Three Reasons for Restraint
Not even a death toll of 600 people in Syria could cause the United States and Europe to threaten military intervention. Three explanations for why Syria is ignored.
The world does not keep its mouth shut concerning Syria; there is no need for unnecessary exaggerations. The world is talking and expressing its overall disgust with Assad’s behavior, but it is very careful to stay in the realms of unofficial condemnations and to avoid calling for action. The decision-makers in Europe and the United States are reiterating the same message over and over: Military involvement in Syria is not on the table.
Basically, they are saying, "Don’t even think about it," thus aiming to thwart and sterilize any possible political sentiment that would attempt to push for such an action. When both the Democratic White House and the Republican John McCain are saying that intervention in Syria makes no sense — a political consensus has been created.
The consensus is flexible, naturally, and could change, but it consists of a number of reasons for delaying massive international involvement in Syria. It doesn’t justify the fact that the West is taking no notice but tries to explain it. So why would the initiators of the military operation in Libya not interfere in Syria?
1. They don’t know who’s going to win.
This is a critical issue. When the United States, France and Britain started their intrusion in Libya, the feeling was that Gadhafi’s days were numbered. It was also evident that there was a massive, armed force of insurgents that had seized control of parts of the country.
In Libya — and in Egypt, too — there arose powerful coalitions that decided to betray and topple the government. In Egypt, it was a mass, consensual phenomenon with the desire to overthrow Mubarak, joined by the army that had made a decision in the early stages to not get involved and protect the president. Once it was clear that the Egyptian rule wouldn’t forcibly suppress the riots — and it’s doubtful whether that was possible at all — there remained no effective option for the government.
The West, with the United States at the helm, understood that Mubarak was weak and already finished anyway; they had to find themselves other horses, less old and sick. That decision was completely realistic and derived from compelling circumstances — the understanding that Mubarak was going to fall in any case. In Libya, the consideration was slightly different: There wasn’t understanding that Gadhafi was done with; nevertheless, the international agreement was that there was a significant force withstanding him and under certain conditions could take him down. And no less important is that Libya, the country that in fact forged an alliance with the Western world, would no longer able to do business with the West, when its leader Gadhafi had turned himself into such a leper.
The Syrian story, seen clearly, is very different. There is no definite opposition inside of the country. There is no military entity that stands against the president, and by itself, the army has maintained its loyalty and so have the security forces. According to estimates in Washington, these are demonstrations that do not even embrace most of Syrian society, which is waiting, frightened, for the result. This state of affairs still could have led to intervention, were it not for the Libyan story.
2. They are suffering from the paradox of “the wrong war.”
When Ariel Sharon took off to Washington on the eve of the second Iraq war, he warned President Bush — as his men claimed then — that he was going to “fight the wrong war.”* Sharon meant that the United States should focus its efforts on Iran and not on Iraq. Bush gracefully turned a deaf ear, and Sharon wasn’t in a position to insist. Of course the war in Iraq is one of the main reasons why the United States would avoid a military strike on Iran; popular insight is that the administration does not have the public support, military maneuverability or financial resources to risk another war in the Middle East.
That’s the paradox of premature action or “the wrong war.” The same principles that would lead to international involvement may also suffer from total disregard if a similar situation takes place — not because of a sweeping change in the circumstances or a distortion in the principles but rather for a real paradoxical reason, the chronological one: the fact that there already is international interference.
The fact that the West is committed at the moment to the developments in Libya dramatically narrows the window of action in Syria. This is a political matter — the European and American public do not really want to credit a series of wars in the Middle East — and also a technical matter of resources. But more than that — and that’s the paradox. It’s the psychology of the decision-makers who already feel that they are invested in one place and have difficulties committing themselves to additional troubles.
3. They don’t know how they will benefit from regime change in Syria.
In Egypt, there was no choice. It was obvious that there would be a change of regime, for either way, Mubarak was sick with cancer and very old. The West hadn’t asked itself how it would profit from a change in the Egyptian regime because the revolution simply did not depend on the West; the street dictated the goings-on.
In Libya, it’s perfectly clear that the new regime will be very dependant on Europe and the U.S. Considering the Libyan oil reserves, regime change may guarantee handsome dividends. Moreover, Gadhafi, with his own hands, turned himself into a totally illegitimate ruler with whom to do business. His decision to brutally repress the demonstrators and rebels had immediately made him into persona non-grata — and his energy riches, in effect, unusable for the West.
Even if he were to win, no American president would ever sign a cooperation agreement with Gadhafi, and no British prime minister would be able to grant a pardon to the Libyan ruler. The regime change in Libya is necessary.
In Syria, there is also some benefit from a regime change — in the first place, enervating the Iranian axis. But what the Israeli officials tend to turn a blind eye on, intentionally, is the quiet and efficient collaboration of Syria with the U.S. in respect to interests in Iraq — a critical subject for the government that has withdrawn its army forces from the country.
Judging by the hesitant American response, the Syrian regime apparently used to be quite instrumental in some aspects for them. While in the Egyptian case, the change occurred on its own, and the Americans only tried desperately to ride the wave. In the Libyan case, the change is necessary. With Syria, things are way more complicated. There is something to gain, yet there is also something to lose — first and foremost, a certain and fragile stability from the Lebanese coast to Iraq.
The author is the foreign news editor of Channel 10.
*Translator's Note: This quote, though accurately translated, could not be verified.
**Translator's Note: In the cartoon, one refers to Syria, two refers to Libya and three refers to Yemen.
The world does not keep its mouth shut concerning Syria; there is no need for unnecessary exaggerations. The world is talking and expressing its overall disgust with Assad’s behavior, but it is very careful to stay in the realms of unofficial condemnations and to avoid calling for action. The decision-makers in Europe and the United States are reiterating the same message over and over: Military involvement in Syria is not on the table.
Basically, they are saying, "Don’t even think about it," thus aiming to thwart and sterilize any possible political sentiment that would attempt to push for such an action. When both the Democratic White House and the Republican John McCain are saying that intervention in Syria makes no sense — a political consensus has been created.
The consensus is flexible, naturally, and could change, but it consists of a number of reasons for delaying massive international involvement in Syria. It doesn’t justify the fact that the West is taking no notice but tries to explain it. So why would the initiators of the military operation in Libya not interfere in Syria?
1. They don’t know who’s going to win.
This is a critical issue. When the United States, France and Britain started their intrusion in Libya, the feeling was that Gadhafi’s days were numbered. It was also evident that there was a massive, armed force of insurgents that had seized control of parts of the country.
In Libya — and in Egypt, too — there arose powerful coalitions that decided to betray and topple the government. In Egypt, it was a mass, consensual phenomenon with the desire to overthrow Mubarak, joined by the army that had made a decision in the early stages to not get involved and protect the president. Once it was clear that the Egyptian rule wouldn’t forcibly suppress the riots — and it’s doubtful whether that was possible at all — there remained no effective option for the government.
The West, with the United States at the helm, understood that Mubarak was weak and already finished anyway; they had to find themselves other horses, less old and sick. That decision was completely realistic and derived from compelling circumstances — the understanding that Mubarak was going to fall in any case. In Libya, the consideration was slightly different: There wasn’t understanding that Gadhafi was done with; nevertheless, the international agreement was that there was a significant force withstanding him and under certain conditions could take him down. And no less important is that Libya, the country that in fact forged an alliance with the Western world, would no longer able to do business with the West, when its leader Gadhafi had turned himself into such a leper.
The Syrian story, seen clearly, is very different. There is no definite opposition inside of the country. There is no military entity that stands against the president, and by itself, the army has maintained its loyalty and so have the security forces. According to estimates in Washington, these are demonstrations that do not even embrace most of Syrian society, which is waiting, frightened, for the result. This state of affairs still could have led to intervention, were it not for the Libyan story.
2. They are suffering from the paradox of “the wrong war.”
When Ariel Sharon took off to Washington on the eve of the second Iraq war, he warned President Bush — as his men claimed then — that he was going to “fight the wrong war.”* Sharon meant that the United States should focus its efforts on Iran and not on Iraq. Bush gracefully turned a deaf ear, and Sharon wasn’t in a position to insist. Of course the war in Iraq is one of the main reasons why the United States would avoid a military strike on Iran; popular insight is that the administration does not have the public support, military maneuverability or financial resources to risk another war in the Middle East.
That’s the paradox of premature action or “the wrong war.” The same principles that would lead to international involvement may also suffer from total disregard if a similar situation takes place — not because of a sweeping change in the circumstances or a distortion in the principles but rather for a real paradoxical reason, the chronological one: the fact that there already is international interference.
The fact that the West is committed at the moment to the developments in Libya dramatically narrows the window of action in Syria. This is a political matter — the European and American public do not really want to credit a series of wars in the Middle East — and also a technical matter of resources. But more than that — and that’s the paradox. It’s the psychology of the decision-makers who already feel that they are invested in one place and have difficulties committing themselves to additional troubles.
3. They don’t know how they will benefit from regime change in Syria.
In Egypt, there was no choice. It was obvious that there would be a change of regime, for either way, Mubarak was sick with cancer and very old. The West hadn’t asked itself how it would profit from a change in the Egyptian regime because the revolution simply did not depend on the West; the street dictated the goings-on.
In Libya, it’s perfectly clear that the new regime will be very dependant on Europe and the U.S. Considering the Libyan oil reserves, regime change may guarantee handsome dividends. Moreover, Gadhafi, with his own hands, turned himself into a totally illegitimate ruler with whom to do business. His decision to brutally repress the demonstrators and rebels had immediately made him into persona non-grata — and his energy riches, in effect, unusable for the West.
Even if he were to win, no American president would ever sign a cooperation agreement with Gadhafi, and no British prime minister would be able to grant a pardon to the Libyan ruler. The regime change in Libya is necessary.
In Syria, there is also some benefit from a regime change — in the first place, enervating the Iranian axis. But what the Israeli officials tend to turn a blind eye on, intentionally, is the quiet and efficient collaboration of Syria with the U.S. in respect to interests in Iraq — a critical subject for the government that has withdrawn its army forces from the country.
Judging by the hesitant American response, the Syrian regime apparently used to be quite instrumental in some aspects for them. While in the Egyptian case, the change occurred on its own, and the Americans only tried desperately to ride the wave. In the Libyan case, the change is necessary. With Syria, things are way more complicated. There is something to gain, yet there is also something to lose — first and foremost, a certain and fragile stability from the Lebanese coast to Iraq.
The author is the foreign news editor of Channel 10.
*Translator's Note: This quote, though accurately translated, could not be verified.
**Translator's Note: In the cartoon, one refers to Syria, two refers to Libya and three refers to Yemen.