Unclarified Compromise
U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden’s visit to Moscow, which occurred on March 9 and 10, was dedicated, at first sight, to solely economic issues: The contract on the delivery of Boeing 747 airliners to Aeroflot*, the possibility for American business to participate in Russian informational and technological project “Skolkovo,” the reform of the U.S.-Russian Business Council, which operates on the basis of a 1990 agreement, the possibility of Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization, the speeding up of the abolition procedure of the notorious Jackson-Vanik amendment of 1974, which impedes full-scale commercial relations. All these prospective economic issues were discussed by Biden and the Russian government in Moscow.
Making his speech at Moscow State University named after M. V. Lomonosov on March 10, Vice President Biden outlined the new agenda of the “reset” policy. Biden pointed out that Moscow and Washington have become partners in the spheres of arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, fighting global terrorism and European security. Now, in his opinion, a special emphasis should be laid on the economic issues. American business can invest in the Russian high-tech sector (mainly aerospace engineering), excavation of natural resources, transport infrastructure and logistic projects. American companies are also interested in the Russian sales market. “Partnership in the innovation economy” in this way characterized to Biden the prospect of bilateral relations.
The attempt to find a new agenda for Russian-American interaction is not chance. For the last two years Russian and American diplomacies have been taking to pieces the “blockages of 2008:” restoring the dialogue on disarmament, moderating the heat of confrontation within the Commonwealth of Independent States and discussing how to reduce the danger of direct confrontation. It was a negative agenda: The parties agreed on how not to commit hostile actions. Since the beginning of 2011, there has been a lack of positive agenda — what steps should Moscow and Washington take in order to strengthen bilateral relations? Biden offered his (probably not very original) response to this question: To create an “air bag” of mutual economic ties, which would limit the chance of confrontation between Russia and the U.S.
There is a much more interesting thing. Speaking about the prospects of economic partnership, Biden did not once mention its price. According to the words of the U.S. vice president, America is ready to help Russia’s accession to WTO and to provide access to its informational and technological resources. What will Americans ask in exchange? Biden’s speech allows us to consider some variants of compromise.
The first variant is concessions in the strategic sphere. Biden remarked that the present time differs from the 1970s, when the agenda of Russian-American relations was limited to arms control. During the past year, American politicians repeated that Russia adhered to the obsolete agenda. Washington did not like Moscow’s appeals to refuse storage of de-alerted nuclear weapons, to take into account British nuclear weapons stock and to prevent the militarization of outer space. During the ratification of the New START treaty the U.S. Congress obliged the White House to speed up negotiations with Russia on the reduction of tactical arms in Europe. Probably, Americans are awaiting for Moscow to concede in disarmament problems in exchange for economic investments.
The second variant is concessions on the territory of the former USSR. One year ago, Russian experts stated that Barack Obama’s administration was prime to acknowledge Russia’s interests in the CIS. But NSS 2010 documented the intention of the White House to prevent the strengthening of Russian positions in the post-Soviet expanse. On the eve of Biden’s arrival in Russia, American media wrote that the U.S. will not let “a second Yalta” happen.** In Moscow, Biden remarked once again that America argues against the “spheres of influence.” It may be understood as an appeal to Russia to reduce its activity in the former USSR.
The third variant is changes in structure of the Russian political system. Biden spoke about the necessity of democratic reforms, empowerment of the opposition and non-governmental organizations. It reminds one of the 1990s, when Bill Clinton’s administration supported Boris Yeltsin in exchange for observance of obligations concerning domestic affairs, recorded in the Washington charter of 1992.*** (Otherwise, the White House claimed it could revise the U.S. obligations on the START treaties.). Americans are probably now ready to pay through economic investments for returning to this system of relations.
However, these things are not main concerns. Biden’s visit showed that Obama’s administration considers the previous variant of the “reset” to be exhausted. Washington sees the future as an expansion of economic ties in exchange for Russian concessions. Still, Americans do not define the precise conditions of this compromise. It is time to start thinking about how not to repeat the mistakes of Mikhail Gorbachev, who made unprecedented concessions to Americans, but never obtained financial support from the U.S.
* Translator’s note: The author is mistaken; according to the contract, it was Boeing 777s which were sold.
** Translator’s note: Yalta is a town in Crimea, where in 1945 a conference between the USSR, the U.S. and the U.K. was held. The parties discussed the world post-war organization; in particular, it was agreed that Germany would be split into four occupied zones.
*** Translator’s note: Charter for American-Russian partnership and friendship
Making his speech at Moscow State University named after M. V. Lomonosov on March 10, Vice President Biden outlined the new agenda of the “reset” policy. Biden pointed out that Moscow and Washington have become partners in the spheres of arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, fighting global terrorism and European security. Now, in his opinion, a special emphasis should be laid on the economic issues. American business can invest in the Russian high-tech sector (mainly aerospace engineering), excavation of natural resources, transport infrastructure and logistic projects. American companies are also interested in the Russian sales market. “Partnership in the innovation economy” in this way characterized to Biden the prospect of bilateral relations.
The attempt to find a new agenda for Russian-American interaction is not chance. For the last two years Russian and American diplomacies have been taking to pieces the “blockages of 2008:” restoring the dialogue on disarmament, moderating the heat of confrontation within the Commonwealth of Independent States and discussing how to reduce the danger of direct confrontation. It was a negative agenda: The parties agreed on how not to commit hostile actions. Since the beginning of 2011, there has been a lack of positive agenda — what steps should Moscow and Washington take in order to strengthen bilateral relations? Biden offered his (probably not very original) response to this question: To create an “air bag” of mutual economic ties, which would limit the chance of confrontation between Russia and the U.S.
There is a much more interesting thing. Speaking about the prospects of economic partnership, Biden did not once mention its price. According to the words of the U.S. vice president, America is ready to help Russia’s accession to WTO and to provide access to its informational and technological resources. What will Americans ask in exchange? Biden’s speech allows us to consider some variants of compromise.
The first variant is concessions in the strategic sphere. Biden remarked that the present time differs from the 1970s, when the agenda of Russian-American relations was limited to arms control. During the past year, American politicians repeated that Russia adhered to the obsolete agenda. Washington did not like Moscow’s appeals to refuse storage of de-alerted nuclear weapons, to take into account British nuclear weapons stock and to prevent the militarization of outer space. During the ratification of the New START treaty the U.S. Congress obliged the White House to speed up negotiations with Russia on the reduction of tactical arms in Europe. Probably, Americans are awaiting for Moscow to concede in disarmament problems in exchange for economic investments.
The second variant is concessions on the territory of the former USSR. One year ago, Russian experts stated that Barack Obama’s administration was prime to acknowledge Russia’s interests in the CIS. But NSS 2010 documented the intention of the White House to prevent the strengthening of Russian positions in the post-Soviet expanse. On the eve of Biden’s arrival in Russia, American media wrote that the U.S. will not let “a second Yalta” happen.** In Moscow, Biden remarked once again that America argues against the “spheres of influence.” It may be understood as an appeal to Russia to reduce its activity in the former USSR.
The third variant is changes in structure of the Russian political system. Biden spoke about the necessity of democratic reforms, empowerment of the opposition and non-governmental organizations. It reminds one of the 1990s, when Bill Clinton’s administration supported Boris Yeltsin in exchange for observance of obligations concerning domestic affairs, recorded in the Washington charter of 1992.*** (Otherwise, the White House claimed it could revise the U.S. obligations on the START treaties.). Americans are probably now ready to pay through economic investments for returning to this system of relations.
However, these things are not main concerns. Biden’s visit showed that Obama’s administration considers the previous variant of the “reset” to be exhausted. Washington sees the future as an expansion of economic ties in exchange for Russian concessions. Still, Americans do not define the precise conditions of this compromise. It is time to start thinking about how not to repeat the mistakes of Mikhail Gorbachev, who made unprecedented concessions to Americans, but never obtained financial support from the U.S.
* Translator’s note: The author is mistaken; according to the contract, it was Boeing 777s which were sold.
** Translator’s note: Yalta is a town in Crimea, where in 1945 a conference between the USSR, the U.S. and the U.K. was held. The parties discussed the world post-war organization; in particular, it was agreed that Germany would be split into four occupied zones.
*** Translator’s note: Charter for American-Russian partnership and friendship