a sanctions regime is that he is still trying to protect Turkish citizens in Libya.
Washington faced the same pressures before the evacuation of American citizens was complete, but now that they have been extracted Washington has been freed from this constraint.
But there are still thousands of Turkish citizens residing in Libya. In addition, Ankara fears that if Libya is faced with sanctions it could bring on a new wave of sanctions against Iran.
And of course Ankara is not eager to see the millions of dollars worth of Turkish investment in Libya evaporate. As elections draw near, the ruling party does not want to take any steps that might damage the economy and create general discontent.
There is also a very prevalent concern about appearing too close to the United States, precipitating a loss in domestic image and prestige in the region.
Washington has been analyzing Ankara's overtures toward the Middle East in the context of the general thesis that Ankara is "shifting its alignments."
Now, especially after the crisis in Egypt, Washington is no longer questioning Turkey's clout in the region – instead, it wants to direct this new factor in a manner that plays into its own larger strategy.
I think that is the main reason Obama has been knocking on Ankara's door so much lately. In addition, Washington is clearly aware of Turkey's prestige and the esteem in which Erdogan is held by the masses rising up against their dictators.
In this way, giving the impression that Washington is acting with Erdogan's participation and consent is important in widening Washington's room to maneuver. And Washington is doing this even at the expense of alarming Israel and other Arab regimes who do not want Turkey to have a larger role in the region.
This represents a symbolic admission that, if nothing else, the U.S. prefers the Turkish model to the Iranian one.
In sum, the U.S. is trying to associate itself with Turkey, while Ankara finds it more prudent to keep its distance from Washington. That is why Washington and Ankara are not on the same page when it comes to sanctions on Libya.