In Asia, America May Be the Security Guarantor, but It Isn’t the Boss

Three years ago, America announced its “return” to Asia, and year by year, this is coming to be realized. This is obviously bringing some negative consequences to China. For example, the issue of the South China Sea has become a prominent one, and those neighboring countries that have traditionally had good relations with China (like Myanmar) have begun to deviate from China’s leadership. At the same time, the antagonistic stances of other nations (for example, Japan and India) are growing increasingly severe. These consequences are naturally coming to the attention of the Chinese public and media. But whether the U.S. will be able to contain China like it did the Soviet Union is still up for debate.

There are complex reasons behind America’s “return” to Asia, but it can be narrowed down to at least five. The first is because of geopolitical reasons directly related to China. The rapid rise of China and spread of its influence throughout Asia exceeded American projections. If America didn’t respond, it could lose its grasp on the region, and so it desperately needed to “return” and compete with China for regional influence.

The second reason is because of the region’s economy. The Asian economies have developed extremely rapidly. Although China plays a key role, countries like India, Vietnam, Indonesia and South Korea have all experienced rapid economic growth. From the perspective of America’s national interests, it needs to become involved in the most dynamic area of economic development. Thus it is apparent that economic concerns are not completely related to China.

Third, China’s neighbors collectively think, “rely upon China for economics and rely upon the U.S. for security.” Out of potential concerns about China, they want America to return to the region. In 1993, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad proposed the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the neighboring countries invited the U.S. to participate. This was a very rare, strategic opportunity for the U.S. and is closely related to the rise of China.

The fourth reason is because of America’s domestic politics; The Obama administration wants to highlight that the Bush administration was too concerned about countering terrorism and that ignoring Asia for the Middle East was a mistake. If it is to correct this mistake, it must return to Asia to regain control over the region’s policies. This will be seen as an important diplomatic achievement of the current government.

The fifth reason is a personal one for U.S. politicians. Obama is the first president in American history to have been awarded a Nobel Peace Prize while in office. He also lived in Indonesia for seven years, so he has a particular interest in the Asian region. At the same time, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton also has a particular relationship with the region; Her first trip was to Asia rather than Europe. And the current top U.S. diplomat for East Asian affairs, Kurt Campbell, has won the trust of the president, and as an active businessman, he has championed America’s return to Asia. From the president to the Secretary of State to a top diplomat, there is an intense interest in the region and they have formed a special team to promote the U.S.’s strategic refocusing eastward.

In these five reasons, only the first one deals directly with China. The second and third deal with regional interests and are only tangentially related to China. And the last two don’t have anything to do with it at all. The notion that the United States is returning to Asia only because of China is inconsistent with facts. The high-profile return, at first glance, is a “three-pronged approach” meant for political, economic and military benefits. But in the long run, it is unlikely to full achieve these goals.

First, this year is an election year for the president and whether Obama can be reelected remains unknown. If Obama fails to be reelected and Mitt Romney takes office, the new administration may not promote the eastward shift of strategy. And even if Obama wins, it looks like Campbell and Clinton will leave office, and their successors may not have the same zeal for continuing this strategy. Secondly, in the next decade the U.S. economy could continue down a path of Japanese-style decline. If so, this financial base would make it difficult to maintain this “three-pronged approach.” The third is that other areas will continue to face challenges in the future. European allies need assistance, and U.S.-Russian relations have shown some tensions. Countries in the Middle East may turn to Islamists after the “Arab Spring,” and the Latin America and Caribbean Forum last December showed that there are anti-American sentiments even in America's backyard. Finally, China’s neighbors want the U.S. to be their security guarantor, not their “boss,” so there exists a contradiction in wishes.

In short, because of a number of constraints, the ambitious policy of “returning” to Asia is not sustainable. As U.S. policy changes, we should maintain a calm state of mind when looking at these shifts.