American Simplicity
The attempt of the Kremlin to persuade the U.S. and NATO to create together a “sector” system of European anti-missile defense (AMD) appears to have failed. The deputy of the head of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Ryabkov, told Kommersant that Russia couldn’t wait around to watch its partners’ readiness to take into consideration the Russian president’s initiative. Having anticipated such an outcome, Moscow prepared and transmitted to Washington another proposal — to give legal guarantees that European AMD will not threaten Russian strategic nuclear forces. However, it is certain to be turned down.
“We monitor no readiness of the NATO partners to advance seriously up the path, outlined in the Russian Federation’s president’s (the proposal to create a AMD “sector” system in Europe, which was set forth by Dmitry Medvedev at last year’s Russia — NATO summit in Lisbon),” acknowledged Sergei Ryabkov on April 20 during his conversation with Kommersant. It means that the discussion of Mr. Medvedev’s sensational initiative reached a deadlock, which one cannot find the way to break. Sergei Ryabkov’s statement has become the first official acknowledgement from Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the fact that five months of discussions on the possibility of the creation of the AMD “sector” led to nothing. However, according to the deputy of the Minister’s words, Moscow does not want to remove its proposal from the negotiating table, but seeks to clear up the advantages of the proposed approach to its partners.
As for the advantages, there are few of them, Sergei Ryabkov pointed out. First, the question on the possible use of any part of the European AMD to one of the partners’ detriment no longer arises. Second, the U.S. and Russia will be liberated from the necessity to conduct debate on how real a threat is from this or that direction. Finally, according to the diplomat’s words, the issues concerning the chains of command will be decided otherwise. “The conjunction of different systems, separated from each other — what is offered by the NATO countries — is problematic, since diverse questions arise. Do parties in this case fully work with information or not, is there a parity in transmission of the appropriate data, who and on what level must make decisions? It is not equal to what we offer, creating a common united system,” Mr. Ryabkov explained.
One way or another, the advantages pointed out by Moscow, to all appearances, did not entice the Alliance countries. The main reason why NATO does not want to build an AMD system together with Moscow is the unwillingness to rely on Russia as a country, which is not a member of the Alliance, when it concerns the security of the member countries.
Under these conditions, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs offered the U.S. to agree on a legally binding document, which would secure non-direction of European AMD against Russian strategic nuclear forces. But this initiative is unlikely to be a success. “This issue was brought to the notice of Americans,” Mr. Ryabkov said and then recognized, “the difficulty is that [Barack Obama’s] administration occupies a very tough position and considers any restrictions on the implementation of their plans in this sphere to be unacceptable.”
The issue of AMD was always a sore point for Washington. For instance, in 1974 when the U.S.S.R and the U.S. signed the supplementary protocol to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, which permitted one AMD system for each party — either around a capital city, or around a base of intercontinental ballistic missiles; the American party protected the base of Grand Forks. The U.S.S.R shielded Moscow. None of the American leaders could afford it, since it should have been explained to the whole country why Washington is more important than New York or Chicago. Now, 10 years after the American withdrawal from the treaty of 1972, the opportunity to freely shield themselves and their allies by creating a European AMD have arisen. No American administration would lose this opportunity.
In these circumstances, the issue of missile defense, which Moscow and Washington can agree on, is an enigma even for experienced negotiators. “It is one of the most intricate diplomatic tasks for us,” confessed Sergei Ryabkov. “I do not presume to forecast the result of it. We are deeply involved with it.”
The experts presume to estimate the prospects of a joint AMD system and the possibility of legal guarantees in this sphere more freely. “The best thing to count on is a recommendation paper,” reckons the president of the PIR Center (Russian Center for Policy Studies),Vladimir Orlov. “A joint declaration can emerge, whereas the legal guarantees cannot.” The analysts consider the prospects of implementation of the AMD “sector” to be illusory. “This idea can be treated as an officially rejected one. The shape of it, proposed by Russia, cannot be comprehended and supported by NATO,” comments retired Lieutenant General Evgeny Buzhinsky, a member of the expert and consultative council of PIR. “The political will is needed. It is necessary to increase the extent of mutual trust, to create centers for information exchange, to move forward. Our position of 'we want everything right now' is hardly realizable.”
The other day, the experts of the PIR Center, together with the American Ploughshares Fund, forwarded recommendations on bridging the gap between the positions of the presidents of Russia and the U.S., advising the leaders of both countries to start cooperating on AMD. The analysts noted the necessity of the gradual integration of Russian and American systems of warning and assessment, as well as of radars, into one common center directed by both the Russian Federation and NATO. Nobody knows precisely when it can happen. However, at Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they say that there is time. “When it comes to the implementation of more advanced stages of AMD installation (the U.S. plans to possess anti-missile missiles capable of intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range of more than 5,500 km by 2020), the question will be put point-blank. There is still time — the next few years,” observed Sergei Ryabkov.
“We monitor no readiness of the NATO partners to advance seriously up the path, outlined in the Russian Federation’s president’s (the proposal to create a AMD “sector” system in Europe, which was set forth by Dmitry Medvedev at last year’s Russia — NATO summit in Lisbon),” acknowledged Sergei Ryabkov on April 20 during his conversation with Kommersant. It means that the discussion of Mr. Medvedev’s sensational initiative reached a deadlock, which one cannot find the way to break. Sergei Ryabkov’s statement has become the first official acknowledgement from Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the fact that five months of discussions on the possibility of the creation of the AMD “sector” led to nothing. However, according to the deputy of the Minister’s words, Moscow does not want to remove its proposal from the negotiating table, but seeks to clear up the advantages of the proposed approach to its partners.
As for the advantages, there are few of them, Sergei Ryabkov pointed out. First, the question on the possible use of any part of the European AMD to one of the partners’ detriment no longer arises. Second, the U.S. and Russia will be liberated from the necessity to conduct debate on how real a threat is from this or that direction. Finally, according to the diplomat’s words, the issues concerning the chains of command will be decided otherwise. “The conjunction of different systems, separated from each other — what is offered by the NATO countries — is problematic, since diverse questions arise. Do parties in this case fully work with information or not, is there a parity in transmission of the appropriate data, who and on what level must make decisions? It is not equal to what we offer, creating a common united system,” Mr. Ryabkov explained.
One way or another, the advantages pointed out by Moscow, to all appearances, did not entice the Alliance countries. The main reason why NATO does not want to build an AMD system together with Moscow is the unwillingness to rely on Russia as a country, which is not a member of the Alliance, when it concerns the security of the member countries.
Under these conditions, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs offered the U.S. to agree on a legally binding document, which would secure non-direction of European AMD against Russian strategic nuclear forces. But this initiative is unlikely to be a success. “This issue was brought to the notice of Americans,” Mr. Ryabkov said and then recognized, “the difficulty is that [Barack Obama’s] administration occupies a very tough position and considers any restrictions on the implementation of their plans in this sphere to be unacceptable.”
The issue of AMD was always a sore point for Washington. For instance, in 1974 when the U.S.S.R and the U.S. signed the supplementary protocol to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, which permitted one AMD system for each party — either around a capital city, or around a base of intercontinental ballistic missiles; the American party protected the base of Grand Forks. The U.S.S.R shielded Moscow. None of the American leaders could afford it, since it should have been explained to the whole country why Washington is more important than New York or Chicago. Now, 10 years after the American withdrawal from the treaty of 1972, the opportunity to freely shield themselves and their allies by creating a European AMD have arisen. No American administration would lose this opportunity.
In these circumstances, the issue of missile defense, which Moscow and Washington can agree on, is an enigma even for experienced negotiators. “It is one of the most intricate diplomatic tasks for us,” confessed Sergei Ryabkov. “I do not presume to forecast the result of it. We are deeply involved with it.”
The experts presume to estimate the prospects of a joint AMD system and the possibility of legal guarantees in this sphere more freely. “The best thing to count on is a recommendation paper,” reckons the president of the PIR Center (Russian Center for Policy Studies),Vladimir Orlov. “A joint declaration can emerge, whereas the legal guarantees cannot.” The analysts consider the prospects of implementation of the AMD “sector” to be illusory. “This idea can be treated as an officially rejected one. The shape of it, proposed by Russia, cannot be comprehended and supported by NATO,” comments retired Lieutenant General Evgeny Buzhinsky, a member of the expert and consultative council of PIR. “The political will is needed. It is necessary to increase the extent of mutual trust, to create centers for information exchange, to move forward. Our position of 'we want everything right now' is hardly realizable.”
The other day, the experts of the PIR Center, together with the American Ploughshares Fund, forwarded recommendations on bridging the gap between the positions of the presidents of Russia and the U.S., advising the leaders of both countries to start cooperating on AMD. The analysts noted the necessity of the gradual integration of Russian and American systems of warning and assessment, as well as of radars, into one common center directed by both the Russian Federation and NATO. Nobody knows precisely when it can happen. However, at Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they say that there is time. “When it comes to the implementation of more advanced stages of AMD installation (the U.S. plans to possess anti-missile missiles capable of intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range of more than 5,500 km by 2020), the question will be put point-blank. There is still time — the next few years,” observed Sergei Ryabkov.
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