America in Syria
Bashar al-Assad was likely correct when he told Lebanese visitors several weeks ago that Americans are pragmatic and in the end they’ll side with the winner. His long-time opponent Riad al-Turk didn’t avoid the facts either, saying several months ago that U.S. and Russian positions on the uprising in his country were the same, but the Americans were smarter than the Russians. In truth, for the Obama administration to fall upon a clear and coherent position on Syria at present would be challenging, and it could be said that Zionists in the government—in intelligence, the White House and the State Department—are pleased by the situation Syria is tangled in. If its military, society, abilities, potential and civilization are shattered at the hands of its own people, it won’t be a source of delight for the United States to have this Arab country, so pivotal in position and role, in an incomprehensible conflict that Syria will need decades to recover from.
Here the Israeli dimension shouldn’t be ignored. It’s always present in the policies of the world’s greatest countries, and the ruling coalition in Tel Aviv, made up of Likud and diverse others, approves of the continuing destruction in Syria and longs for a never-ending conflict where the Syrian army wages war, with artillery, mortars, war planes, barrel bombs and sarin gas, against citizens and rebels, civilians and militants.
Supporters of the Assad regime who repeat cant about the opposition government, aiming at a grand cosmic conspiracy, are capable of extracting from Washington’s inability to force Moscow to back down from their position that they are instead settling down in the Russian position, particularly in preparations for the Geneva conference, in which the views of the Kremlin and the White House don’t appear very different. Observers can see more American deception over the course of the ordeal in Syria, ever since Obama delayed calling for Bashar al-Assad to leave power. These words later ensured they could sell the illusion of helping, while waiting for the crisis to resolve itself spontaneously. In the meantime, Washington hasn’t seemed enthusiastic about imposing a no-fly zone on the regime, a measure demanded by the armed opposition, who feel that this type of ban would cause thousands of civilians to rise up and help change the equation on the ground. Since Washington declined to meet the demand to impose a buffer zone in the north, it has become a fait accompli through the bold sacrifices of the rebels and the Free Army. When the U.S. successfully restrained London and Paris’ sudden move toward arming two opposition militias, this justified concluding that America’s decision is, in essence, Israel’s—not trying to reach a quick settlement or applauding the opposition’s early victories, not resisting the continuation of the Assad regime, exhausted and staggering, for as long as possible.
The U.S. isn’t certain what kind of regime will spring up in Syria after the Assad family is deposed, and Israel isn’t totally confident that the peace enjoyed by the Golan Heights since the ceasefire of 1974 will continue after the ruling family in Damascus is removed. The clear appearance of extremism in the armed opposition is concerning, and in the story of Jabhat al-Nusra, Washington found a pretext for passing off all the demands that arose for aid to key elements of the armed opposition. The poor performance by the leaders of the coalition or its predecessor, the National Council, was followed by justifications for its lack of clear commitment when pursuing the Assad problem in the political solution they’ve determined to cook up in Geneva. What they cook up there will be Russian in preparation and ingredients, with the aroma of America’s need for presentation and self-promotion.
Here the Israeli dimension shouldn’t be ignored. It’s always present in the policies of the world’s greatest countries, and the ruling coalition in Tel Aviv, made up of Likud and diverse others, approves of the continuing destruction in Syria and longs for a never-ending conflict where the Syrian army wages war, with artillery, mortars, war planes, barrel bombs and sarin gas, against citizens and rebels, civilians and militants.
Supporters of the Assad regime who repeat cant about the opposition government, aiming at a grand cosmic conspiracy, are capable of extracting from Washington’s inability to force Moscow to back down from their position that they are instead settling down in the Russian position, particularly in preparations for the Geneva conference, in which the views of the Kremlin and the White House don’t appear very different. Observers can see more American deception over the course of the ordeal in Syria, ever since Obama delayed calling for Bashar al-Assad to leave power. These words later ensured they could sell the illusion of helping, while waiting for the crisis to resolve itself spontaneously. In the meantime, Washington hasn’t seemed enthusiastic about imposing a no-fly zone on the regime, a measure demanded by the armed opposition, who feel that this type of ban would cause thousands of civilians to rise up and help change the equation on the ground. Since Washington declined to meet the demand to impose a buffer zone in the north, it has become a fait accompli through the bold sacrifices of the rebels and the Free Army. When the U.S. successfully restrained London and Paris’ sudden move toward arming two opposition militias, this justified concluding that America’s decision is, in essence, Israel’s—not trying to reach a quick settlement or applauding the opposition’s early victories, not resisting the continuation of the Assad regime, exhausted and staggering, for as long as possible.
The U.S. isn’t certain what kind of regime will spring up in Syria after the Assad family is deposed, and Israel isn’t totally confident that the peace enjoyed by the Golan Heights since the ceasefire of 1974 will continue after the ruling family in Damascus is removed. The clear appearance of extremism in the armed opposition is concerning, and in the story of Jabhat al-Nusra, Washington found a pretext for passing off all the demands that arose for aid to key elements of the armed opposition. The poor performance by the leaders of the coalition or its predecessor, the National Council, was followed by justifications for its lack of clear commitment when pursuing the Assad problem in the political solution they’ve determined to cook up in Geneva. What they cook up there will be Russian in preparation and ingredients, with the aroma of America’s need for presentation and self-promotion.