What Does Kerry Want from the Palestinians?
Published in Al Quds
(Jordan) on 3 July 2013
by Yasser Al-Za’atara (link to original)
(Jordan) on 3 July 2013
by Yasser Al-Za’atara (link to original)
Translated from
by Kristine Anderson.
Edited by Natalie Clager.
Prior to assuming his current position, Secretary of State John Kerry had not devoted much attention to any matter as deserving of concern as Palestine, excepting perhaps Syria. Yet he now sits for days in the region on his fifth tour within months.
The question at hand here relates to the actual purpose of Kerry’s tours, namely whether they are representative of U.S. policy or fulfilling the needs of the Zionist entity. The answer is that Obama’s African tour is more representative of the U.S. administration’s focus in upcoming stages, his visit being a blockade against the rise of China. Meanwhile Washington’s interference in the Middle East is nothing more than pandering to the Zionist entity, whose U.S. lobby exerts great pressure stateside, making its security a priority for any administration regardless of political orientation.
As for the matter of intervention in Syria, it falls within the same framework of Tel Aviv’s interests; at the same time, it appears to be a kind of bickering with Russia, which has recently raised its head in defiance of U.S. power. Russia is cooperating, in this regard, with China to further cement a rebellion against U.S. unilateralism, which, from an intellectual standpoint, has become a thing of the past.
What Kerry, and indeed any political novice, will realize about the Palestinian issue is that the likelihood that resuming negotiations would lead to a final agreement is a chimera. The Israeli contingent is not at all willing to present an acceptable offer, and the Palestinian faction is not amenable to accepting an offer even more measly than what it rejected at Camp David in 2000.
Anyone who reads the infamous notes from this negotiation, which contain the appalling concessions that were bilaterally rejected by Olmert and Livni, will be certain that a final agreement is impossible. Kerry, Netanyahu and even Mahmoud Abbas all realize this, and it appears that all have colluded [to elect] one lone solution, with no other on the horizon. It is a temporary solution, unanimously favored by the Israeli factions, which the authority accepts and supports on the ground — but this is not openly acknowledged.
The basic aim of all these political moves is to sustain hope that some sort of progress will be made. This is in apprehension of an explosive new intifada that would hinder controlling Palestine. The possibility of an intifada is not ruled out by numerous Israeli circles, and they are exerting all possible effort to prevent it. The efforts are shared by Palestinian Authority leadership, which sees a new intifada as an existential danger threatening its power and national gains in the West Bank.
The result is that the Israeli and Palestinian factions each have an interest in continuing to suggest the possibility of a solution. This prevents any dire consequences that would result from a new uprising, which is inevitable in light of continuing settlement-building and the spread of Judaism in Palestinian lands.
In this context the security collaboration continues, along with daily arrests on the part of the occupation authorities; additionally, there is the re-forming of consciousness in the West Bank via investments, money and jobs, as well as crackdowns on any outlets linked to resistance ideation. All this is toward the purpose of preventing an intifada, even one in the peaceful manner of the Arab Spring.
Perhaps Kerry wishes to bring both factions back to the negotiation table as part of a plan to prevent an uprising. But Netanyahu wants negotiation on his own terms, which complicates the matter. It is not improbable that the dilemma will eventually be overcome, not for the sake of arriving at a final agreement, but rather to carry out the agenda of a temporary nation within the borders of the barrier. This will deteriorate into a border conflict with neighboring Palestine, without the leadership being forced to say it has conceded. Then it will be grand to celebrate later when, in a solemn ceremony, that nation goes from U.N. observer status to a permanent member.
The Palestinian people will thwart this little game through a new intifada, which will one day erupt in response to the settlements and the increasing spread of Judaism, and perhaps subsequently in response to the consecration of the temporary nation within the barrier. This will signify the unspoken burial of the issue, for what is happening now, and what will come to pass, will not be accepted by a great populace that has spent decades struggling for its freedom and the liberation of its land.
The question at hand here relates to the actual purpose of Kerry’s tours, namely whether they are representative of U.S. policy or fulfilling the needs of the Zionist entity. The answer is that Obama’s African tour is more representative of the U.S. administration’s focus in upcoming stages, his visit being a blockade against the rise of China. Meanwhile Washington’s interference in the Middle East is nothing more than pandering to the Zionist entity, whose U.S. lobby exerts great pressure stateside, making its security a priority for any administration regardless of political orientation.
As for the matter of intervention in Syria, it falls within the same framework of Tel Aviv’s interests; at the same time, it appears to be a kind of bickering with Russia, which has recently raised its head in defiance of U.S. power. Russia is cooperating, in this regard, with China to further cement a rebellion against U.S. unilateralism, which, from an intellectual standpoint, has become a thing of the past.
What Kerry, and indeed any political novice, will realize about the Palestinian issue is that the likelihood that resuming negotiations would lead to a final agreement is a chimera. The Israeli contingent is not at all willing to present an acceptable offer, and the Palestinian faction is not amenable to accepting an offer even more measly than what it rejected at Camp David in 2000.
Anyone who reads the infamous notes from this negotiation, which contain the appalling concessions that were bilaterally rejected by Olmert and Livni, will be certain that a final agreement is impossible. Kerry, Netanyahu and even Mahmoud Abbas all realize this, and it appears that all have colluded [to elect] one lone solution, with no other on the horizon. It is a temporary solution, unanimously favored by the Israeli factions, which the authority accepts and supports on the ground — but this is not openly acknowledged.
The basic aim of all these political moves is to sustain hope that some sort of progress will be made. This is in apprehension of an explosive new intifada that would hinder controlling Palestine. The possibility of an intifada is not ruled out by numerous Israeli circles, and they are exerting all possible effort to prevent it. The efforts are shared by Palestinian Authority leadership, which sees a new intifada as an existential danger threatening its power and national gains in the West Bank.
The result is that the Israeli and Palestinian factions each have an interest in continuing to suggest the possibility of a solution. This prevents any dire consequences that would result from a new uprising, which is inevitable in light of continuing settlement-building and the spread of Judaism in Palestinian lands.
In this context the security collaboration continues, along with daily arrests on the part of the occupation authorities; additionally, there is the re-forming of consciousness in the West Bank via investments, money and jobs, as well as crackdowns on any outlets linked to resistance ideation. All this is toward the purpose of preventing an intifada, even one in the peaceful manner of the Arab Spring.
Perhaps Kerry wishes to bring both factions back to the negotiation table as part of a plan to prevent an uprising. But Netanyahu wants negotiation on his own terms, which complicates the matter. It is not improbable that the dilemma will eventually be overcome, not for the sake of arriving at a final agreement, but rather to carry out the agenda of a temporary nation within the borders of the barrier. This will deteriorate into a border conflict with neighboring Palestine, without the leadership being forced to say it has conceded. Then it will be grand to celebrate later when, in a solemn ceremony, that nation goes from U.N. observer status to a permanent member.
The Palestinian people will thwart this little game through a new intifada, which will one day erupt in response to the settlements and the increasing spread of Judaism, and perhaps subsequently in response to the consecration of the temporary nation within the barrier. This will signify the unspoken burial of the issue, for what is happening now, and what will come to pass, will not be accepted by a great populace that has spent decades struggling for its freedom and the liberation of its land.