Obama and Netanyahu: Who Will Convince the Other?
Published in al-Watan
(Syria) on 7 March, 2012
by Khurshid Dalli (link to original)
(Syria) on 7 March, 2012
by Khurshid Dalli (link to original)
Translated from
by Elissa Krieg.
Edited by Peter McGuire.
It seems that, through a serious ordeal, American President Barack Obama is striving for new presidential authority. The man who, at the beginning of his term more than three years ago, promised to turn over a new leaf with Iran has not exactly failed in his attempt to find a solution to the unresolved issues with the country though discussion. He still, however, finds himself faced with a set of internal and external pressures that have extended to accusations of carelessness with the Iranian nuclear issue.
After the meeting between Obama and Netanyahu–which has been described as decisive in terms of how to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue–there is speculation over how close Israel is to launching a military strike to destroy Iran's nuclear reactors. Obama finds himself under two kinds of pressure:
First, Obama is under internal pressure by the Republicans, who use the Iranian nuclear issue as an opening to attack Obama. They want to make him look like a weak president who is not strong enough to make a decision about Iran, and therefore subjects American national security to danger. Regardless of the truth and reasoning behind this accusation, it affects the American electorate and voting trends in the election fight.
Second, Obama is being exposed to external pressure by Israel, which has strong influence in the United States. The Jewish lobby and AIPAC are deeply embedded in all sectors of American life and have widespread electoral influence in the country.
Obama, who has followed a strategy of increasing sanctions on Tehran throughout his term, is having an enormous problem reconciling his previous decisions with the pressures he now faces. In spite of this difficulty, he does not lack the means to bring Netanyahu over to his point of view and convince him of the danger of an Israeli military strike on Iran's nuclear reactors (as happened with the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981). Some are talking about the strong arguments that Obama is laying out, of which the most important could be:
1. The assessment of American military, security and intelligence agencies that says there is still a safe interval before Iran can make a nuclear bomb. The assessment also states that these agencies are following the situation minute by minute, and that the issue of enriching uranium 20 percent does not necessarily mean that Iran is capable of making such a bomb.
2. Official American moderators say that even if Iran obtains a nuclear bomb, Washington can deal with it. On this point, there is disparity between the American and Israeli points of view. In contrast with the American perspective, that it will be able to deal with an Iranian nuclear bomb, Israel thinks that it cannot or will not be able to endure the existence of a nuclear Iran and that its military capacity is not like America's. Furthermore, Israel wants to destroy Iran's nuclear reactors in advance, so that it does not someday find that its nightmare came true.
3. In the face of the aforementioned moderation, there are those who are still talking about the "Pentagon bomb," the guarantee that Obama will persuade Netanyahu of his point of view. Apparently this bomb, called GBU-57, weighs 13.6 tons, is directed by GPS and can penetrate to a depth of 60 meters underground before exploding and breaking through concrete fortifications. This is the first bomb of its kind, and seems to have been designed to strike Iran's nuclear facilities.
In reality, in spite of these observations, the American–Israeli controversy over striking Iran's nuclear facilities is still in its opening phase. Therefore, one could say that the timing of Obama's meeting with Netanyahu shows signs of being planned, at least by the Americans. Perhaps the first of these signs is the American message that Israel’s intelligence assessment of Iran's nuclear strength may be inaccurate. But what if Netanyahu is unconvinced and finds himself faced with popular pressure, party and electoral pressures and most importantly pressure from the intelligence apparatus? In his gut, Netanyahu believes that sanctions will not lead to a result. All along, he is thinking of the date of the military strike, although no one knows what the region will look like the moment following the attack, if it happens. In any case, Netanyahu believes that he is able (by pressure, intimidation and provocation) to get more from the American administration because Obama was asking for a favor in his speech at the AIPAC conference. So the question remains, who will convince the other: Obama or Netanyahu?
After the meeting between Obama and Netanyahu–which has been described as decisive in terms of how to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue–there is speculation over how close Israel is to launching a military strike to destroy Iran's nuclear reactors. Obama finds himself under two kinds of pressure:
First, Obama is under internal pressure by the Republicans, who use the Iranian nuclear issue as an opening to attack Obama. They want to make him look like a weak president who is not strong enough to make a decision about Iran, and therefore subjects American national security to danger. Regardless of the truth and reasoning behind this accusation, it affects the American electorate and voting trends in the election fight.
Second, Obama is being exposed to external pressure by Israel, which has strong influence in the United States. The Jewish lobby and AIPAC are deeply embedded in all sectors of American life and have widespread electoral influence in the country.
Obama, who has followed a strategy of increasing sanctions on Tehran throughout his term, is having an enormous problem reconciling his previous decisions with the pressures he now faces. In spite of this difficulty, he does not lack the means to bring Netanyahu over to his point of view and convince him of the danger of an Israeli military strike on Iran's nuclear reactors (as happened with the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981). Some are talking about the strong arguments that Obama is laying out, of which the most important could be:
1. The assessment of American military, security and intelligence agencies that says there is still a safe interval before Iran can make a nuclear bomb. The assessment also states that these agencies are following the situation minute by minute, and that the issue of enriching uranium 20 percent does not necessarily mean that Iran is capable of making such a bomb.
2. Official American moderators say that even if Iran obtains a nuclear bomb, Washington can deal with it. On this point, there is disparity between the American and Israeli points of view. In contrast with the American perspective, that it will be able to deal with an Iranian nuclear bomb, Israel thinks that it cannot or will not be able to endure the existence of a nuclear Iran and that its military capacity is not like America's. Furthermore, Israel wants to destroy Iran's nuclear reactors in advance, so that it does not someday find that its nightmare came true.
3. In the face of the aforementioned moderation, there are those who are still talking about the "Pentagon bomb," the guarantee that Obama will persuade Netanyahu of his point of view. Apparently this bomb, called GBU-57, weighs 13.6 tons, is directed by GPS and can penetrate to a depth of 60 meters underground before exploding and breaking through concrete fortifications. This is the first bomb of its kind, and seems to have been designed to strike Iran's nuclear facilities.
In reality, in spite of these observations, the American–Israeli controversy over striking Iran's nuclear facilities is still in its opening phase. Therefore, one could say that the timing of Obama's meeting with Netanyahu shows signs of being planned, at least by the Americans. Perhaps the first of these signs is the American message that Israel’s intelligence assessment of Iran's nuclear strength may be inaccurate. But what if Netanyahu is unconvinced and finds himself faced with popular pressure, party and electoral pressures and most importantly pressure from the intelligence apparatus? In his gut, Netanyahu believes that sanctions will not lead to a result. All along, he is thinking of the date of the military strike, although no one knows what the region will look like the moment following the attack, if it happens. In any case, Netanyahu believes that he is able (by pressure, intimidation and provocation) to get more from the American administration because Obama was asking for a favor in his speech at the AIPAC conference. So the question remains, who will convince the other: Obama or Netanyahu?