One Hand Open, One on the Trigger as US Invites China to RIMPAC
Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 2 April 2013
by Editorial (link to original)
(China) on 2 April 2013
by Editorial (link to original)
Translated from
by Nathan Hsu.
Edited by Eva Langman
.
Having received a most generous invitation from the U.S., China will send ships to next year's U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC). However, the air behind this act of magnanimity is thick with wariness and deceit, and it is difficult to imagine that much will come from China's participation.
In the past, RIMPAC has been viewed as an effort by the U.S. at creating an opportunity to rehearse tactics against China and Russia with its allies in Asia and the Pacific. Last year, a total of 22 countries and more than 40 ships participated in what can be called the largest-scale military exercise in the world. The U.S. extended the olive branch to Russia in 2012, and now it is extending it toward China. The Pentagon’s invitation to join next year's RIMPAC seems to imply that China’s status has been bumped up to that of a close strategic ally of the U.S.
However, this is merely a facade. According to current U.S. law, its military cannot engage in any activity with the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] that may harm national security, including holding substantive joint military exercises. This precludes China from being tasked with any role of significance in this round of RIMPAC. In truth, the U.S.-organized RIMPAC is a multi-tiered and segmented affair, with the level and content of exercises determined by how closely aligned one is with the host nation.
For example, core allies such as the U.K., Japan and Australia are permitted combat-level collaboration with the U.S., with each party linking data to quickly transmit information for shared intelligence. The U.S. even allows ships from these countries to use live fire to sink U.S. target ships, thereby gaining real combat experience. Participants from the second tier of countries, such as India and Malaysia, are permitted to familiarize themselves with the U.S. Navy's war methods during the exercises as a preliminary step to establishing a foundation for possible joint action in the future. As for competitor states such as Russia, the U.S. adopts a much more limited approach. Russia is allowed to engage in only the simplest exercises, such as basic convoy maneuvers, anti-piracy exercises, humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief activities. The reception that China will get during its participation will likely be no different than that given Russia last year.
Since China's decision to join RIMPAC, U.S. public opinion has been rife with suspicion about the PLA using the joint military exercise to probe U.S. military secrets, with a multitude of voices crying out for extreme caution toward China and its spies. The Pentagon has claimed that it has prepared itself for every contingency in its defense against secrets being stolen by the Chinese navy. Under this broader context, sending Chinese ships to RIMPAC amounts to little more than providing the U.S. with warm bodies.
Guarding against China even while seeking its increased involvement is the crux of U.S. military policy toward us. But when push comes to shove, it is this air of guardedness that takes precedence, and any engagement from the U.S. is an attempt to nudge the PLA toward a peaceful evolution. U.S. policymaking has always been marked by an implicit mindset: the desire to utilize U.S.-Chinese military exchanges to influence and train a new breed of Chinese soldiers, support their rise to power within the PLA, and in so doing, transform its role from that of the party's army to a national defense force that may act as the foundation for the democratization of China. China understands this well, and the PLA General Political Department pays close attention to the political ramifications of exchanges with the U.S. military. It places special emphasis on discipline in personnel selection and training, as well as taking strict precautions against infiltration and subversion. In a sense, the pretense surrounding the U.S.’ behavior toward China, as well as China's divided opinion of the U.S., is illustrative of the current state of military exchange between the two: half-hearted.
In the past, RIMPAC has been viewed as an effort by the U.S. at creating an opportunity to rehearse tactics against China and Russia with its allies in Asia and the Pacific. Last year, a total of 22 countries and more than 40 ships participated in what can be called the largest-scale military exercise in the world. The U.S. extended the olive branch to Russia in 2012, and now it is extending it toward China. The Pentagon’s invitation to join next year's RIMPAC seems to imply that China’s status has been bumped up to that of a close strategic ally of the U.S.
However, this is merely a facade. According to current U.S. law, its military cannot engage in any activity with the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] that may harm national security, including holding substantive joint military exercises. This precludes China from being tasked with any role of significance in this round of RIMPAC. In truth, the U.S.-organized RIMPAC is a multi-tiered and segmented affair, with the level and content of exercises determined by how closely aligned one is with the host nation.
For example, core allies such as the U.K., Japan and Australia are permitted combat-level collaboration with the U.S., with each party linking data to quickly transmit information for shared intelligence. The U.S. even allows ships from these countries to use live fire to sink U.S. target ships, thereby gaining real combat experience. Participants from the second tier of countries, such as India and Malaysia, are permitted to familiarize themselves with the U.S. Navy's war methods during the exercises as a preliminary step to establishing a foundation for possible joint action in the future. As for competitor states such as Russia, the U.S. adopts a much more limited approach. Russia is allowed to engage in only the simplest exercises, such as basic convoy maneuvers, anti-piracy exercises, humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief activities. The reception that China will get during its participation will likely be no different than that given Russia last year.
Since China's decision to join RIMPAC, U.S. public opinion has been rife with suspicion about the PLA using the joint military exercise to probe U.S. military secrets, with a multitude of voices crying out for extreme caution toward China and its spies. The Pentagon has claimed that it has prepared itself for every contingency in its defense against secrets being stolen by the Chinese navy. Under this broader context, sending Chinese ships to RIMPAC amounts to little more than providing the U.S. with warm bodies.
Guarding against China even while seeking its increased involvement is the crux of U.S. military policy toward us. But when push comes to shove, it is this air of guardedness that takes precedence, and any engagement from the U.S. is an attempt to nudge the PLA toward a peaceful evolution. U.S. policymaking has always been marked by an implicit mindset: the desire to utilize U.S.-Chinese military exchanges to influence and train a new breed of Chinese soldiers, support their rise to power within the PLA, and in so doing, transform its role from that of the party's army to a national defense force that may act as the foundation for the democratization of China. China understands this well, and the PLA General Political Department pays close attention to the political ramifications of exchanges with the U.S. military. It places special emphasis on discipline in personnel selection and training, as well as taking strict precautions against infiltration and subversion. In a sense, the pretense surrounding the U.S.’ behavior toward China, as well as China's divided opinion of the U.S., is illustrative of the current state of military exchange between the two: half-hearted.