Xu Shu: Playing the US Card Didn’t Give Abe a Way Out
Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 26 February 2013
by Editorial (link to original)
(China) on 26 February 2013
by Editorial (link to original)
Translated from
by Jingman Xiao .
Edited by Molly Rusk.
Japan had been restless and upset about China’s economic rise when America happened to implement its “Return-to-Asia” scheme — an attempt to contain China. Abe saw this as a great opportunity to enhance the strength of the right wing and end America’s treatment of Japan as the defeated. With the [Japanese] Senate election in July just around the corner, he is trying to reverse the tide of history. Hence, on the one hand, Abe strives to exacerbate the Diaoyu Island situation. On the other hand, he requested a meeting with Obama in the U.S. with genuine urgency and an intention to create a scenario in which the U.S. would intervene and force China to make a concession in its maintenance of national sovereignty. He bet heavily on this plan and met with Obama with absolute confidence, hoping to make some political gains and contain China. However, this diplomatic move turned out to be a fiasco. How did he fail?
First, he miscalculated the post-World War II political situation. Due to the fact that many Asian countries are rising, peaceful cooperation and economic development has become a common aspiration. Any conspiracy to reverse convictions about World War II, to embellish Japan’s history of conquest and to re-engage in militarism would be boycotted collectively by other Asian countries, which without doubt would arouse concern in the U.S.
Second, he misjudged the Obama administration’s political agenda. Obama’s biggest headache is the economy and the hindrance from the Republican Party. Thus, U.S. foreign policy is oriented toward a revitalization of the U.S. economy. The “return to Asia” strategy, after all, is America’s way of capitalizing on the economic rise of Asian countries by occupying and increasing its shares in the Asian market (including the export of ammunition); this could make Obama a leading figure in America’s resurgence and allow him to leave his legacy to posterity.
Third, Abe misjudged the U.S.-Japanese relationship. Since World War II, the U.S. has been controlling Japan due to fear of its resurgence and the possibility that it will start a new war. If the Japanese Constitution were to be changed, it would become extremely difficult for America to control Japan. So, how could America loosen its grip? The U.S. created the Diaoyu Island issue with the intention of causing problems between China and Japan; essentially, the issue impairs the strength of both China and Japan by manipulating Japan and keeping China at bay. The U.S.-Japanese relationship is that of a master and servant. Abe’s visit, however, turned out to be too high profile: He listed his demands before having discussed an agenda with the U.S.; he demanded that the constitution be modified and that Japan exercise the right to collective self-defense. His presumptuous behavior usurped the host’s role. Is America going to be Japan’s servant? Is America going to follow Japan’s instructions? What grace would Obama still have?
Therefore, Obama played a small trick and taught Abe a lesson: A servant shall not treat his master in this manner.
Abe’s reception was very poor by diplomatic standards. First, there was no large-scale official activity — only a working lunch, rather than a big banquet, was organized. Second, there was no large jointly organized press conference outside the White House. Rather, only one took place in Obama’s office with no live broadcast on TV, which deprived Abe of an opportunity to talk to both Japan and the international community. Third, during the conference, Obama was absolutely silent about the Diaoyu Island issue so as not to trigger responses from China and to avoid giving an impression that America supports Japan’s militarism. Fourth, Obama made no compromise regarding the modification of Japan’s Constitution, as this inevitably would cause aversion from the Asian countries that were once victims of Japan’s conquest and would thus ruin the progress of U.S. diplomacy in Asia. America must have been aware that Abe is the troublemaker that obstructs its “return to Asia.”
Under these circumstances, Abe’s U.S. card has proved useless. The only thing he can do is to change his attitude regarding the Diaoyu Islands. As a matter of fact, China’s recent diplomatic activities with America, South Korea and some Southeast Asian countries have already created change and thwarted Abe’s diplomatic effort.
First, he miscalculated the post-World War II political situation. Due to the fact that many Asian countries are rising, peaceful cooperation and economic development has become a common aspiration. Any conspiracy to reverse convictions about World War II, to embellish Japan’s history of conquest and to re-engage in militarism would be boycotted collectively by other Asian countries, which without doubt would arouse concern in the U.S.
Second, he misjudged the Obama administration’s political agenda. Obama’s biggest headache is the economy and the hindrance from the Republican Party. Thus, U.S. foreign policy is oriented toward a revitalization of the U.S. economy. The “return to Asia” strategy, after all, is America’s way of capitalizing on the economic rise of Asian countries by occupying and increasing its shares in the Asian market (including the export of ammunition); this could make Obama a leading figure in America’s resurgence and allow him to leave his legacy to posterity.
Third, Abe misjudged the U.S.-Japanese relationship. Since World War II, the U.S. has been controlling Japan due to fear of its resurgence and the possibility that it will start a new war. If the Japanese Constitution were to be changed, it would become extremely difficult for America to control Japan. So, how could America loosen its grip? The U.S. created the Diaoyu Island issue with the intention of causing problems between China and Japan; essentially, the issue impairs the strength of both China and Japan by manipulating Japan and keeping China at bay. The U.S.-Japanese relationship is that of a master and servant. Abe’s visit, however, turned out to be too high profile: He listed his demands before having discussed an agenda with the U.S.; he demanded that the constitution be modified and that Japan exercise the right to collective self-defense. His presumptuous behavior usurped the host’s role. Is America going to be Japan’s servant? Is America going to follow Japan’s instructions? What grace would Obama still have?
Therefore, Obama played a small trick and taught Abe a lesson: A servant shall not treat his master in this manner.
Abe’s reception was very poor by diplomatic standards. First, there was no large-scale official activity — only a working lunch, rather than a big banquet, was organized. Second, there was no large jointly organized press conference outside the White House. Rather, only one took place in Obama’s office with no live broadcast on TV, which deprived Abe of an opportunity to talk to both Japan and the international community. Third, during the conference, Obama was absolutely silent about the Diaoyu Island issue so as not to trigger responses from China and to avoid giving an impression that America supports Japan’s militarism. Fourth, Obama made no compromise regarding the modification of Japan’s Constitution, as this inevitably would cause aversion from the Asian countries that were once victims of Japan’s conquest and would thus ruin the progress of U.S. diplomacy in Asia. America must have been aware that Abe is the troublemaker that obstructs its “return to Asia.”
Under these circumstances, Abe’s U.S. card has proved useless. The only thing he can do is to change his attitude regarding the Diaoyu Islands. As a matter of fact, China’s recent diplomatic activities with America, South Korea and some Southeast Asian countries have already created change and thwarted Abe’s diplomatic effort.