What Can We in Sweden Do for Uncle Sam?
Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus. With this headline-grabbing wording, Robert Kagan, in his book America and Europe in the New World Order (Knopf), put his finger on the gap between Europe and the U.S. The year was 2003; the war in Iraq had sunk transatlantic relations to their lowest levels.
Kagan established that Europe and the U.S. had gone their separate ways and pointed out the crucial explanatory factor: the U.S.’ strength in respect to Europe’s weakness, which in practical political terms expressed itself in the usage of military means in contrast to diplomacy. His conclusion was that the “West” no longer existed.
A decade later, the discussion is once again going, and more precisely concerns whether the U.S. is about to leave Europe.
The U.S. is strategically reorienting itself toward Asia and the Pacific region, paring down its defenses in Europe and challenging Europeans to take greater responsibility. In practice, however, the halving of the number of army brigades from four to two signifies very little, since in reality this has already been the situation for the last 10 years. There will be a reduction of the air force but a simultaneous strengthening of naval forces. With the addition of the ongoing development of missile defenses, it is difficult to draw the conclusion that the U.S. is abandoning Europe to its fate.
This is underscored by the fact that the U.S.’ best friends — in terms of values, politics and resources — are found in Europe. Acting like a global Dirty Harry is not possible except in the most exceptional circumstances. The U.S. needs support from Europe for its own policy, but also a Europe that can act in those areas where the U.S. has difficulty establishing a foothold, for example in the new Arab world.
It is both a long-term trend after the Cold War’s end and a natural choice that the U.S. demands Europe can better stand on its own two feet.
The real concern is, rather, that it is already so empty in Europe's own pantry and that it will echo even more when many countries are reducing their defense budgets. This also ought to worry the Swedish government. For the center-right coalition, the EU has the same mantra-like status as the topic of UN for the Social Democrats. But in terms of security and defense policy, the EU is a dead end. One major reason is, of course, that the U.S. would prefer to channel their commitment to these issues through NATO, where the U.S. is a member.
So if and when Reinfeldt and Bildt consider what Sweden can do to strengthen the ties across the Atlantic, it is a matter of strengthening NATO, effected best through Swedish membership. Sweden can also contribute to reducing the risk of a military vacuum developing in Europe by reestablishing defenses on Gotland.
The EU, then? In the transatlantic issue, it is a question of continued pro-active Swedish commitment to the — also strategically important — Eastern Partnership with countries like Georgia and Ukraine.
Kagan established that Europe and the U.S. had gone their separate ways and pointed out the crucial explanatory factor: the U.S.’ strength in respect to Europe’s weakness, which in practical political terms expressed itself in the usage of military means in contrast to diplomacy. His conclusion was that the “West” no longer existed.
A decade later, the discussion is once again going, and more precisely concerns whether the U.S. is about to leave Europe.
The U.S. is strategically reorienting itself toward Asia and the Pacific region, paring down its defenses in Europe and challenging Europeans to take greater responsibility. In practice, however, the halving of the number of army brigades from four to two signifies very little, since in reality this has already been the situation for the last 10 years. There will be a reduction of the air force but a simultaneous strengthening of naval forces. With the addition of the ongoing development of missile defenses, it is difficult to draw the conclusion that the U.S. is abandoning Europe to its fate.
This is underscored by the fact that the U.S.’ best friends — in terms of values, politics and resources — are found in Europe. Acting like a global Dirty Harry is not possible except in the most exceptional circumstances. The U.S. needs support from Europe for its own policy, but also a Europe that can act in those areas where the U.S. has difficulty establishing a foothold, for example in the new Arab world.
It is both a long-term trend after the Cold War’s end and a natural choice that the U.S. demands Europe can better stand on its own two feet.
The real concern is, rather, that it is already so empty in Europe's own pantry and that it will echo even more when many countries are reducing their defense budgets. This also ought to worry the Swedish government. For the center-right coalition, the EU has the same mantra-like status as the topic of UN for the Social Democrats. But in terms of security and defense policy, the EU is a dead end. One major reason is, of course, that the U.S. would prefer to channel their commitment to these issues through NATO, where the U.S. is a member.
So if and when Reinfeldt and Bildt consider what Sweden can do to strengthen the ties across the Atlantic, it is a matter of strengthening NATO, effected best through Swedish membership. Sweden can also contribute to reducing the risk of a military vacuum developing in Europe by reestablishing defenses on Gotland.
The EU, then? In the transatlantic issue, it is a question of continued pro-active Swedish commitment to the — also strategically important — Eastern Partnership with countries like Georgia and Ukraine.
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