The List of U.S. Directives
Published in Thawra-Al-Wahda
(Syria) on 08 November 2011
by Ali Qasim (link to original)
(Syria) on 08 November 2011
by Ali Qasim (link to original)
Translated from
by Mouhsine Abdellaoui.
Edited by Steven Stenzler.
American attitudes prevail, and attached to them are the French ones. America’s list of directives and exhortations openly and without equivocation insist on involving the Arab League in side riddles, and even dragging it into a maze from which it would be difficult to get out.
The warning found in those riddles has not been discovered merely through deduction; rather, it stems from the concern for the work of the Arab League, and we are aware that there are those who set political snares and traps to catch the Arab effort even before it has emerged. So what if they were surprised by the results?
We believe, with absolute certainty, that other countries have hidden intentions towards the Arab effort. It seemed in the beginning that Syria would thwart this effort, but the scenario continues. However, when an agreement was reached, the parties that bet on its failure acted in every way to prevent it, sometimes overtly, sometimes covertly. In both cases, they converged and cut across the same intersection!
It is paradoxical that those parties that were most vocal about the solution in Syria were the first to oppose the agreement — those who claimed to care about the lives of Syrians, who incite to kill and who recommend maintaining a state of armament.
Generally, talking about irony in international politics is not a novel observation; neither is it new to say that the Arab League is evidently standing at a dangerous crossroads, and that the maze it is preparing to enter is probably more dangerous than ever before.
Syrian concern for the pan-Arab action did not only stem from the desire to reach a solution; it was also aimed at saving the Arab effort and protecting it from the publicly plotted machinations of other nations.
All we hope is that those responsible for the Arab action take this issue into account, that their vigilance be at a level commensurate with the risks they are facing, and that there be a sense of responsibility at this historical stage.
Also, we are working to give a political impetus to the Arab action, in order to establish a new phase in which it can shift from simply reacting to events to taking the initiative, by applying the Arab solution to the various issues and challenges it faces.
The fear that the Arab action could be sliding in an unfavorable direction still exists, and has not ceased to occupy our minds. We do not want those at the head of the Arab action to contribute to that slide, nor to constitute one of the parties that could drag it into that trap, regardless of their intentions, because intentions alone are not sufficient!
We do not believe they do not realize the consequences of their actions, nor do we imagine they do not know where the limits of their powers are, and what their functions are at this stage.
The orders they have received from the U.S. are clear, unequivocal and unambiguous. The U.S. administration has determined the plan of action that they must follow, just as it had already precisely determined what was required of the militants and terrorists.
What we want and what we are working towards is mitigating the influence of the U.S. in motivating some of the positions taken by the league.
This requires at a minimum a quick explanation on the part of the league so that no ambiguity remains; the U.S. will resort to fishing in troubled waters to influence the decisions taken by the Arab league. Our concern for the Arab action has not changed, and neither has our commitment to the Arab effort. Our faith in the Arabs’ capability to find a solution is indisputable, even if the issue was necessarily dependent on an iron will and good intentions. We assume the good intentions of Arabs and hope that our assumption is warranted. Anything other than that — God forbid— would have serious repercussions not only for the region, but across the globe.
We are convinced that Arabs are aware of this situation, and that they know the extent to which the U.S. administration is trying to influence the region. What we need today is for them to work in accordance with this conviction, and not according to the list of prevailing directives; and here lies the demarcation line.
The warning found in those riddles has not been discovered merely through deduction; rather, it stems from the concern for the work of the Arab League, and we are aware that there are those who set political snares and traps to catch the Arab effort even before it has emerged. So what if they were surprised by the results?
We believe, with absolute certainty, that other countries have hidden intentions towards the Arab effort. It seemed in the beginning that Syria would thwart this effort, but the scenario continues. However, when an agreement was reached, the parties that bet on its failure acted in every way to prevent it, sometimes overtly, sometimes covertly. In both cases, they converged and cut across the same intersection!
It is paradoxical that those parties that were most vocal about the solution in Syria were the first to oppose the agreement — those who claimed to care about the lives of Syrians, who incite to kill and who recommend maintaining a state of armament.
Generally, talking about irony in international politics is not a novel observation; neither is it new to say that the Arab League is evidently standing at a dangerous crossroads, and that the maze it is preparing to enter is probably more dangerous than ever before.
Syrian concern for the pan-Arab action did not only stem from the desire to reach a solution; it was also aimed at saving the Arab effort and protecting it from the publicly plotted machinations of other nations.
All we hope is that those responsible for the Arab action take this issue into account, that their vigilance be at a level commensurate with the risks they are facing, and that there be a sense of responsibility at this historical stage.
Also, we are working to give a political impetus to the Arab action, in order to establish a new phase in which it can shift from simply reacting to events to taking the initiative, by applying the Arab solution to the various issues and challenges it faces.
The fear that the Arab action could be sliding in an unfavorable direction still exists, and has not ceased to occupy our minds. We do not want those at the head of the Arab action to contribute to that slide, nor to constitute one of the parties that could drag it into that trap, regardless of their intentions, because intentions alone are not sufficient!
We do not believe they do not realize the consequences of their actions, nor do we imagine they do not know where the limits of their powers are, and what their functions are at this stage.
The orders they have received from the U.S. are clear, unequivocal and unambiguous. The U.S. administration has determined the plan of action that they must follow, just as it had already precisely determined what was required of the militants and terrorists.
What we want and what we are working towards is mitigating the influence of the U.S. in motivating some of the positions taken by the league.
This requires at a minimum a quick explanation on the part of the league so that no ambiguity remains; the U.S. will resort to fishing in troubled waters to influence the decisions taken by the Arab league. Our concern for the Arab action has not changed, and neither has our commitment to the Arab effort. Our faith in the Arabs’ capability to find a solution is indisputable, even if the issue was necessarily dependent on an iron will and good intentions. We assume the good intentions of Arabs and hope that our assumption is warranted. Anything other than that — God forbid— would have serious repercussions not only for the region, but across the globe.
We are convinced that Arabs are aware of this situation, and that they know the extent to which the U.S. administration is trying to influence the region. What we need today is for them to work in accordance with this conviction, and not according to the list of prevailing directives; and here lies the demarcation line.