Russia’s Unreadiness to Thunder
The East and the South of the post-Soviet expanse are noticeably perturbed. The Central Asian leaders announced their readiness to launch institutional and economic reforms. The first to speak about reforms was Kazakhstan’s president, an astute Nursultan Nazarbayev. He also went further than others, having announced early presidential elections. It is not clear yet what reforms his neighbors can bring about. The unexpected and devastating events in North Africa and the Middle East are supposed to make them forestall the domestic occurrences, whereas the plan of reforms is still at the stage of elaboration.
Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan declared reforms more distinctly, having agreed after actions of protest to conduct a dialogue with the opposition headed by Levon Ter-Petrosyan. In neighboring Azerbaijan, the disturbances stopped for a moment with tough measures and with the government’s accusations of the “external forces.” In another Caucasian country, Georgia, the oppositionists — incapable of being united — once again promised to remove President Mikheil Saakashvili from power. The last to voice these ideas was former Speaker Nino Burjanadze, who is said to have enlisted the support of European leaders during her trip to the Old World; she called May 2 the beginning of the end to the regime.
To forecast the course of future events in the post-Soviet expanse and their outcome is ungrateful — more so as each country is specifically unique with leaders of different capabilities and opponents of different potentials. The reaction of the West (primarily of the U.S.) and of Russia to what is happening is more noteworthy.
To put it succinctly, Washington is prepared for any evolution of events. The representatives of the diplomatic missions, of the State Department and sometimes Secretary of State Hillary Clinton herself, undoubtedly, mostly busy with North African events, found an opportunity to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. They managed to praise governments — which are ready to reform — and at the same time, to scratch opposition where it itches; and even to reprove both, when it was necessary. The most striking example is U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Matthew Bryza, who is rumored to be a friend of Ilham Aliyev and to have family ties with a high-rank representative of Azerbaijan. All of this did not impede the diplomat to criticize repression and appeal to official Baku for democratic changes. Bryza’s colleague, Mary Jovanovich, who is rumored to have contributed to one of the color revolutions in the CIS expanse, was generous enough to make a statement in which she welcomed the beginning of a dialogue between the government and the opposition.
There is no reaction from Russia. It looks as if it was not concerned about the expanse beyond Russia, called the sphere of strategic interests, or even “the zone of Russia’s geopolitical responsibility.” This definition was attributed to it during the negotiations with the U.S., when “the reset of relations” was claimed. What is the cause of this indifference? Is it the confidence in positions of the governments, with which relations have been already regulated? Where does this confidence arise from, if the same Sargsyan began negotiations with Ter-Petrosyan obviously because he considers himself politically vulnerable? As for the names of oppositionists to Emomali Rakhmon: Does anybody know them, or has Rakhmon himself “matured” suddenly for making changes? Or, if Saakashvili’s regime does not survive the next attack, does Moscow know amongst whom of tens of opposition leaders to conduct a dialogue (a dialogue it appears to be ready for) with after Georgia’s president leaves? Will not it result in the same thing that happened when Kyrgyzstan's ochlocratic regime representatives came to Moscow in order to gain support, and, having returned home, announced the necessity to forbid the Russian language?
There are a lot of questions about each country in “the zone of Russia’s geopolitical responsibility.” Each question needs its precise and clear answer. No answers were given. There probably aren’t any because, having taken assurances of Washington in the reset policy — which involves the expanse of the former USSR — Moscow did not take into consideration that the area of the “reset” needs new “content.” Washington remembers it and is “loading.” Russia is likely to awaken when it hears the sound of thunder.
Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan declared reforms more distinctly, having agreed after actions of protest to conduct a dialogue with the opposition headed by Levon Ter-Petrosyan. In neighboring Azerbaijan, the disturbances stopped for a moment with tough measures and with the government’s accusations of the “external forces.” In another Caucasian country, Georgia, the oppositionists — incapable of being united — once again promised to remove President Mikheil Saakashvili from power. The last to voice these ideas was former Speaker Nino Burjanadze, who is said to have enlisted the support of European leaders during her trip to the Old World; she called May 2 the beginning of the end to the regime.
To forecast the course of future events in the post-Soviet expanse and their outcome is ungrateful — more so as each country is specifically unique with leaders of different capabilities and opponents of different potentials. The reaction of the West (primarily of the U.S.) and of Russia to what is happening is more noteworthy.
To put it succinctly, Washington is prepared for any evolution of events. The representatives of the diplomatic missions, of the State Department and sometimes Secretary of State Hillary Clinton herself, undoubtedly, mostly busy with North African events, found an opportunity to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. They managed to praise governments — which are ready to reform — and at the same time, to scratch opposition where it itches; and even to reprove both, when it was necessary. The most striking example is U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Matthew Bryza, who is rumored to be a friend of Ilham Aliyev and to have family ties with a high-rank representative of Azerbaijan. All of this did not impede the diplomat to criticize repression and appeal to official Baku for democratic changes. Bryza’s colleague, Mary Jovanovich, who is rumored to have contributed to one of the color revolutions in the CIS expanse, was generous enough to make a statement in which she welcomed the beginning of a dialogue between the government and the opposition.
There is no reaction from Russia. It looks as if it was not concerned about the expanse beyond Russia, called the sphere of strategic interests, or even “the zone of Russia’s geopolitical responsibility.” This definition was attributed to it during the negotiations with the U.S., when “the reset of relations” was claimed. What is the cause of this indifference? Is it the confidence in positions of the governments, with which relations have been already regulated? Where does this confidence arise from, if the same Sargsyan began negotiations with Ter-Petrosyan obviously because he considers himself politically vulnerable? As for the names of oppositionists to Emomali Rakhmon: Does anybody know them, or has Rakhmon himself “matured” suddenly for making changes? Or, if Saakashvili’s regime does not survive the next attack, does Moscow know amongst whom of tens of opposition leaders to conduct a dialogue (a dialogue it appears to be ready for) with after Georgia’s president leaves? Will not it result in the same thing that happened when Kyrgyzstan's ochlocratic regime representatives came to Moscow in order to gain support, and, having returned home, announced the necessity to forbid the Russian language?
There are a lot of questions about each country in “the zone of Russia’s geopolitical responsibility.” Each question needs its precise and clear answer. No answers were given. There probably aren’t any because, having taken assurances of Washington in the reset policy — which involves the expanse of the former USSR — Moscow did not take into consideration that the area of the “reset” needs new “content.” Washington remembers it and is “loading.” Russia is likely to awaken when it hears the sound of thunder.