The United States and the “Islamic Spring”
The United States needs some time to muddle through and absorb what is taking place in our region, whose Arab spring is turning Islamic through sequential electoral victories achieved by Islamic parties in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt. Officials in Washington find the issue perplexing, whereas they still have been unable to settle the dispute among themselves over the attitude toward Islamic forces and how to interact with them. Confusion is visible in their behavior toward the electoral ascension of the Renaissance, Justice and Development, and Justice and Development parties in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt, respectively.
However, the case of Egypt remains the most indicative of the officials’ confusion in Washington as to the future of the Arab region, not only for the importance of this case in its surroundings, but also because it expresses more vividly the confusion between a democracy that might set an Islamic rule, and a dictatorship that might be consequent of granting the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces a privileged position in the new political regime.
For instance, the Council for Foreign Relations (one of the most important research and thought centers in America) warned of the Islamic Brotherhood’s excellent organization as an obstacle in the trail of the democratic transition, and a Washington Post editorial in its November 4 issue warned of military rule and demanded that the Obama administration persuade the Egyptian army not to stay in power.
Thus, the position of the Obama administration seems, in a sense, to be the expression of this division in the American interior. However, this does not mean that it specifically balances the opposing positions, and that is in order to satisfy them at once, or to avoid the anger of either of them. The official U.S. position is in a state of objective confusion that was not caused by the different positions of the internal forces, though this divergence has fueled it to a certain extent.
Also, just as Egypt is the most attractive within the United States because of the distinct relations between the two countries since the mid-1970s on the one hand, and relations between Cairo and Tel Aviv on the other hand, the situation in Egypt enjoys special care on the part of Congress, the media, think tanks and lobbying groups influencing the U.S. decision-making process.
This attraction increases the Obama administration's confusion as to the future of the "Arab spring" in general, not vice versa, which is the result of the divergence of positions of the internal parties and forces that affect the decision-making related to foreign policy.
The said divergence, and the associated discrepancy, in the position toward Islamic political parties and forces shows more vividly in dealings with the other parties such as the Military Council in Egypt. As such, no significant change has occurred in the American attitudes toward Islamists after the revolution of Jan. 25, and under the "Arab spring" in general. There are those who regard the Islamists a major threat to the U.S. interests and see their access to power as a disaster whose impact exceeds that of any dictatorship, those who do not find sufficient justification to fear them, refuse to deal with them, warn against what they call "Islamophobia" or "Brothers-phobia," and warn that there is a difference between the time any movement or party are in opposition to the government and when they rise up to power and become in a position of responsibility.
Also, there are those who stand in the halfway position: Neither are they frightened witless by Islamists, nor do they unconditionally feel safe for themselves dealing with them. Rather, they take a cautious position: They do not close the door to the possibility of dealing with them, but they also do not open it wide.
Obama himself seems to be in a difficult position. If it is true that his favorite option is to have political activist Wael Ghoneim as the next president of Egypt, according to a mid-May issue of the New York Times, citing one of his aides, he then must be puzzled while thinking that this option is not laid on the table and that he is facing only two other choices: The rule of Islamists or their leadership of the governing coalition on the one hand, and the rule of the military or their indirect seizure of power on the other hand.
However, restricting Egypt's future in these two options is considered an illusory microcosm of a far more complex reality. If that proves to be true, the problem then is not only the Obama administration’s inability to resolve its position, but also that its approach of the situation in Egypt is not sound. Yet, it is still feasible for Washington to put an end to its double position if it carefully reads the current political map of Egypt.
However, the case of Egypt remains the most indicative of the officials’ confusion in Washington as to the future of the Arab region, not only for the importance of this case in its surroundings, but also because it expresses more vividly the confusion between a democracy that might set an Islamic rule, and a dictatorship that might be consequent of granting the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces a privileged position in the new political regime.
For instance, the Council for Foreign Relations (one of the most important research and thought centers in America) warned of the Islamic Brotherhood’s excellent organization as an obstacle in the trail of the democratic transition, and a Washington Post editorial in its November 4 issue warned of military rule and demanded that the Obama administration persuade the Egyptian army not to stay in power.
Thus, the position of the Obama administration seems, in a sense, to be the expression of this division in the American interior. However, this does not mean that it specifically balances the opposing positions, and that is in order to satisfy them at once, or to avoid the anger of either of them. The official U.S. position is in a state of objective confusion that was not caused by the different positions of the internal forces, though this divergence has fueled it to a certain extent.
Also, just as Egypt is the most attractive within the United States because of the distinct relations between the two countries since the mid-1970s on the one hand, and relations between Cairo and Tel Aviv on the other hand, the situation in Egypt enjoys special care on the part of Congress, the media, think tanks and lobbying groups influencing the U.S. decision-making process.
This attraction increases the Obama administration's confusion as to the future of the "Arab spring" in general, not vice versa, which is the result of the divergence of positions of the internal parties and forces that affect the decision-making related to foreign policy.
The said divergence, and the associated discrepancy, in the position toward Islamic political parties and forces shows more vividly in dealings with the other parties such as the Military Council in Egypt. As such, no significant change has occurred in the American attitudes toward Islamists after the revolution of Jan. 25, and under the "Arab spring" in general. There are those who regard the Islamists a major threat to the U.S. interests and see their access to power as a disaster whose impact exceeds that of any dictatorship, those who do not find sufficient justification to fear them, refuse to deal with them, warn against what they call "Islamophobia" or "Brothers-phobia," and warn that there is a difference between the time any movement or party are in opposition to the government and when they rise up to power and become in a position of responsibility.
Also, there are those who stand in the halfway position: Neither are they frightened witless by Islamists, nor do they unconditionally feel safe for themselves dealing with them. Rather, they take a cautious position: They do not close the door to the possibility of dealing with them, but they also do not open it wide.
Obama himself seems to be in a difficult position. If it is true that his favorite option is to have political activist Wael Ghoneim as the next president of Egypt, according to a mid-May issue of the New York Times, citing one of his aides, he then must be puzzled while thinking that this option is not laid on the table and that he is facing only two other choices: The rule of Islamists or their leadership of the governing coalition on the one hand, and the rule of the military or their indirect seizure of power on the other hand.
However, restricting Egypt's future in these two options is considered an illusory microcosm of a far more complex reality. If that proves to be true, the problem then is not only the Obama administration’s inability to resolve its position, but also that its approach of the situation in Egypt is not sound. Yet, it is still feasible for Washington to put an end to its double position if it carefully reads the current political map of Egypt.