Nuclear Technology in Iran: How to Cope?
Guillaume Metten (Belguim), Richard Dalton (United Kingdom), Steen Hohwü-Christensen (Sweden), Paul von Maltzahn (Germany), François Nicoullaud (France) and Roberto Toscano (Italy) are all former ambassadors to Iran.
In Iran, ambassadors from several different European countries have closely followed the rising crisis of the nuclear question between Iran and the international community. To us, the long stalemate of this issue is unacceptable.
The Arab world and the Middle East are entering a new era. New perspectives are taking shape everywhere. These periods of uncertainty are ready for reevaluation. The time has come to work on the Iranian nuclear question.
In international law, the position of Europe and the United States is not as solid as it seems. For essential reasons, this is portrayed in a series of resolutions voted on by the Security Council that reference chapter VII in the Charter of the United Nations, which authorizes practice of coercive measures in case of “threats to the peace.”
But where is the threat? Would it be the enrichment of uranium in the Iranian centrifuge? Of course, this is about careful nuclear activity led by a careful country in a region that is itself highly delicate. Iran has a moral and political duty to respond to legitimate concerns from the international community. However, nothing in international law, nothing in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, in principle, forbids such activity that is subject to inspections in Iran from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Of course, the agreement on guarantees dating back to the 1970s is now obsolete, but it is also true that the IAEA has never revealed any hijackings of nuclear material at the end of military events in Iran.
Could “the threat against peace” be found in a secret program promoting the construction of nuclear arms? For at least three years, the American intelligence community of intelligence has not sustained this hypothesis any longer: “We continue to assess that Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons... We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons... We continue to judge that Iran's nuclear decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran,” declares director James Clapper. Today, a majority of experts, including some in Israel, seem to consider that Iran is looking to claim itself to be “a threshold country,” a country technically capable of producing a bomb but one that is abstaining for the moment. Nothing in international law prohibits such an ambition. Countries other than Iran, committed to never develop nuclear arms, have already attained such a threshold or are about to reach it. They are, however, not concerned.
We are told, however, it is Iran’s bad grace that they refuse to seriously negotiate, which forced our country to appeal to the Security Council in 2006. Again, these things are less clear. Remember that in 2005, Iran was ready to discuss a ceiling for the number of centrifuges and to maintain a rate of enrichment below the high percentage of military interest. It has especially shown a willingness to put the additional protocol in practice that they already signed with IAEA, which authorizes intrusive inspections on its territory, even on the undeclared sites. But now the Europeans and Americans wanted to force Iran to renounce its enrichment program. Before accusing this country of blocking any negotiations, it is time to admit that the objective of “zero centrifuges operating in Iran, permanently or temporarily” is an unrealistic goal and is driven to a dead end at this moment in time.
Stay a dilemma. Why offer an opening to the Iranian regime that would help restore its domestic and international legitimacy? Wouldn’t it be better to wait until it has a more presentable regime? This is a useful question to think about. However, we are perhaps exaggerating the effect of this nuclear negotiation on the evolution of domestic mentalities, which is even more profound. Ronald Reagan described the USSR as an “evil empire.” He nevertheless led intense negotiations with Mikhail Gorbachev about nuclear disarmament. The country interested in Iran’s future must certainly maintain constant pressure on the question of political and human rights, but also settle the insistent question of proliferation. We are thus cutting down an important source of tension in a region that aspires to peace.
The failure of last January’s meeting in Istanbul and the disappointing exchange of letters between the two parties that followed bring to the foreground the difficulties of ending such a long blockade. About the method, negotiation will be more discrete and technical, and it will be more likely to succeed. On the situation itself, we already know that every solution will be formed based on the quality of the IAEA’s system inspection.
And here is where we either trust the ability of the IAEA to survey all its member states, including Iran, or we will not rely on them. Then why should we preserve an effective organization with only virtuous countries? Indeed, the first stage would be, without a doubt, for the two parties to question the IAEA together on what would appear necessary to control the Iranian nuclear program and guarantee, in a credible way, that it is peaceful in all dimensions. Based on its response, a pragmatic negotiation could then begin.
In Iran, ambassadors from several different European countries have closely followed the rising crisis of the nuclear question between Iran and the international community. To us, the long stalemate of this issue is unacceptable.
The Arab world and the Middle East are entering a new era. New perspectives are taking shape everywhere. These periods of uncertainty are ready for reevaluation. The time has come to work on the Iranian nuclear question.
In international law, the position of Europe and the United States is not as solid as it seems. For essential reasons, this is portrayed in a series of resolutions voted on by the Security Council that reference chapter VII in the Charter of the United Nations, which authorizes practice of coercive measures in case of “threats to the peace.”
But where is the threat? Would it be the enrichment of uranium in the Iranian centrifuge? Of course, this is about careful nuclear activity led by a careful country in a region that is itself highly delicate. Iran has a moral and political duty to respond to legitimate concerns from the international community. However, nothing in international law, nothing in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, in principle, forbids such activity that is subject to inspections in Iran from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Of course, the agreement on guarantees dating back to the 1970s is now obsolete, but it is also true that the IAEA has never revealed any hijackings of nuclear material at the end of military events in Iran.
Could “the threat against peace” be found in a secret program promoting the construction of nuclear arms? For at least three years, the American intelligence community of intelligence has not sustained this hypothesis any longer: “We continue to assess that Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons... We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons... We continue to judge that Iran's nuclear decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran,” declares director James Clapper. Today, a majority of experts, including some in Israel, seem to consider that Iran is looking to claim itself to be “a threshold country,” a country technically capable of producing a bomb but one that is abstaining for the moment. Nothing in international law prohibits such an ambition. Countries other than Iran, committed to never develop nuclear arms, have already attained such a threshold or are about to reach it. They are, however, not concerned.
We are told, however, it is Iran’s bad grace that they refuse to seriously negotiate, which forced our country to appeal to the Security Council in 2006. Again, these things are less clear. Remember that in 2005, Iran was ready to discuss a ceiling for the number of centrifuges and to maintain a rate of enrichment below the high percentage of military interest. It has especially shown a willingness to put the additional protocol in practice that they already signed with IAEA, which authorizes intrusive inspections on its territory, even on the undeclared sites. But now the Europeans and Americans wanted to force Iran to renounce its enrichment program. Before accusing this country of blocking any negotiations, it is time to admit that the objective of “zero centrifuges operating in Iran, permanently or temporarily” is an unrealistic goal and is driven to a dead end at this moment in time.
Stay a dilemma. Why offer an opening to the Iranian regime that would help restore its domestic and international legitimacy? Wouldn’t it be better to wait until it has a more presentable regime? This is a useful question to think about. However, we are perhaps exaggerating the effect of this nuclear negotiation on the evolution of domestic mentalities, which is even more profound. Ronald Reagan described the USSR as an “evil empire.” He nevertheless led intense negotiations with Mikhail Gorbachev about nuclear disarmament. The country interested in Iran’s future must certainly maintain constant pressure on the question of political and human rights, but also settle the insistent question of proliferation. We are thus cutting down an important source of tension in a region that aspires to peace.
The failure of last January’s meeting in Istanbul and the disappointing exchange of letters between the two parties that followed bring to the foreground the difficulties of ending such a long blockade. About the method, negotiation will be more discrete and technical, and it will be more likely to succeed. On the situation itself, we already know that every solution will be formed based on the quality of the IAEA’s system inspection.
And here is where we either trust the ability of the IAEA to survey all its member states, including Iran, or we will not rely on them. Then why should we preserve an effective organization with only virtuous countries? Indeed, the first stage would be, without a doubt, for the two parties to question the IAEA together on what would appear necessary to control the Iranian nuclear program and guarantee, in a credible way, that it is peaceful in all dimensions. Based on its response, a pragmatic negotiation could then begin.
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