American Practical Politics
Have you heard of Afghanistan?
I pose this question simply because during the last head-to-head Monday night in Boca Raton, Florida, the two American presidential candidates barely mentioned the subject. It must be said that, 12 days prior, Joe Biden concluded the discussion on this topic by slinging, in an exasperated tone, at his adversary Paul Ryan: “But we are leaving. We are leaving in 2014, period,” before adding: “We're going to be saving over the next 10 years another $800 billion. We've been in this war for over a decade. The primary objective is almost completed. Now all we're doing is putting the Kabul government in a position to be able to maintain their own security. It's their responsibility, not America's.”
So, mission accomplished? Come on. The goals for U.S. involvement were the following: to eliminate the Taliban, definitively remove al-Qaida from the country, establish a viable government and finally set up security forces capable of enforcing law and order. Commentators and analysts are unanimous in recognizing that no point on this roadmap has been met, despite an impressive military deployment of the most powerful country in the world, supported by its allies; despite the hundreds of billions squandered; despite dozens of plans, some honorably ambitious, others simply bizarre, to eradicate poppy cultivation, promote women’s education or hygiene of the populace. Washington will have lost 2,000 of its boys in this asymmetrical confrontation, which has caused additional thousands of injuries. The world has lost its last illusions of the capacity of the only superpower to enforce Pax Americana in the foothills of the Hindu Kush.
On Oct. 13, the influential New York Times didn’t even cause a stir in titling its editorial, “Time to pack up,” which seemed obvious. The observation made by the newspaper was that the withdrawal must be dictated solely by the imperative of safety for our troops; to extend our presence wouldn’t allow us to achieve even the most modest goals set by Barack Obama.
The next occupant of the White House, who will take office on Jan. 20, 2013, must fight to save what they can in this part of the word — supposing that it is still possible. That is to say that in this troubled Pakistan, whether they are maintaining relations with Kabul or the supposedly solid ties with the United States, nothing is clear. Since the mission assigned to the men of the Navy Seals (“kill bin Laden”), the tension between the two countries hasn’t stopped rising. The conclusion to which State Department diplomats and Pentagon strategists have arrived can be summarized as such: We don’t know how to deal with Islamabad. Increasing our aid won’t achieve anything, but neither would threatening to suspend such aid. An American general observed that before the increase of troop forces, close to 2,000 insurgents travelled between the two countries; since then, the number has remained unchanged.
While the eyes of the international community remain fixed on Iran and its nuclear program, the Pakistani atomic arsenal hasn’t stopped developing, to the worries of the major powers. Miniaturized, the bombs are becoming easier to handle and, above all, to launch. It is therefore understandable that the prospect of some of these toys falling into the hands of fierce theological students gives cold sweats to Western intelligence agencies, primarily due to their extremely porous relationship with the direction of Inter-Services Intelligence by Lieutenant-General Zaheer ul-Islam, who replaced Ahmed Shuja Pasha in March this year.
Rather than preemptively attacking this serious problem, America has chosen to avoid the issue. The U.S. is working to repatriate its 68,000 GIs, but is leaving in place a contingent of 15,000 to 25,000 men to support the state. This will give Afghanistan the freedom to make its own decisions while promising (in concert with other countries) a gold mine of $16 billion until 2015. Finally, the decision has been made to continue to train the armed forces of President Hamid Karzaï at the risk of seeing multiplied defections and “green-on-blue attacks” (those recruits who turn their arms against their trainers).
God, the good old colonial wars of yesteryear were good!
I pose this question simply because during the last head-to-head Monday night in Boca Raton, Florida, the two American presidential candidates barely mentioned the subject. It must be said that, 12 days prior, Joe Biden concluded the discussion on this topic by slinging, in an exasperated tone, at his adversary Paul Ryan: “But we are leaving. We are leaving in 2014, period,” before adding: “We're going to be saving over the next 10 years another $800 billion. We've been in this war for over a decade. The primary objective is almost completed. Now all we're doing is putting the Kabul government in a position to be able to maintain their own security. It's their responsibility, not America's.”
So, mission accomplished? Come on. The goals for U.S. involvement were the following: to eliminate the Taliban, definitively remove al-Qaida from the country, establish a viable government and finally set up security forces capable of enforcing law and order. Commentators and analysts are unanimous in recognizing that no point on this roadmap has been met, despite an impressive military deployment of the most powerful country in the world, supported by its allies; despite the hundreds of billions squandered; despite dozens of plans, some honorably ambitious, others simply bizarre, to eradicate poppy cultivation, promote women’s education or hygiene of the populace. Washington will have lost 2,000 of its boys in this asymmetrical confrontation, which has caused additional thousands of injuries. The world has lost its last illusions of the capacity of the only superpower to enforce Pax Americana in the foothills of the Hindu Kush.
On Oct. 13, the influential New York Times didn’t even cause a stir in titling its editorial, “Time to pack up,” which seemed obvious. The observation made by the newspaper was that the withdrawal must be dictated solely by the imperative of safety for our troops; to extend our presence wouldn’t allow us to achieve even the most modest goals set by Barack Obama.
The next occupant of the White House, who will take office on Jan. 20, 2013, must fight to save what they can in this part of the word — supposing that it is still possible. That is to say that in this troubled Pakistan, whether they are maintaining relations with Kabul or the supposedly solid ties with the United States, nothing is clear. Since the mission assigned to the men of the Navy Seals (“kill bin Laden”), the tension between the two countries hasn’t stopped rising. The conclusion to which State Department diplomats and Pentagon strategists have arrived can be summarized as such: We don’t know how to deal with Islamabad. Increasing our aid won’t achieve anything, but neither would threatening to suspend such aid. An American general observed that before the increase of troop forces, close to 2,000 insurgents travelled between the two countries; since then, the number has remained unchanged.
While the eyes of the international community remain fixed on Iran and its nuclear program, the Pakistani atomic arsenal hasn’t stopped developing, to the worries of the major powers. Miniaturized, the bombs are becoming easier to handle and, above all, to launch. It is therefore understandable that the prospect of some of these toys falling into the hands of fierce theological students gives cold sweats to Western intelligence agencies, primarily due to their extremely porous relationship with the direction of Inter-Services Intelligence by Lieutenant-General Zaheer ul-Islam, who replaced Ahmed Shuja Pasha in March this year.
Rather than preemptively attacking this serious problem, America has chosen to avoid the issue. The U.S. is working to repatriate its 68,000 GIs, but is leaving in place a contingent of 15,000 to 25,000 men to support the state. This will give Afghanistan the freedom to make its own decisions while promising (in concert with other countries) a gold mine of $16 billion until 2015. Finally, the decision has been made to continue to train the armed forces of President Hamid Karzaï at the risk of seeing multiplied defections and “green-on-blue attacks” (those recruits who turn their arms against their trainers).
God, the good old colonial wars of yesteryear were good!
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