Edited by Anita Dixon
The American Shadow at the Background of the Huangyan Island Dispute
This time the Huangyan Island dispute between China and the Philippines has the world’s full attention, since it is a rarely seen dispute over territorial sovereignty between a small and a large nation. Even though prior to this, both Obama and Hillary Clinton once said that America would not intervene in disputes between China and the Philippines, America is in reality still sending nuclear submarines to visit the Philippines and is preparing to equip the Philippines with land-based radar. A few days ago, the joint “Kallat 2012” military exercises also just dropped a heavy curtain, with the Philippines’ attitude of exploiting powerful connections being extremely obvious. It can be said that the shadows of superpowers were frequently flashing in the background of the entire event.
Actually, speaking from a mental standpoint, America’s feelings toward the Philippines are somewhat complicated. As early as the Spanish-American War in 1898, the U.S. army “liberated” the Philippines from the hands of Spanish colonialists. During World War II, General MacArthur washed away his shame, persevering to wrest control of the Philippines from the grasp of the Japanese military. After this, the Philippines were continuously America’s faithful ally. But after the Cold War ended, the relationship between the two nations became somewhat estranged; under pressure, the U.S. army base stationed in the Philippines had no choice but to shut down. The eruption of anti-American demonstrations in the Philippines also forced Americans to always bear in mind their involvement. But in the end, the interests of the two nations will decide whether U.S.-Philippine relations will be close or distant.
In recent years, the South China Sea dispute has entered a new stage. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and other countries have, one after another, submitted plans to mark off boundaries in the South China Sea to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. With regards to the South China Sea islands, reefs and maritime territory, each country has changed direction in its goal from actual control to administrative management, leading to sharpening of conflict over sovereignty. At the background of Southeast Asian nations daring to fight for this small matter is these nations’ exploitation of America’s return as the “major power” of the Asia-Pacific. Looking from the viewpoint of global strategy, America returning to the Asia-Pacific in reality is a kind of shrinkage of strategy. In the context of the financial crisis, when America, with ocean supremacy as its cornerstone, is thwarted in Eurasia, and especially Central Asia, it will have no choice but to once again withdraw its power to the seas in order to wait for action and accumulate power. This is the embodiment of the U.S. Navy’s “control the land from the sea” way of thinking. These Southeast Asian island nations that occupy advantageous geographical locations will once again become the target of American enticements.
Regarding the individual nations of Southeast Asia, the importance of the South China Sea is self-evident. With America’s return to Asia, as it raises the banner of maintaining local safety and the safety of its allies, America needs to issue a definite attitude on the South China Sea problem. However, in reality the investments and actions of the power that America has invested in the South China Sea have not reached the level that it claimed they would.
The territory in the Pacific Ocean is not the same as the Middle East. In the Middle East, located at the heart of Eurasia, the relationship between regional environment and religion is tangled and complicated; after coming down from a few bouts with Iran, America just has a feeling of confusion and disorientation. But returning to the different situation in the Pacific Ocean, the American people’s expression appears to be much more mature. This and America’s abrupt rise in maritime power and establishment of maritime supremacy are inseparable. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the father of the theory of sea power, was an American. Obama still wants to be the president of the Pacific Ocean, as the Pacific Ocean is an ocean full of American psychological dominance. With regards to the South China Sea, former Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command Willard once said, we have already been operating here for over 100 years and we have an obligation to look after these waters. These words reflected the aggressiveness and self-confidence of the old-style navies of powerful nations. But facing the current China-Philippine dispute, America’s displays have given people a feeling of relative caution; this is precisely where its shrewdness lies.
America’s true strategic intent is to gain the interest of fishermen. A return to the Asia-Pacific requires the help of backing from allies in order to succeed, but how to get that help is still a big question. If the Pacific Ocean is always at a dead calm, then those small nations will not rely heavily upon the American protective umbrella. With regard to this, it’s evident that the “strategy then harmony” idea espoused from the chest of Americans is precisely equivalent to the need to maintain an appropriate level of disturbance in the South China Sea, even to the point of allowing disturbances in small nations. On one hand, doing so could cause allies to pay money, exert their own strength and personally manage China. On the other hand, it allows America to find reasonable grounds to maintain troops there. This method has in reality already been used successfully by America in Libya. Of course, the risk of this method is that conflict will possibly increase to the extent that America cannot control it. But America’s ability to evaluate its own strategy is responsible, and in general America will not take the initiative to provoke China and escalate disputes. This much is relatively clear. Therefore, Uncle Sam has shown that he is very capable of staying calm.
In addition, under the context of a strategic return to the Asia-Pacific, America is also working hard to realize increased agility in military deployment. In fact, looking at American military deployment in the Western Pacific over the past few years, America already no longer excessively relies on the island chain layout established at the time of the Cold War. A few of the American navy’s former fixed deployments have been completely replaced by new forms. For example, through the normalization of military exercises, warship patrols, maritime assistance and other situations, automatic military deployment has been achieved. The advantages of this consist of: first, a reduction of the risk of excessive deployment of troops to the first island chain that would result in suffering an accurate attack; second, the possibility to achieve faster reaction and arrival by upgrading the ability to routinely send troops; and third, the possibility to not have to completely rely on specific allies, the possibility to strengthen alliances and military cooperation between partners through activities such as group military exercises and, through the preservation of local safety, the possibility to carry out acts, such as maritime assistance, to garner high marks in morality.
Looking back at history and giving perspective to the present is all for the sake of better grasping the future. The Huangyan Island dispute reflects at a deep level a trial of strength between major powers. Looking from the displays of relevant countries, small countries are not necessarily diplomatic losers, and the “borrow power to use power” way of thinking is probably comprehended by the West. Because of this, faced with external pressure, strengthening and hardening the foundation is still the first thing to be done. In addition, in the treacherous international environment, it’s still necessary to look through the opponent’s strategic intentions, persevere during battle to “show reason” and not “show weakness,” and to ensure a “those upholding justice will find help all around” position.
Actually, speaking from a mental standpoint, America’s feelings toward the Philippines are somewhat complicated. As early as the Spanish-American War in 1898, the U.S. army “liberated” the Philippines from the hands of Spanish colonialists. During World War II, General MacArthur washed away his shame, persevering to wrest control of the Philippines from the grasp of the Japanese military. After this, the Philippines were continuously America’s faithful ally. But after the Cold War ended, the relationship between the two nations became somewhat estranged; under pressure, the U.S. army base stationed in the Philippines had no choice but to shut down. The eruption of anti-American demonstrations in the Philippines also forced Americans to always bear in mind their involvement. But in the end, the interests of the two nations will decide whether U.S.-Philippine relations will be close or distant.
In recent years, the South China Sea dispute has entered a new stage. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and other countries have, one after another, submitted plans to mark off boundaries in the South China Sea to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. With regards to the South China Sea islands, reefs and maritime territory, each country has changed direction in its goal from actual control to administrative management, leading to sharpening of conflict over sovereignty. At the background of Southeast Asian nations daring to fight for this small matter is these nations’ exploitation of America’s return as the “major power” of the Asia-Pacific. Looking from the viewpoint of global strategy, America returning to the Asia-Pacific in reality is a kind of shrinkage of strategy. In the context of the financial crisis, when America, with ocean supremacy as its cornerstone, is thwarted in Eurasia, and especially Central Asia, it will have no choice but to once again withdraw its power to the seas in order to wait for action and accumulate power. This is the embodiment of the U.S. Navy’s “control the land from the sea” way of thinking. These Southeast Asian island nations that occupy advantageous geographical locations will once again become the target of American enticements.
Regarding the individual nations of Southeast Asia, the importance of the South China Sea is self-evident. With America’s return to Asia, as it raises the banner of maintaining local safety and the safety of its allies, America needs to issue a definite attitude on the South China Sea problem. However, in reality the investments and actions of the power that America has invested in the South China Sea have not reached the level that it claimed they would.
The territory in the Pacific Ocean is not the same as the Middle East. In the Middle East, located at the heart of Eurasia, the relationship between regional environment and religion is tangled and complicated; after coming down from a few bouts with Iran, America just has a feeling of confusion and disorientation. But returning to the different situation in the Pacific Ocean, the American people’s expression appears to be much more mature. This and America’s abrupt rise in maritime power and establishment of maritime supremacy are inseparable. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the father of the theory of sea power, was an American. Obama still wants to be the president of the Pacific Ocean, as the Pacific Ocean is an ocean full of American psychological dominance. With regards to the South China Sea, former Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command Willard once said, we have already been operating here for over 100 years and we have an obligation to look after these waters. These words reflected the aggressiveness and self-confidence of the old-style navies of powerful nations. But facing the current China-Philippine dispute, America’s displays have given people a feeling of relative caution; this is precisely where its shrewdness lies.
America’s true strategic intent is to gain the interest of fishermen. A return to the Asia-Pacific requires the help of backing from allies in order to succeed, but how to get that help is still a big question. If the Pacific Ocean is always at a dead calm, then those small nations will not rely heavily upon the American protective umbrella. With regard to this, it’s evident that the “strategy then harmony” idea espoused from the chest of Americans is precisely equivalent to the need to maintain an appropriate level of disturbance in the South China Sea, even to the point of allowing disturbances in small nations. On one hand, doing so could cause allies to pay money, exert their own strength and personally manage China. On the other hand, it allows America to find reasonable grounds to maintain troops there. This method has in reality already been used successfully by America in Libya. Of course, the risk of this method is that conflict will possibly increase to the extent that America cannot control it. But America’s ability to evaluate its own strategy is responsible, and in general America will not take the initiative to provoke China and escalate disputes. This much is relatively clear. Therefore, Uncle Sam has shown that he is very capable of staying calm.
In addition, under the context of a strategic return to the Asia-Pacific, America is also working hard to realize increased agility in military deployment. In fact, looking at American military deployment in the Western Pacific over the past few years, America already no longer excessively relies on the island chain layout established at the time of the Cold War. A few of the American navy’s former fixed deployments have been completely replaced by new forms. For example, through the normalization of military exercises, warship patrols, maritime assistance and other situations, automatic military deployment has been achieved. The advantages of this consist of: first, a reduction of the risk of excessive deployment of troops to the first island chain that would result in suffering an accurate attack; second, the possibility to achieve faster reaction and arrival by upgrading the ability to routinely send troops; and third, the possibility to not have to completely rely on specific allies, the possibility to strengthen alliances and military cooperation between partners through activities such as group military exercises and, through the preservation of local safety, the possibility to carry out acts, such as maritime assistance, to garner high marks in morality.
Looking back at history and giving perspective to the present is all for the sake of better grasping the future. The Huangyan Island dispute reflects at a deep level a trial of strength between major powers. Looking from the displays of relevant countries, small countries are not necessarily diplomatic losers, and the “borrow power to use power” way of thinking is probably comprehended by the West. Because of this, faced with external pressure, strengthening and hardening the foundation is still the first thing to be done. In addition, in the treacherous international environment, it’s still necessary to look through the opponent’s strategic intentions, persevere during battle to “show reason” and not “show weakness,” and to ensure a “those upholding justice will find help all around” position.