“Strategic Anxiety” Leads US Diplomacy in Asia-Pacific to a Wrong Track

The U.S. has been very active in the Asia-Pacific region recently: First, it publicly claimed that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan was applicable to the Diaoyu Islands (the Senkaku Islands); second, it has become even more involved in the South China Sea issue as the territorial dispute between China and some ASEAN member nations escalates; third, Hillary Clinton, the U.S. Secretary of State, has visited China’s neighbors frequently. Such diplomatic behavior is obviously directed toward China.

In the past 10 years, the United States’ diplomatic power suffered from the War on Terror, while China’s development achieved great success, which disturbed the U.S. somewhat, intensifying its “strategic anxiety.” After assuming the presidency, Obama sped up the shift of the United States’ strategic concern over to the East, with the rise of China and other emerging great powers becoming a priority issue. However, such policy has increasingly changed into actions “containing China.”

Nevertheless, one problem that the U.S. should be alert to is the cost of such linear diplomatic behavior, which will far exceed the expected interests.

First, containing China likely leads to the legal reconstruction of the status quo imposed after World War II. Following the Yalta Conference, China took back Taiwan and its associated islands. Japan, as the defeated nation, disarmed itself and was occupied by the United States. The four northern islands were thus occupied by the Soviet Union. In a word, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were together “in charge of Japan.”

Now some American politicians intend to support Japan for a powerful reinstatement in order to contain China (and to some extent, Russia) and to make the U.S. a so-called “offshore balancer.” Even on the issue of the Diaoyu Islands, the U.S. wants to pull the chestnut out of the fire for Japan. Such intentional defiance of the Yalta Conference is likely to shake the peaceful order in the region that was settled after World War II, again turning many already firm and profoundly fixed historic issues into ongoing disputes. The prospect of such behavior will not only harm the interests of China and Russia but also those of the United States. Moreover, the diplomatic ambition of the U.S. goes beyond its capacity, which will likely inflict the U.S. with losses again.

Even in the golden age of American power, major military efforts made by the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region were crushed (such as in the Korean War and Vietnam War). Why is this the case? The answer lies not only in that the U.S. was fighting wars without a just cause, but also in a more important aspect, which is the change of the balance of power.

From the perspective of geopolitics, power projection capabilities are inversely proportional to power projection distance, which if it was stretched to a certain degree, would reach a limit where “an arrow is at the end of its flight, not even able to pierce the most flimsy silk.” The U.S. is a nation located in the East-Pacific; however, it travels all the way along to the West-Pacific, frequently sending China hostile signals. In this political game, the challenge the U.S. faces is its own limitations. When its primary concern was still the Middle East, the U.S. could not even handle a medium-sized country such as Iran, let alone contain China when its strength is largely eclipsed.

Just as the U.S. reacted to the Soviet Union’s deployment of missiles in Cuba, China should be respected on issues which concern its interests and sensitive geographic regions. However, the U.S., on the contrary, constantly provokes China on some issues of core interests to China, such as the Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea dispute. These actions are not only useless but also very dangerous.

Furthermore, the political structure of the Asia-Pacific region is complex and subtle. If the U.S. is to be involved in any regional confrontation, it will inflict losses without gaining any benefit. Historically, many powerful countries which took unlimited responsibility and acted out of ideological prejudice are taken advantage of by small nations and ultimately find their losses outweighing their gains.

The Zen of survival for powerful countries should be “possessing strength, but retaining gentleness.” A nation should especially prevent its intentions from overreaching its actual capacity and leading to the decline of the nation. The U.S., which just suffered from an “unlimited anti-terrorism” policy in the Middle East and that previously stumbled in the expansion in the Asia-Pacific region, should have learned this from experience.

Hillary’s busy schedule makes people think of her former counterpart, Allen Dulles. They both worked hard for U.S. national interests, but they always seemed to never be on the right track, sometimes even “being more of a hindrance than a help.” In fact, what the U.S. needs is not an aggressive siege of China, but a rational and careful strategic rethinking.

The author is special commentator at the People’s Daily and associate researcher at the Institute of Contemporary International Relations.