Frantic Rush and Stirring up Intervention
Published in Thawra Al Wehda
(Syria) on 6 March 2011
by Ali Qasim (link to original)
(Syria) on 6 March 2011
by Ali Qasim (link to original)
Translated from
by Amy Stoller.
Edited by Gillian Palmer.
It is clear that America has a frantic desire to direct intervention in Libya, after a series of equivocating steps that will open the door wide to the suppressed appetite for restoration of the role that had always been a cornerstone of U.S. interests.
The suddenness of the logistics preparation — and the preparation of media, politics and diplomacy — affects their motivation. They hope to float on the surface at once, while standing on the other side of the street, spreading propaganda, reasons and excuses, preparing the way for the flood of new slogans.
In the final analysis, the timing of the U.S. response is echoed by the British position, although the British position seemed more aggressive than the U.S. on the basis of its practical results: evacuating the Libyan oil fields and preventing the threat.
The logical question is: Why the military option, the one that the U.S. inclines toward to deal with what is going on in Libya, despite boundaries of space and the actual interests of the Libyan people?
No one argues that what is happening in Libya is a tragic situation and that the Libyan people pay the price; no doubt that even the most pessimistic were not expecting this harvest and these painful scenes in the Arab world. Everyone agreed that all of the ways out of the crisis appear disastrous and the prospects appear strange.
However, this does not prevent us from considering what is beyond that. That is to reflect on the dimensions and the risk of the threat of military intervention in Libya, or any other type of intervention — especially as these issues are public and obvious in American statements, showing the obvious logistical goals and objectives, both direct and indirect.
What is striking is that the position of the Arabs, until recently, was to want only observers of events and Arab foreign ministers responsive to popular will reject absolutely any intervention, having a high sensitivity to any kind of interference. But this situation retains the need to support and protect against the risk faced by the nation; the underlying events and challenges will not stop with what we have seen in Libya.
However, it is considered that any intervention shaped by the head of American diplomacy will be difficult, but this does not mean that the process did not start, or that Washington has yet to start the acceleration. Along the way, something may discourage them from sticking to their plan or working for it.
Indeed, it is believed that the difficulty of any intervention, or the involvement of some allies, may affect the U.S. reaction. It is most important because the issue is not the result of the political moment, but the product of a prior vision and a chance to lay hands directly on the situation in Libya. Consequently, the U.S has stretched out its hand and will spare no effort to exploit its chances.
The suddenness of the logistics preparation — and the preparation of media, politics and diplomacy — affects their motivation. They hope to float on the surface at once, while standing on the other side of the street, spreading propaganda, reasons and excuses, preparing the way for the flood of new slogans.
In the final analysis, the timing of the U.S. response is echoed by the British position, although the British position seemed more aggressive than the U.S. on the basis of its practical results: evacuating the Libyan oil fields and preventing the threat.
The logical question is: Why the military option, the one that the U.S. inclines toward to deal with what is going on in Libya, despite boundaries of space and the actual interests of the Libyan people?
No one argues that what is happening in Libya is a tragic situation and that the Libyan people pay the price; no doubt that even the most pessimistic were not expecting this harvest and these painful scenes in the Arab world. Everyone agreed that all of the ways out of the crisis appear disastrous and the prospects appear strange.
However, this does not prevent us from considering what is beyond that. That is to reflect on the dimensions and the risk of the threat of military intervention in Libya, or any other type of intervention — especially as these issues are public and obvious in American statements, showing the obvious logistical goals and objectives, both direct and indirect.
What is striking is that the position of the Arabs, until recently, was to want only observers of events and Arab foreign ministers responsive to popular will reject absolutely any intervention, having a high sensitivity to any kind of interference. But this situation retains the need to support and protect against the risk faced by the nation; the underlying events and challenges will not stop with what we have seen in Libya.
However, it is considered that any intervention shaped by the head of American diplomacy will be difficult, but this does not mean that the process did not start, or that Washington has yet to start the acceleration. Along the way, something may discourage them from sticking to their plan or working for it.
Indeed, it is believed that the difficulty of any intervention, or the involvement of some allies, may affect the U.S. reaction. It is most important because the issue is not the result of the political moment, but the product of a prior vision and a chance to lay hands directly on the situation in Libya. Consequently, the U.S has stretched out its hand and will spare no effort to exploit its chances.