The Taliban: Complicated Guys
Karzai, Taliban, U.S., Qatar: These four words recently started to appear in the news. Against the backdrop of the G-8 summit and interest in the “will Syria be handed over or not?” theme, news about Afghanistan didn’t seem worthy of interest — for good reason.
The United States is pulling out its contingent. The question has been decided; even the party of war in the U.S. is no longer grumbling about it. Against the backdrop of budget cuts and cutting back military spending, maintaining such a large deployment for an incomprehensible goal is a bit too luxurious. Besides, American imperialists are seriously beginning to worry that American troops, sitting in Afghanistan, do not have the capabilities to react to the real threats that are heavily upsetting America — like Syria, for example.
In general, no one is arguing about troop withdrawal. The conversation has already turned to what will happen after withdrawal. Americans are pragmatically taking assessment of Afghan perspectives after withdrawal and have come to a clear-cut conclusion: Depending on Karzai as their personal marionette is wishful thinking. His chances of maintaining order are less than the Soviet-backed Najibullah, who successfully fought off the Seven Party, who to this day would have done the same thing and not have sold it in the beginning to Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, or to Yeltsin.
This is why it is necessary to have a conversation with those who most likely will take over power in a post-American Afghanistan — meaning the Taliban.
The Taliban are opening up a representative office in Qatar. Considering that Qatar is simply the back gate to the American al-Udeid Air Base and Americans alone will very rudely bring about a change in leadership in this Gulf superpower, it is safe to say that the Taliban have thus opened up a representative office in the United States. Is there really a sign hanging on the office door, accented in a neutral way, like some kind of “political office”?
The BBC reports that the Taliban and the Americans will begin direct talks soon. Undoubtedly none of this pleases Karzai, whom they’ve openly written off. Reminiscent of the fate of Najibullah, the Afghan president’s anxiety is understandable.
Karzai, pounding his fist on the table, demands that the United States undertake negotiations with the Taliban only under his order. However, the Taliban have long said that they consider Karzai an American marionette — and, more than likely, here they are absolutely correct — and they see no reason to speak with this lackey, preferring instead to speak directly to the master. From a cynical point of view, this position makes perfect sense.
Karzai’s problem is that he already fell into the American political grindstone a long time ago, and he can’t get out of it. The corruption in his administration startles even the Americans, who themselves are pecking at the budget and drug trafficking at an accelerated pace.
Therefore, any movement that Karzai makes in the wrong direction could be, at any moment, gently corrected into the unenviable fate bestowed upon a corrupt war criminal, since most of the crimes committed in Afghanistan are committed by security forces. In the press there are all sorts of wild stories about cutting off the ears of NATO forces as souvenirs or prisoners being caught on camera while answering the call of nature. However, Karzai’s men aren’t much better; it’s just that for them, the Internet has not yet become a part of life. In case of emergency, the regime could turn into a bloody mess in a flash, trampling on human values. Actually, the millions of bills that Karzai — and his people — have are also tangible and serve as another rope around his neck.
For this reason Karzai’s fate is virtually spelled out; his fluttering is purely of a reflexive manner. Americans are understanding of the nervous spasms of their subordinate and do not comment on them.
However, with the preparations for negotiations underway, the main problem for the Americans is that the Taliban are complicated guys. They are definitely not accommodating, and they completely understand that the Americans really have no way out — no matter what, they are still leaving the country. This has given the Taliban the opportunity to negotiate significant concessions. For this reason only, before the official part, as usual, there are behind-the-scenes explanations of preconditions. From all appearances, the conditions are not very acceptable to the Americans; for this reason they are dragging out the negotiations.
The United States is pulling out its contingent. The question has been decided; even the party of war in the U.S. is no longer grumbling about it. Against the backdrop of budget cuts and cutting back military spending, maintaining such a large deployment for an incomprehensible goal is a bit too luxurious. Besides, American imperialists are seriously beginning to worry that American troops, sitting in Afghanistan, do not have the capabilities to react to the real threats that are heavily upsetting America — like Syria, for example.
In general, no one is arguing about troop withdrawal. The conversation has already turned to what will happen after withdrawal. Americans are pragmatically taking assessment of Afghan perspectives after withdrawal and have come to a clear-cut conclusion: Depending on Karzai as their personal marionette is wishful thinking. His chances of maintaining order are less than the Soviet-backed Najibullah, who successfully fought off the Seven Party, who to this day would have done the same thing and not have sold it in the beginning to Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, or to Yeltsin.
This is why it is necessary to have a conversation with those who most likely will take over power in a post-American Afghanistan — meaning the Taliban.
The Taliban are opening up a representative office in Qatar. Considering that Qatar is simply the back gate to the American al-Udeid Air Base and Americans alone will very rudely bring about a change in leadership in this Gulf superpower, it is safe to say that the Taliban have thus opened up a representative office in the United States. Is there really a sign hanging on the office door, accented in a neutral way, like some kind of “political office”?
The BBC reports that the Taliban and the Americans will begin direct talks soon. Undoubtedly none of this pleases Karzai, whom they’ve openly written off. Reminiscent of the fate of Najibullah, the Afghan president’s anxiety is understandable.
Karzai, pounding his fist on the table, demands that the United States undertake negotiations with the Taliban only under his order. However, the Taliban have long said that they consider Karzai an American marionette — and, more than likely, here they are absolutely correct — and they see no reason to speak with this lackey, preferring instead to speak directly to the master. From a cynical point of view, this position makes perfect sense.
Karzai’s problem is that he already fell into the American political grindstone a long time ago, and he can’t get out of it. The corruption in his administration startles even the Americans, who themselves are pecking at the budget and drug trafficking at an accelerated pace.
Therefore, any movement that Karzai makes in the wrong direction could be, at any moment, gently corrected into the unenviable fate bestowed upon a corrupt war criminal, since most of the crimes committed in Afghanistan are committed by security forces. In the press there are all sorts of wild stories about cutting off the ears of NATO forces as souvenirs or prisoners being caught on camera while answering the call of nature. However, Karzai’s men aren’t much better; it’s just that for them, the Internet has not yet become a part of life. In case of emergency, the regime could turn into a bloody mess in a flash, trampling on human values. Actually, the millions of bills that Karzai — and his people — have are also tangible and serve as another rope around his neck.
For this reason Karzai’s fate is virtually spelled out; his fluttering is purely of a reflexive manner. Americans are understanding of the nervous spasms of their subordinate and do not comment on them.
However, with the preparations for negotiations underway, the main problem for the Americans is that the Taliban are complicated guys. They are definitely not accommodating, and they completely understand that the Americans really have no way out — no matter what, they are still leaving the country. This has given the Taliban the opportunity to negotiate significant concessions. For this reason only, before the official part, as usual, there are behind-the-scenes explanations of preconditions. From all appearances, the conditions are not very acceptable to the Americans; for this reason they are dragging out the negotiations.