US Participation and Messages of Escalation
Published in al-Thawra
(Syria) on 23 April 2013
by Ali Qasim, Editor in Chief (link to original)
(Syria) on 23 April 2013
by Ali Qasim, Editor in Chief (link to original)
Translated from
by David Bishop.
Edited by Lydia Dallett.
The announcement of the meeting between Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and John Kerry in Brussels comes without preamble, once again bringing up several questions that have been put off. Most of these questions have nothing to do with the factors that necessitated the hasty meeting. Rather they have to do with the motives that propel U.S. politics and pushed Kerry to add an appointment to his agenda, requiring a telephone call on the morning of his direct, public alignment with the friends of terrorism in Istanbul.
On the Russian side, there were no suggestions of any cause for a meeting of this kind. Perhaps, while it was not included in the Russian calculus at the moment, it was a suitable opportunity for Russia to remind everyone of the framework governing its approach to solving the crisis in Syria.
Those questions may seem legitimate from more than one angle, since the papers Kerry is carrying seem to be a burden that weighs on him more than they make things easier for him. He was exaggerated in his rush to carry the papers all at once and he was rash in holding onto the burned ones — flames continue to burn on some of them while inside his briefcase. They bring up ambiguity in the present U.S. effort and its direction.
It is not hard to see the connection between the American messages that led up to the meeting regarding the increase of U.S. aid to the terrorists or the armament deals — which the U.S. secretary of defense is so proud of after his first survey of the region. He is proud of the plans that were made for them; since the United States working on various and even contradictory fronts, it is nothing new or outside of what is normal.
For if the U.S. administration goes on at great length explaining this coincidence’s significance, Kerry will remain incapable of providing a logical interpretation of this direct and open involvement in a multifaceted relationship with terrorism on one hand and of his egging on hotheads in Israel and its empty foster child in the sheikhdoms of the Gulf on the other. This all comes at the same time that the administration wants to convince the world that it is in fact serious about looking for political solutions as quickly as possible.
We hope that the Russian impression of the United States will correspond to what Kerry will bring up today, and that it's convincing. We hope this despite the fact that U.S. behavior does not point toward this but rather contradicts it. U.S. warmongering leaves no room for doubt about its feverish effort in another direction. Even this effort fits into the framework of improving the conditions under which America will come to the table.
Therefore, the Russian warning to the unaware European countries that are vying to lift the ban on equipping the terrorists with weapons may necessitate a similar warning to the Americans: The hand stretched out to help the terrorists cannot work together with the hand open to a political solution. And even their European partners, fearful for their seat among the ranks of the terrorists’ friends, are not out of the equation, whether they postpone lifting the ban on sending weapons or go in the direction of stealing Syrian oil. There is no difference as long as their armaments get into the hands of the terrorists by circumstances of their making. What applies to the original also goes for the partner because playing against time — a tactic which they relied on to gain more cards and to participate in their own approach to terrorism — did not accomplish what they wanted. The circumstances of their mercenaries and terrorists, crying out for help, are the evidence.
In any case, the Americans realize that the calculations for “planting the field” of their mercenaries and their agents did not apply to any “yield” of the friends of terrorism and that what they were unable to do in Istanbul they will not be able to make up for in Brussels. Even more, what they lost there will double here, and what they failed to get passed under colorful titles will not be able to make it through Russian channels, which are counting the Americans’ errors and recording its mistakes, missteps and the accumulation of its weak spots until the time comes for true participation on the basis of weaknesses and strengths.
On the Russian side, there were no suggestions of any cause for a meeting of this kind. Perhaps, while it was not included in the Russian calculus at the moment, it was a suitable opportunity for Russia to remind everyone of the framework governing its approach to solving the crisis in Syria.
Those questions may seem legitimate from more than one angle, since the papers Kerry is carrying seem to be a burden that weighs on him more than they make things easier for him. He was exaggerated in his rush to carry the papers all at once and he was rash in holding onto the burned ones — flames continue to burn on some of them while inside his briefcase. They bring up ambiguity in the present U.S. effort and its direction.
It is not hard to see the connection between the American messages that led up to the meeting regarding the increase of U.S. aid to the terrorists or the armament deals — which the U.S. secretary of defense is so proud of after his first survey of the region. He is proud of the plans that were made for them; since the United States working on various and even contradictory fronts, it is nothing new or outside of what is normal.
For if the U.S. administration goes on at great length explaining this coincidence’s significance, Kerry will remain incapable of providing a logical interpretation of this direct and open involvement in a multifaceted relationship with terrorism on one hand and of his egging on hotheads in Israel and its empty foster child in the sheikhdoms of the Gulf on the other. This all comes at the same time that the administration wants to convince the world that it is in fact serious about looking for political solutions as quickly as possible.
We hope that the Russian impression of the United States will correspond to what Kerry will bring up today, and that it's convincing. We hope this despite the fact that U.S. behavior does not point toward this but rather contradicts it. U.S. warmongering leaves no room for doubt about its feverish effort in another direction. Even this effort fits into the framework of improving the conditions under which America will come to the table.
Therefore, the Russian warning to the unaware European countries that are vying to lift the ban on equipping the terrorists with weapons may necessitate a similar warning to the Americans: The hand stretched out to help the terrorists cannot work together with the hand open to a political solution. And even their European partners, fearful for their seat among the ranks of the terrorists’ friends, are not out of the equation, whether they postpone lifting the ban on sending weapons or go in the direction of stealing Syrian oil. There is no difference as long as their armaments get into the hands of the terrorists by circumstances of their making. What applies to the original also goes for the partner because playing against time — a tactic which they relied on to gain more cards and to participate in their own approach to terrorism — did not accomplish what they wanted. The circumstances of their mercenaries and terrorists, crying out for help, are the evidence.
In any case, the Americans realize that the calculations for “planting the field” of their mercenaries and their agents did not apply to any “yield” of the friends of terrorism and that what they were unable to do in Istanbul they will not be able to make up for in Brussels. Even more, what they lost there will double here, and what they failed to get passed under colorful titles will not be able to make it through Russian channels, which are counting the Americans’ errors and recording its mistakes, missteps and the accumulation of its weak spots until the time comes for true participation on the basis of weaknesses and strengths.