Appropriate Measures Must Be Taken to Resolve U.S. Beef Controversy
The lifting of the ban on U.S. beef imports containing ractopamine has become a political and diplomatic crisis. The Legislative Yuan has issued a proposal to control U.S. beef imports through inspections which must detect no traces of ractopamine or [otherwise use] the very strictest standards, indicating a complete misalignment between popular sentiment and opinion within the Executive Yuan. Additionally, U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Francisco Sánchez delayed his trip to Taiwan, demonstrating America's dissatisfaction, as well as adding further pressure. If the Ma administration is unable to take appropriate measures to resolve the U.S. beef controversy, it stands to lose the most in both internal and foreign affairs.
After its successful campaign and re-election, and under pressure from the United States, the Ma administration clearly intends to restart negotiations on the importation of U.S. beef. Although high-level government officials have continually emphasized that there is “no commitment, no timetable, and no pre-set position,” it directed the Council of Agriculture to establish a task force of technical specialists for U.S. beef, clearly hoping to silence the opposition with expert opinion. The government has used open procedures to address the U.S. beef problem, which is some measure an improvement in comparison to the political maelstrom caused by its closed-door operations three years ago. However, U.S. beef is not only a problem of food safety and the food industry, but also involves the broader considerations of foreign affairs, politics, the economy and other national interests, and has already developed far beyond the purview of a panel experts. The Ma administration must take responsibility for making policy and for its subsequent success or failure instead of continuing to vacillate.
To resolve the U.S. beef controversy, one should consider the issue on several levels: First, on food safety, although the panel of experts has not yet reached a conclusion, it can more or less confirm which meat products contain ractopamine. With effective management, “low risk,” but not “zero risk,” levels can be achieved, and the government can truly effectively control imports.
Second, with respect to the industry, it will be difficult to draw the line between beef and pork as to which meat products can use ractopamine, and the aftereffects of lifting the ban on U.S. beef will inevitably be a blow to the domestic livestock industry, especially pig farming. If the ban is lifted, there must be suitable subsidies or assistance for the domestic livestock industry.
Third, regarding national interest, the maintenance and advancement of U.S.-Taiwan relations is linked to major Taiwanese interests. The consequences of prohibiting the importation of U.S. beef include: the inability to restart talks under the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement between Taiwan and the U.S., probable implications for visa exemptions when visiting the U.S., a weakening of America's willingness to help Taiwan join the United Nations, as well as other tangible and intangible diplomatic and economic interests. This also extends to the government's ability to negotiate with the United States. Despite fierce past opposition to U.S. beef imports in South Korea, President Lee Myung-bak used the U.S.-South Korean Free Trade Agreement as a bargaining chip in exchange, effectively lowering domestic resistance. Therefore, the Ma administration should strongly negotiate with the United States, and strive for a more concrete U.S. commitment towards Taiwan. This will not only restore TIFA talks, but will provide more specific topics for discussion, such as U.S.-Taiwan investment protocols, the U.S.-Taiwan FTA, Taiwan's joining the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, etc. Otherwise, if Taiwan allows U.S. beef imports and the United States delays talks on essential issues in the future due to political reasons, Taiwan will see no substantial gains. How will the Ma administration explain this to the public?
Accordingly, if the Ma administration intends to allow U.S. beef imports, it must stand tall and demonstrate its ability to negotiate in foreign affairs, convincing the public of where Taiwan's national interests lie; additionally, it must come up with a plan for lifting the ban on U.S. beef which contains effective measures for risk management as well as supplementary actions, such as adopting the strictest standards for inspection, requiring sufficient labeling and proposing strict inspection procedures and plans for improving administrative efficacy. At the same time, it should propose a set of effective measures for subsidizing and rewarding farmers, prompting those in the domestic industry to continue the disuse of ractopamine, as well as maintaining the competitiveness of the industry.
The Ma administration's ability to communicate is also in need of improvement. Interaction between the Executive Yuan and Parliament must maintain order. The current ruling party holds a majority in the Legislative Yuan, and has easily overcome obstacles on highly sensitive topics such as ECFA in the past. If the Legislative Yuan does not support U.S. beef imports, how will the Ma administration explain this to the United States? Communication between the government and society is equally important. Underestimating public opposition and acting rashly at a bad time, attracting renewed criticism of U.S. beef imports, was the [administration's] greatest misstep, and has made a policy issue which could be discussed rationally increasingly populist. Neutralizing the backlash from public sentiment instead of continual avoidance is the Chen cabinet's greatest responsibility.
The U.S. beef controversy is a test of the Ma administration's ability to bear responsibility and manage national politics. If lifting the ban on U.S. beef is necessary to protect national interests, it should move without reservation towards the recommendations made above, and diffuse the potential crisis. If not, it should hit the brakes, and keep the damage to a minimum. If the administration continues to vacillate, playing both sides, it will be the one that suffers the most in the end.
After its successful campaign and re-election, and under pressure from the United States, the Ma administration clearly intends to restart negotiations on the importation of U.S. beef. Although high-level government officials have continually emphasized that there is “no commitment, no timetable, and no pre-set position,” it directed the Council of Agriculture to establish a task force of technical specialists for U.S. beef, clearly hoping to silence the opposition with expert opinion. The government has used open procedures to address the U.S. beef problem, which is some measure an improvement in comparison to the political maelstrom caused by its closed-door operations three years ago. However, U.S. beef is not only a problem of food safety and the food industry, but also involves the broader considerations of foreign affairs, politics, the economy and other national interests, and has already developed far beyond the purview of a panel experts. The Ma administration must take responsibility for making policy and for its subsequent success or failure instead of continuing to vacillate.
To resolve the U.S. beef controversy, one should consider the issue on several levels: First, on food safety, although the panel of experts has not yet reached a conclusion, it can more or less confirm which meat products contain ractopamine. With effective management, “low risk,” but not “zero risk,” levels can be achieved, and the government can truly effectively control imports.
Second, with respect to the industry, it will be difficult to draw the line between beef and pork as to which meat products can use ractopamine, and the aftereffects of lifting the ban on U.S. beef will inevitably be a blow to the domestic livestock industry, especially pig farming. If the ban is lifted, there must be suitable subsidies or assistance for the domestic livestock industry.
Third, regarding national interest, the maintenance and advancement of U.S.-Taiwan relations is linked to major Taiwanese interests. The consequences of prohibiting the importation of U.S. beef include: the inability to restart talks under the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement between Taiwan and the U.S., probable implications for visa exemptions when visiting the U.S., a weakening of America's willingness to help Taiwan join the United Nations, as well as other tangible and intangible diplomatic and economic interests. This also extends to the government's ability to negotiate with the United States. Despite fierce past opposition to U.S. beef imports in South Korea, President Lee Myung-bak used the U.S.-South Korean Free Trade Agreement as a bargaining chip in exchange, effectively lowering domestic resistance. Therefore, the Ma administration should strongly negotiate with the United States, and strive for a more concrete U.S. commitment towards Taiwan. This will not only restore TIFA talks, but will provide more specific topics for discussion, such as U.S.-Taiwan investment protocols, the U.S.-Taiwan FTA, Taiwan's joining the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, etc. Otherwise, if Taiwan allows U.S. beef imports and the United States delays talks on essential issues in the future due to political reasons, Taiwan will see no substantial gains. How will the Ma administration explain this to the public?
Accordingly, if the Ma administration intends to allow U.S. beef imports, it must stand tall and demonstrate its ability to negotiate in foreign affairs, convincing the public of where Taiwan's national interests lie; additionally, it must come up with a plan for lifting the ban on U.S. beef which contains effective measures for risk management as well as supplementary actions, such as adopting the strictest standards for inspection, requiring sufficient labeling and proposing strict inspection procedures and plans for improving administrative efficacy. At the same time, it should propose a set of effective measures for subsidizing and rewarding farmers, prompting those in the domestic industry to continue the disuse of ractopamine, as well as maintaining the competitiveness of the industry.
The Ma administration's ability to communicate is also in need of improvement. Interaction between the Executive Yuan and Parliament must maintain order. The current ruling party holds a majority in the Legislative Yuan, and has easily overcome obstacles on highly sensitive topics such as ECFA in the past. If the Legislative Yuan does not support U.S. beef imports, how will the Ma administration explain this to the United States? Communication between the government and society is equally important. Underestimating public opposition and acting rashly at a bad time, attracting renewed criticism of U.S. beef imports, was the [administration's] greatest misstep, and has made a policy issue which could be discussed rationally increasingly populist. Neutralizing the backlash from public sentiment instead of continual avoidance is the Chen cabinet's greatest responsibility.
The U.S. beef controversy is a test of the Ma administration's ability to bear responsibility and manage national politics. If lifting the ban on U.S. beef is necessary to protect national interests, it should move without reservation towards the recommendations made above, and diffuse the potential crisis. If not, it should hit the brakes, and keep the damage to a minimum. If the administration continues to vacillate, playing both sides, it will be the one that suffers the most in the end.