Cold War Thinking Has America Confused as to Whether China Is a Friend or Foe
Since U.S. President Barack Obama announced a new national defense strategy, many people have begun to feel a bit nervous. The new plan calls for a large scale reduction of U.S. armed forces and placing its new military focus on Asia. Moreover, the report specifically mentioned China a number of times. Some in the media have determined that China and Iran have been classified by the U.S. as combat targets for winning decisive battles. Commentary in the People’s Daily has pointed out that the U.S. should view China’s military strength rationally. Others have suggested that China is being overly sensitive when it comes to America’s new strategy and, as a result, China’s reactions have been excessively strong.
Each viewpoint has its merits. On this point, the author chooses not to pose his argument, but there is one point that cannot be denied: America’s new military strategy is full off strong remnants of “Cold War thinking.” What is Cold War thinking? Simply put, it is the fixed Cold War political ideology adopted by the U.S. during the post-WWII period when the world was polarized into two camps. Some of the main points of this thinking include the pursuit of absolute security and the inability or unwillingness to put oneself in another’s shoes to better understand their interests, feelings or safety concerns. It was also the time of “self-fulfilling prophecies” that created enemies and then strategic plans to combat those enemies. With this announcement of a new military strategy by the U.S., America’s Cold War thinking has been revealed to be clearer than ever.
First, the U.S. has made public its suspicion of China’s intent to modernize its military and its attempt to pursue its own absolute security. The report stated that in order for China’s military to avoid conflict in the Asian region, its military growth and intentions must be more transparent and clear. America’s suspicion of China’s intentions for military development clearly reveals its alerted stance against China’s rise. Also revealed is America’s stance on preventing China from becoming a leading force in the Asian region and America’s fear that an expansion of Chinese military force will threaten U.S. interests in Asia, especially its right to open shipping lanes. During the Cold War, National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), released in early 1950, analyzed the changes to the global order and concluded that the Soviet Union was the greatest threat to American security. In order to pursue security interests, the document proposed a series of military deployment suggestions including the development of a hydrogen bomb and the rapid development of conventional weapons. Afterward, this document became an outline for the policy of containment.
Second is the creation of an imaginary enemy and the strategic plans to deal with it. The report stated that some countries, such as China and Iran, have developed asymmetrical capabilities like anti-interventionist or regional obstruction capabilities. This creates a huge challenge to U.S. military projection capabilities. As a result, the U.S. wants to strengthen its ability to project itself. Obviously, the U.S. has imagined China and Iran to be its post-Cold War “enemies” and must take actions that will contain China’s ability to develop offshore anti-intervention capabilities as a means to ensure open waters. Regarding the origins of the Cold War, George Kennan’s 8,000-word cable is believed to have significantly impacted the Cold War. The cable analyzed all sorts of Soviet Union behavior, drawing the conclusion that the Soviet Union was the potential enemy of the U.S. and the West.
However, the times have changed. America’s current Cold War thinking has new expressions, one of which is its internal contradictions. For example, the U.S. has imagined China to be its “enemy,” yet in this new military strategy, the U.S. also recognizes that China’s rise in Asia has also had an effect on the American economy and national security. The two countries have strong common interests in protecting the peace and stability of East Asia and in establishing cooperative bilateral relations. Looking at America’s views toward U.S.-Sino relations, it can be surmised that the U.S. will not contain China like it did the Soviet Union. Instead, it will adopt a policy of both restraint and cooperation. The international order has developed into such a state that America is left with a sense of helplessness.
Each viewpoint has its merits. On this point, the author chooses not to pose his argument, but there is one point that cannot be denied: America’s new military strategy is full off strong remnants of “Cold War thinking.” What is Cold War thinking? Simply put, it is the fixed Cold War political ideology adopted by the U.S. during the post-WWII period when the world was polarized into two camps. Some of the main points of this thinking include the pursuit of absolute security and the inability or unwillingness to put oneself in another’s shoes to better understand their interests, feelings or safety concerns. It was also the time of “self-fulfilling prophecies” that created enemies and then strategic plans to combat those enemies. With this announcement of a new military strategy by the U.S., America’s Cold War thinking has been revealed to be clearer than ever.
First, the U.S. has made public its suspicion of China’s intent to modernize its military and its attempt to pursue its own absolute security. The report stated that in order for China’s military to avoid conflict in the Asian region, its military growth and intentions must be more transparent and clear. America’s suspicion of China’s intentions for military development clearly reveals its alerted stance against China’s rise. Also revealed is America’s stance on preventing China from becoming a leading force in the Asian region and America’s fear that an expansion of Chinese military force will threaten U.S. interests in Asia, especially its right to open shipping lanes. During the Cold War, National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), released in early 1950, analyzed the changes to the global order and concluded that the Soviet Union was the greatest threat to American security. In order to pursue security interests, the document proposed a series of military deployment suggestions including the development of a hydrogen bomb and the rapid development of conventional weapons. Afterward, this document became an outline for the policy of containment.
Second is the creation of an imaginary enemy and the strategic plans to deal with it. The report stated that some countries, such as China and Iran, have developed asymmetrical capabilities like anti-interventionist or regional obstruction capabilities. This creates a huge challenge to U.S. military projection capabilities. As a result, the U.S. wants to strengthen its ability to project itself. Obviously, the U.S. has imagined China and Iran to be its post-Cold War “enemies” and must take actions that will contain China’s ability to develop offshore anti-intervention capabilities as a means to ensure open waters. Regarding the origins of the Cold War, George Kennan’s 8,000-word cable is believed to have significantly impacted the Cold War. The cable analyzed all sorts of Soviet Union behavior, drawing the conclusion that the Soviet Union was the potential enemy of the U.S. and the West.
However, the times have changed. America’s current Cold War thinking has new expressions, one of which is its internal contradictions. For example, the U.S. has imagined China to be its “enemy,” yet in this new military strategy, the U.S. also recognizes that China’s rise in Asia has also had an effect on the American economy and national security. The two countries have strong common interests in protecting the peace and stability of East Asia and in establishing cooperative bilateral relations. Looking at America’s views toward U.S.-Sino relations, it can be surmised that the U.S. will not contain China like it did the Soviet Union. Instead, it will adopt a policy of both restraint and cooperation. The international order has developed into such a state that America is left with a sense of helplessness.
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