The Day after the Veto
Published in Maariv
(Israel) on 31 July 2011
by Alon Pinkas (link to original)
(Israel) on 31 July 2011
by Alon Pinkas (link to original)
Translated from
by Viktoria Lymar.
Edited by Hoishan Chan.
There are 50 days before the Palestinian declaration of statehood, yet the U.S. has no idea how to get out of the mess and the White House — no clue what’s going to happen in September.
Sometimes, an absence of a clear and declared policy is the best policy. In such a way, at least, the administration in Washington tries to convince itself with regard to the coming September. It talks about this month in less apocalyptic terms than Israel, while at the same time trying to find a way to prevent September from occurring, or to change its route.
Were it not for the football league, they may have abolished the month completely. From President Obama, through Secretary Clinton to the last of the staffers overseeing the Middle East in the State Department and National Security Council, there is unanimity and an almost uniform opinion on two things. First, should the Palestinians submit a request to the U.N. Security Council for receiving a recommendation to recognize a Palestinian state, the U.S. is to exercise its veto, knowing that the Palestinian debate will go over to the General Assembly and win support; while knowing that the General Assembly cannot admit a new member to the U.N. without the Security Council, and knowing that the Resolution 377, the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, with its origins in the Korean War in November 1950, which allows for the Security Council be bypassed if it “fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,” could be valid from the legal point of view but is absolutely not applicable from the political perspective in the Palestinian case.
Second, no one in Washington has any doubt that no one in Washington has any idea what is to be done in the hour, day, week or month after imposing the veto. The government is well aware of the significance of exercising its veto. On the one hand, the United States is interested in negotiations and the political “process,” and there is no benefit in the unilateral and mischievous Palestinian turn to the U.N.
September Can Pass Quietly or Bring about a Storm
On the other hand, the United States is about to practically veto its own policy — for indeed, the Palestinian appeal will in all likelihood be phrased in language drawn precisely out of President Obama’s May speeches.
On the third hand, there’s no “political process,” and it is not expected to come into being; the level of confidence of the administration in Prime Minister Netanyahu as well as the Palestinians is lower than it has been ever during the past two years. It’s obvious to the Americans that just as September might be spared from considerable events and from the “tsunami” Israel warns of, as if a neutral and perceptive observer instead of an active player, who is influencing what he watches and influenced by this, so can October break out, with great fanfare, with massive Palestinian demonstrations and increased isolation of Israel.
On the fourth hand, the administration realizes that it also has a decent share in the stalemate. Although Israel and the Palestinians excel in formulating “why not” pretexts, and the two parties are masters of lists of demands and conditions, the American government is the one to choose not to consolidate a coherent policy as a continuation of the Obama speeches. The president’s role is to lay out guidelines; the aides’ job is to suggest to him statecraft options and programs expressing both American interests and the power of the United States. From this standpoint, the mere resorting to veto is a demonstration of weakness and lack of direction rather than a meaningful political statement.
On the fifth hand, the officials are looking for excuses and justification to the notion that the United States has no energies and the president has no patience or political utility to keep on dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the eve of an election year and while the economy and the political-financial crisis of the debt ceiling weigh and control the agenda.
There are still about 50 days till the U.N. assembly. Seemingly, the administration can come up with an alternative proposition to call on the Palestinians and Israel to open negotiation on the basis of Obama’s outline or that of their choice. The problem is that for the Palestinians, the move to the U.N. has been already launched into the world space. In order to dissuade them from the motion for a recognition of their state, the American-European counteroffer needs to be even more tempting, to the extent that the Netanyahu government wouldn’t be able to accept it. And then the Americans would again veto the proposal of their own. Everything makes sense, doesn’t it?
Sometimes, an absence of a clear and declared policy is the best policy. In such a way, at least, the administration in Washington tries to convince itself with regard to the coming September. It talks about this month in less apocalyptic terms than Israel, while at the same time trying to find a way to prevent September from occurring, or to change its route.
Were it not for the football league, they may have abolished the month completely. From President Obama, through Secretary Clinton to the last of the staffers overseeing the Middle East in the State Department and National Security Council, there is unanimity and an almost uniform opinion on two things. First, should the Palestinians submit a request to the U.N. Security Council for receiving a recommendation to recognize a Palestinian state, the U.S. is to exercise its veto, knowing that the Palestinian debate will go over to the General Assembly and win support; while knowing that the General Assembly cannot admit a new member to the U.N. without the Security Council, and knowing that the Resolution 377, the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, with its origins in the Korean War in November 1950, which allows for the Security Council be bypassed if it “fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,” could be valid from the legal point of view but is absolutely not applicable from the political perspective in the Palestinian case.
Second, no one in Washington has any doubt that no one in Washington has any idea what is to be done in the hour, day, week or month after imposing the veto. The government is well aware of the significance of exercising its veto. On the one hand, the United States is interested in negotiations and the political “process,” and there is no benefit in the unilateral and mischievous Palestinian turn to the U.N.
September Can Pass Quietly or Bring about a Storm
On the other hand, the United States is about to practically veto its own policy — for indeed, the Palestinian appeal will in all likelihood be phrased in language drawn precisely out of President Obama’s May speeches.
On the third hand, there’s no “political process,” and it is not expected to come into being; the level of confidence of the administration in Prime Minister Netanyahu as well as the Palestinians is lower than it has been ever during the past two years. It’s obvious to the Americans that just as September might be spared from considerable events and from the “tsunami” Israel warns of, as if a neutral and perceptive observer instead of an active player, who is influencing what he watches and influenced by this, so can October break out, with great fanfare, with massive Palestinian demonstrations and increased isolation of Israel.
On the fourth hand, the administration realizes that it also has a decent share in the stalemate. Although Israel and the Palestinians excel in formulating “why not” pretexts, and the two parties are masters of lists of demands and conditions, the American government is the one to choose not to consolidate a coherent policy as a continuation of the Obama speeches. The president’s role is to lay out guidelines; the aides’ job is to suggest to him statecraft options and programs expressing both American interests and the power of the United States. From this standpoint, the mere resorting to veto is a demonstration of weakness and lack of direction rather than a meaningful political statement.
On the fifth hand, the officials are looking for excuses and justification to the notion that the United States has no energies and the president has no patience or political utility to keep on dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the eve of an election year and while the economy and the political-financial crisis of the debt ceiling weigh and control the agenda.
There are still about 50 days till the U.N. assembly. Seemingly, the administration can come up with an alternative proposition to call on the Palestinians and Israel to open negotiation on the basis of Obama’s outline or that of their choice. The problem is that for the Palestinians, the move to the U.N. has been already launched into the world space. In order to dissuade them from the motion for a recognition of their state, the American-European counteroffer needs to be even more tempting, to the extent that the Netanyahu government wouldn’t be able to accept it. And then the Americans would again veto the proposal of their own. Everything makes sense, doesn’t it?